Bava Kamma — Daf 32a

ואם עמד בעל קורה חייב ואם אמר לבעל חבית עמוד פטור

היה בעל חבית ראשון ובעל קורה אחרון נשברה חבית בקורה חייב ואם עמד בעל חבית פטור ואם אמר לבעל קורה עמוד חייב וכן זה בא בנרו וזה בפשתנו:

גמ׳ בעא מיניה רבה בר נתן מרב הונא המזיק את אשתו בתשמיש המטה מהו כיון דברשות קעביד פטור או דלמא איבעי ליה לעיוני

א"ל תניתוה שלזה רשות להלך ולזה רשות להלך

אמר רבא ק"ו ומה יער שזה לרשותו נכנס וזה לרשותו נכנס נעשה כמי שנכנס לרשות חבירו וחייב זה שלרשות חבירו נכנס לא כל שכן

אלא הא קתני שלזה רשות להלך ולזה רשות להלך

התם תרוייהו כהדדי נינהו הכא איהו קעביד מעשה

והיא לא והכתיב (ויקרא יח, כט) ונכרתו הנפשות העושות מקרב עמם

הנאה לתרוייהו אית להו איהו מעשה הוא דקעביד:

היה בעל קורה ראשון כו': אמר ריש לקיש שתי פרות ברה"ר אחת רבוצה ואחת מהלכת בעטה מהלכת ברבוצה פטורה רבוצה במהלכת חייבת

לימא מסייע ליה היה בעל קורה ראשון ובעל חבית אחרון נשברה חבית בקורה פטור ואם עמד בעל קורה חייב והא הכא דכרבוצה במהלכת דמי וקתני חייב

ותסברא הא סייעי בעיא לא מסתייא דלא מסייעי אלא מקשה נמי קשיא טעמא דבעטה הא הוזקה ממילא פטור והא מתני' דממילא וקתני חייב

מתני' דפסקה לאורחא כשלדא הכא כגון דרבעה בחד גיסא איבעי לה לסגויי באידך גיסא

אלא סיפא דמתני' מסייע ליה לר"ל דקתני היה בעל חבית ראשון ובעל קורה אחרון נשברה חבית בקורה חייב ואם עמד בעל חבית פטור והא הכא דכמהלכת ברבוצה דמי וקתני פטור

מתני' דכי אורחיה קא מסגי הכא א"ל נהי דאית לך רשות לסגויי עלי לבעוטי בי לית לך רשותא:

מתני׳ שנים שהיו מהלכין ברה"ר אחד רץ ואחד מהלך או שהיו שניהם רצין והזיקו זה את זה שניהם פטורין:

גמ׳ מתני' דלא כאיסי בן יהודה דתניא איסי בן יהודה אומר רץ חייב מפני שהוא משונה ומודה איסי בע"ש בין השמשות שהוא פטור מפני שרץ ברשות

א"ר יוחנן הלכה כאיסי בן יהודה ומי אמר רבי יוחנן הכי והאמר ר' יוחנן הלכה כסתם משנה ותנן אחד רץ ואחד מהלך או שהיו שניהם רצין פטורין

מתני' בע"ש בין השמשות

ממאי מדקתני או שהיו שניהם רצין פטורין הא תו ל"ל השתא אחד רץ ואחד מהלך פטור שניהם רצין מבעיא אלא הכי קאמר אחד רץ ואחד מהלך פטור בד"א בע"ש בין השמשות אבל בחול אחד רץ ואחד מהלך חייב שניהם רצין אפי' בחול פטורין

