Bava Kamma — Daf 34b

תם חמור ממועד

וכי תימא הכי נמי כדתנן ר' יהודה אומר תם חייב ומועד פטור אימר דשמעת ליה לרבי יהודה לענין שמירה דכתיבי קראי לענין תשלומין מי שמעת ליה

והתניא רבי יהודה אומר יכול שור שוה מנה שנגח שור שוה חמש סלעים והנבילה יפה סלע זה נוטל חצי החי וחצי המת וזה נוטל חצי החי וחצי המת

אמרת וכי מועד למה יוצא להחמיר עליו או להקל עליו הוי אומר להחמיר עליו ומה מועד אינו משלם אלא מה שהזיק תם הקל לא כ"ש

אלא א"ר יוחנן שבח נבילה איכא בינייהו דמ"ס דניזק הוי ומ"ס פלגא

והיינו דקא קשיא ליה לר"י השתא דאמרת חס רחמנא עילויה דמזיק דשקיל בשבחא יכול שור שוה חמש סלעים שנגח שור שוה מנה והנבילה יפה חמשים זוז זה נוטל חצי החי וחצי המת וזה נוטל חצי החי וחצי המת

אמרת היכן מצינו מזיק נשכר שזה נשכר ואומר (שמות כא, לו) שלם ישלם בעלים משלמין ואין בעלים נוטלין

מאי ואומר וכי תימא הני מילי היכא דאיכא פסידא לניזק אבל היכא דליכא פסידא לניזק כגון שור שוה חמש סלעים שנגח שור שוה חמש סלעים והנבילה יפה שלשים זוז שקיל נמי מזיק בשבחא

ואומר שלם ישלם בעלים משלמין ואין בעלים נוטלין

א"ל רב אחא בר תחליפא לרבא א"כ מצינו לרבי יהודה תם משלם יותר מחצי נזק והתורה אמרה (שמות כא, לה) ומכרו את השור החי וחצו את כספו

אית ליה לר"י פחת שפחתה מיתה מחצין בחי

מנא ליה (שמות כא, לה) מוגם את המת יחצון והא אפקיה ר' יהודה לזה נוטל חצי החי וחצי המת וזה נוטל חצי החי וחצי המת

א"כ נכתוב קרא ואת המת מאי וגם ש"מ תרתי:

מתני׳ יש חייב על מעשה שורו ופטור על מעשה עצמו פטור על מעשה שורו וחייב על מעשה עצמו

כיצד שורו שבייש פטור והוא שבייש חייב שורו שסימא את עין עבדו והפיל את שינו פטור והוא שסימא את עין עבדו והפיל את שינו חייב

שורו שחבל באביו ובאמו חייב והוא שחבל באביו ואמו פטור שורו שהדליק את הגדיש בשבת חייב והוא שהדליק את הגדיש בשבת פטור מפני שהוא מתחייב בנפשו:

גמ׳ תני רבי אבהו קמיה דרבי יוחנן כל המקלקלין פטורין חוץ מחובל ומבעיר א"ל פוק תני לברא חובל ומבעיר אינה משנה ואם תימצי לומר משנה חובל בצריך לכלבו מבעיר בצריך לאפרו

תנן שורו שהדליק את הגדיש בשבת חייב והוא שהדליק את הגדיש בשבת פטור וקתני הוא דומיא דשורו מה שורו דלא קבעי ליה

