Bava Kamma — Daf 34a

ואפילו הזיק עד שלא חב בעל חוב קדים ש"מ ב"ח מאוחר שקדם וגבה מה שגבה לא גבה

לא לעולם אימא לך מה שגבה גבה ושאני התם דא"ל אילו גבך הוה לא מינך הוה גבי ליה דהאי תורא דאזקן מיניה משתלמנא:

ת"ר שור שוה מאתים שנגח שור שוה מאתים וחבל בו בחמשים זוז ושבח ועמד על ארבע מאות זוז שאלמלא (לא) הזיקו היה עומד על שמנה מאות זוז נותן כשעת הנזק

כחש כשעת העמדה בדין

שבח מזיק נותן לו כשעת הנזק כחש כשעת העמדה בדין

אמר מר שבח מזיק נותן כשעת הנזק מני ר' ישמעאל היא דאמר בעל חוב הוא וזוזי הוא דמסיק ליה

אימא סיפא כחש כשעת העמדה בדין אתאן לר"ע דאמר שותפי נינהו רישא רבי ישמעאל וסיפא ר"ע

לא כולה ר"ע היא והכא במאי עסקינן כשפיטמו

אי כשפיטמו אימא רישא שבח ועמד על ד' מאות זוז נותן לו כשעת הנזק אי כשפיטמו צריכא למימר

אמר רב פפא רישא משכחת לה בין דפטמה פטומי בין דשבחא ממילא ואצטריך לאשמועינן דהיכא דשבחא ממילא נותן לו כשעת הנזק סיפא לא משכחת לה אלא כשפטמו

כחש כשעת העמדה בדין כחש מחמת מאי אילימא דכחשא מחמת מלאכה לימא ליה את מכחשת ואנא יהיבנא

אמר רב אשי דכחש מחמת מכה דא"ל קרנא דתורך קבירא ביה:

מתני׳ שור שוה מאתים שנגח שור שוה מאתים ואין הנבילה יפה כלום אמר ר"מ על זה נאמר (שמות כא, לה) ומכרו את השור החי וחצו את כספו

א"ל רבי יהודה וכן הלכה קיימת ומכרו את השור החי וחצו את כספו ולא קיימת וגם המת יחצון ואיזה זה שור שוה מאתים שנגח שור שוה מאתים והנבילה יפה חמשים זוז שזה נוטל חצי החי וחצי המת וזה נוטל חצי החי וחצי המת:

גמ׳ ת"ר שור שוה מאתים שנגח שור שוה מאתים והנבילה יפה חמשים זוז זה נוטל חצי החי וחצי המת וזה נוטל חצי החי וחצי המת וזהו שור האמור בתורה דברי רבי יהודה

רבי מאיר אומר אין זהו שור האמור בתורה אלא שור שוה מאתים שנגח לשור שוה מאתים ואין הנבילה יפה כלום על זה נאמר ומכרו את השור החי וחצו את כספו אלא מה אני מקיים וגם את המת יחצון פחת שפחתו מיתה מחצין בחי

מכדי בין ר"מ בין רבי יהודה האי מאה ועשרים וחמשה שקיל והאי מאה ועשרים וחמשה שקיל מאי בינייהו

אמר רבא פחת נבילה איכא בינייהו רבי מאיר סבר פחת נבילה דניזק הוי ורבי יהודה סבר פחת נבילה דמזיק הוי פלגא