[injury by] Tam would involve a more severe penalty than [injury by] Mu'ad?  And should you maintain that this indeed is so,  as we have learned: R. Judah says: In the case of Tam there is liability [where the precaution taken to control the ox has not been adequate] whereas in the case of Mu'ad there is no liability,  it may be contended that you only heard R. Judah maintaining this with reference to precaution, which is specified in Scripture,  but did you ever hear him say this regarding compensation? Moreover, it has been taught: R. Judah says: One might say that where an ox of the value of a maneh [a hundred zuz] gored an ox of the value of five sela' [i.e., twenty zuz] and the carcass was worth a sela' [i.e., four zuz], one party should get half of the living ox  together with half of the dead ox  and the other party should similarly get half of the living ox and half of the dead ox?  [This cannot be so]; for we reason thus: Has Mu'ad been singled out  to entail a more severe penalty or a more lenient one? You must surely say: [to entail] a more severe penalty. Now, if in the case of Mu'ad no payment is made but for the amount of the damage, should this not the more so be true in the case of Tam the [penalty in respect of which is] less severe?  — R. Johanan therefore said: The practical difference between them  arises where there has been an increase in the value of the carcass, one Master  maintaining that it will accrue to the plaintiff whereas the other Master holds that it will be shared equally [by the two parties]. And it is just on account of this view that a difficulty was felt by R. Judah: Now that you say that the Divine Law is lenient to the defendant, allowing him to share in the increase [of the value of the carcass], you might then presume that where an ox of the value of five sela' [i.e. twenty zuz] gored an ox of the value of a maneh [a hundred zuz] and the carcass was valued at fifty zuz, one party would take half of the living ox  together with half of the dead ox  and the other party would similarly take half of the living ox and half of the dead ox?  Say [this cannot be so, for] where could it elsewhere be found that an offender should [by order of the Court] be made to benefit as you would have the offender here in this case to benefit? It is moreover stated, He shall surely make restitution,  [emphasising that] the offender could only have to pay but never to receive payment. Why that additional quotation?  — [Otherwise] you might have thought this principle to be confined only to a case where the plaintiff was the loser,  and that where no loss would be incurred to the plaintiff — as e.g. where an ox of the value of five sela' gored an ox similarly of the value of five sela' [i.e. twenty zuz] and it so happened that the carcass [increased in value and] reached the amount of thirty zuz — the defendant should indeed be entitled to share in the profit;  hence the verse, He shall surely make full restitution, is adduced [to emphasise that in all cases] an offender could only have to pay but never to receive payment. But R. Aha b. Tahlifa said to Raba: If so [that the principle to compensate by half for the decrease in value brought about by the death is maintained only by R. Meir], will it not be found that according to R. Judah Tam will involve the payment of more than half damages,  whereas the Torah [emphatically] stated, And they shall sell the live ox and divide the money of it? — [No;] R. Judah also holds that the decrease in value brought about by the death will be [compensated] by half in the body of the living ox.  Whence could he derive this?  — From [the verse], And the dead ox also they shall divide.  But did not R. Judah derive from this verse that one party will take half of the living ox together with half of the dead ox and the other party will similarly take half of the living ox and half of the dead ox?  — If that were all, the text could have run, 'And the dead ox [they shall divide].' Why insert 'also'? It shows that two lessons are to be derived from the verse. MISHNAH. THERE ARE CASES WHERE THERE IS LIABILITY FOR OFFENCES COMMITTED BY ONE'S CATTLE  THOUGH THERE WOULD BE NO LIABILITY SHOULD THESE OFFENCES BE COMMITTED BY ONESELF. THERE ARE, AGAIN, CASES WHERE THERE IS NO LIABILITY FOR OFFENCES COMMITTED BY ONE'S CATTLE  THOUGH THERE WOULD BE LIABILITY WERE THESE OFFENCES COMMITTED BY ONESELF. FOR INSTANCE, IF CATTLE HAS BROUGHT INDIGNITY [UPON A HUMAN BEING] THERE IS NO LIABILITY,  WHEREAS IF THE OWNER CAUSES THE INDIGNITY THERE WOULD BE LIABILITY.  SO ALSO IF AN OX PUTS OUT THE EYE OF THE OWNER'S SLAVE OR KNOCKS OUT HIS TOOTH THERE IS NO LIABILITY,  WHEREAS IF THE OWNER HIMSELF HAS PUT OUT THE EYE OF HIS SLAVE OR KNOCKED OUT HIS TOOTH HE WOULD BE LIABLE [TO LET HIM GO FREE].  AGAIN, IF AN OX HAS INJURED THE FATHER OR MOTHER OF THE OWNER THERE IS LIABILITY,  THOUGH WERE THE OWNER HIMSELF TO INJURE HIS FATHER OR HIS MOTHER  THERE WOULD BE NO [CIVIL] LIABILITY.  SO ALSO WHERE CATTLE HAS CAUSED FIRE TO BE SET TO A BARN ON THE DAY OF SABBATH THERE IS LIABILITY,  WHEREAS WERE THE OWNER TO SET FIRE TO A BARN ON SABBATH  THERE WOULD BE NO [CIVIL] LIABILITY, AS HE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO A CAPITAL CHARGE. GEMARA. R. Abbahu recited in the presence of R. Johanan:  Any work [on the Sabbath] that has a destructive purpose entails no penalty [for the violation of the Sabbath], with the exception, however, of the act of inflicting a bodily injury, as also of the act of setting on fire. Said R. Johanan to him: Go and recite this outside  [for the exception made of] the act of inflicting a bodily injury and of setting on fire is not part of the teaching; and should you find grounds for maintaining that it is,  [you may say that] the infliction of a bodily injury refers to where the blood was required to feed a dog;  and in the case of setting on fire, where there was some need of the ashes. We have learnt: WHERE CATTLE HAS CAUSED FIRE TO BE SET TO A BARN ON THE DAY OF SABBATH THERE IS LIABILITY, WHEREAS WERE THE OWNER TO HAVE SET FIRE TO A BARN ON SABBATH THERE WOULD BE NO [CIVIL] LIABILITY. Now, the act of the owner is here placed on a level with that of Cattle; which would show, would it not, that just as in the act of Cattle there was certainly no intention to satisfy any need,