א"ל אביי אם כן מצינו לרבי יהודה

Moreover, even where the goring had taken place before the debt was contracted, was not the creditor actually first [in taking possession of the ox]?  Can it be concluded from this that where a creditor of a subsequent date has preceded a creditor of an earlier date in distraining on [the property of the debtor], the distraint is of no legal avail?  — No; I may still maintain that [in this case]  the distraint holds good, whereas in the case there,  it is altogether different; as the plaintiff [for damages] may argue,  'Had the ox already been with you [before it gored], would I not have been entitled to distrain on it while in your hands? For surely out of the ox that did the damage I am to be compensated.' Our Rabbis taught: Where an ox  of the value of two hundred [zuz] gored an ox of the same value of two hundred [zuz] and injured it to the amount of fifty zuz, but it so happened that the injured ox [subsequently] improved and reached the value of four hundred zuz, since it can be contended that but for the injury it would have reached the value of eight hundred zuz, compensation will be [still] paid as at the time of the damage.  Where it has depreciated, the compensation will be paid in accordance with the value at the time of the case being brought into Court.  Where it was the ox which did the damage that [subsequently] improved, the compensation will still be made in accordance with the value at the time of the damage.  Where it has [on the other hand] depreciated, the compensation will be made in accordance with the value at the time of the case being brought into Court. The Master has said: 'Where it was the ox which did the damage that [subsequently] improved, the compensation will still be made as at the time of the damage.' This ruling is in accordance with R. Ishmael, who maintains that the plaintiff is a creditor and he has a pecuniary claim against him [the defendant]. Read now the concluding clause: 'Where it [on the other hand] depreciated, the compensation will be made in accordance with the value at the time of the case being brought into Court'. This ruling, on the other hand, follows the view of R. Akiba, that they both [plaintiff and defendant] become the owners in common [of the ox that did the damage]. [Is it possible that] the first clause should follow the view of R. Ishmael and the second clause follow that of R. Akiba? — No; the whole teaching follows the view of R. Akiba, for we deal here with a case where the improvement was due to the defendant having fattened the ox.  If the improvement was due to fattening, how could you explain the opening clause, 'where … the injured ox [subsequently] improved and reached the value of four hundred zuz … compensation will be paid as at the time of the damage'? For where the improvement was due to the act of fattening [by the owner], what need could there have been to state [that compensation for the original damage has still to be paid]? — R. Papa thereupon said: The ruling in the opening clause  applies to all cases, whether where the ox improved by special fattening or where it improved by itself: the statement of the rule was required for the case where the ox improved by itself — even then compensation will be paid as at time of the damage. The ruling in the concluding clause,  however, could apply only to a case where the improvement was due to special fattening. 'Where it  has depreciated, the compensation will be made in accordance with the value at the time of the case being brought into Court.' Through what can it have depreciated? Shall I say that it has depreciated through hard work? In that case [surely] the defendant can say, 'You cause it to depreciate!  Could you expect me to pay for it?' — R. Ashi thereupon said: The depreciation [referred to] is due to the injury, in which case the plaintiff is entitled to contend, '[The evil effect of] the horn of your ox is still buried within the suffering animal.' MISHNAH. WHERE AN OX  OF THE VALUE OF TWO HUNDRED [ZUZ] GORED AN OX OF THE SAME VALUE OF TWO HUNDRED [ZUZ] AND THE CARCASS HAD NO VALUE AT ALL, R. MEIR SAID THAT IT WAS WITH REFERENCE TO THIS CASE THAT IT IS WRITTEN, AND THEY SHALL SELL THE LIVE OX AND DIVIDE THE MONEY OF IT.  R. JUDAH, HOWEVER, SAID: THIS IS CERTAINLY THE HALACHAH,  BUT WHILE YOU FULFIL [BY THIS RULING THE INJUNCTION], 'AND THEY SHALL SELL THE LIVE OX AND DIVIDE THE MONEY OF IT,' YOU DO NOT FULFIL [THE NEXT INJUNCTION], 'AND THE DEAD OX ALSO THEY SHALL DIVIDE.'  THE CASE DEALT WITH BY SCRIPTURE IS THEREFORE WHERE AN OX OF THE VALUE OF TWO HUNDRED [ZUZ] GORED AN OX OF THE SAME VALUE OF TWO HUNDRED [ZUZ] AND THE CARCASS WAS WORTH FIFTY ZUZ: ONE PARTY WOULD HERE GET HALF OF THE LIVING OX TOGETHER WITH HALF OF THE DEAD OX  AND THE OTHER PARTY WOULD SIMILARLY GET HALF OF THE LIVING OX TOGETHER WITH HALF OF THE DEAD OX. GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: Where an ox of the value of two hundred [zuz] gored an ox of the same value of two hundred [zuz] and the carcass was worth fifty zuz, one party would get half of the living ox together with half of the dead ox and the other party would similarly get half of the living ox together with half of the dead ox. This is the [case of the goring] ox dealt with in the Torah, according to the view of R. Judah. R. Meir, however, says; This is not the [case of the goring] ox dealt with in the Torah, but where an ox of the value of two hundred [zuz] gored an ox of the same value of two hundred [zuz] and the carcass was of no value at all — this is the case regarding which it is laid down, 'And they shall sell the live ox and divide the money of it.' But how could I [in this case] carry out [the other direction], 'And the dead ox also they shall divide'? [This only means that] the diminution [in value] brought about by the death  has to be [compensated] to the extent of one-half out of the body of the living ox. Now, since [in the former case]  according to both R. Meir and R. Judah one party will get a hundred and twenty-five [zuz]  and the other party will similarly get a hundred and twenty-five [zuz], what is the [practical] difference between them? — Raba thereupon said: The difference arises where  there has been a decrease in the value of the carcass,  R. Meir maintains that the loss in the value of the carcass has to be [wholly] sustained by the plaintiff,  whereas R. Judah is of the opinion that the loss in the value of the carcass will be borne by the defendant to the extent of a half.  Said Abaye to him:  If this be the case, will it not turn out that according to R. Judah