אמר מר ומודה איסי בע"ש בין השמשות שהוא פטור מפני שרץ ברשות בע"ש מאי ברשות איכא

כדר' חנינא דאמר ר' חנינא

BUT IF THE CARRIER OF THE BEAM [SUDDENLY] STOPPED, HE IS LIABLE.  IF, HOWEVER, HE CRIED TO THE CARRIER OF THE BARREL, HALT!' HE IS EXEMPT. WHERE, HOWEVER, THE CARRIER OF THE BARREL WAS IN FRONT, AND THE CARRIER OF THE BEAM BEHIND AND THE BARREL BROKE BY [COLLISION WITH] THE BEAM, HE IS LIABLE.  IF, HOWEVER, THE CARRIER OF THE BARREL [SUDDENLY] STOPPED, HE IS EXEMPT. BUT WHERE HE CRIED TO THE CARRIER OF THE BEAM, 'HALT!' HE IS LIABLE. THE SAME APPLIES TO ONE CARRYING A [BURNING] CANDLE WHILE ANOTHER WAS PROCEEDING WITH FLAX. GEMARA. Rabbah b. Nathan questioned R. Huna: If a man injures his wife through conjugal intercourse, what is [the legal position]? Since he performed this act with full permission is he to be exempt [for damage resulting therefrom], or should perhaps greater care have been taken by him? — He said to him. We have learnt it: … FOR THE ONE IS ENTITLED TO WALK [THERE AND CARRY BEAMS] AND THE OTHER IS ENTITLED TO WALK [THERE AND CARRY BARRELS].  Raba [however] said: There is an a fortiori [to the contrary]: If in the case of the Wood,  where this one [the defendant] was entering [as if] into his own domain, and the other [the plaintiff] was [similarly] entering [as if] into his own domain, it is nevertheless considered [in the eye of the law]  that he entered his fellow's [the plaintiff's] domain, and he is made liable, should this case  where this one [the defendant]  was actually entering the domain of his fellow [the plaintiff]  not be all the more [subject to the same law]?  But surely [the Mishnah] states, … FOR THE ONE IS ENTITLED TO WALK THERE [AND CARRY BEAMS] AND THE OTHER IS ENTITLED TO WALK [THERE AND CARRY BARRELS, indicating exemption where the entry was sanctioned]! — There, both of the parties were simultaneously [active against each other], whereas here  it was only he  that committed the deed. Is she  [considered] not [to have participated in the act at all]? Is it not written, The souls that commit them shall be cut off from among their people?  — [It is true that] enjoyment is derived by both of them, but it is only he to whom the active part can be ascribed. WHERE THE CARRIER OF THE BEAM WAS IN FRONT etc. Resh Lakish stated:  In the case of two cows on public ground, one lying down [maliciously] and the other walking about, if the one that was walking kicked the one that was lying, there is exemption [since the latter too misconducted itself by laying itself down on public ground], whereas if the one that was lying kicked the one that was walking, there is liability to pay. May not [the following be cited in] support of this:  WHERE THE CARRIER OF THE BEAM WAS IN FRONT AND THE CARRIER OF THE BARREL BEHIND, AND THE BARREL BROKE BY [COLLISION WITH] THE BEAM, HE IS EXEMPT. BUT IF THE CARRIER OF THE BEAM [SUDDENLY] STOPPED HE IS LIABLE. For surely [this latter case] here is similar to that of the lying cow kicking the walking cow,  and liability is stated! — But do you really think that this [liability] need be proved?  [The Mishnaic text however] not only fails to be of any support [in this respect], but affords a contradiction to Resh Lakish, [in whose view] the reason [even for the liability] is that the lying cow kicked the walking cow, thus [implying] that [the latter] sustained damage [because of the former cow] through sheer accident, and there would be exemption. Now, [the case of] the Mishnah surely deals with accidental damage, and still states liability? — The Mishnah [deals with a case] where the beam blocked the [whole] passage as if by a carcass,  whereas here [in the case dealt with by Resh Lakish] the cow was lying on one side of the road so that the other cow should have passed on the other side. But the concluding clause may [be taken to] support Resh Lakish. For it is stated, BUT IF THE CARRIER OF THE BARREL WAS IN FRONT AND THE CARRIER OF THE BEAM BEHIND, AND THE BARREL BROKE BY [COLLISION WITH] THE BEAM, HE IS LIABLE. IF, HOWEVER, THE CARRIER OF THE BARREL [SUDDENLY] STOPPED, HE IS EXEMPT. Now, surely this case resembles that of the walking cow kicking the lying cow,  and the text states exemption? — No! The Mishnah [deals with the case where the damage was done in a usual manner as] he  was passing in the ordinary way, whereas here [in the case dealt with by Resh Lakish] it may be argued for the lying cow,  'Even if you are entitled to tread upon me, you have still no right to kick me.' MISHNAH. IF TWO [PERSONS] WERE PASSING ONE ANOTHER ON PUBLIC GROUND, ONE [OF THEM] RUNNING AND THE OTHER WALKING OR BOTH OF THEM RUNNING, AND THEY WERE INJURED BY EACH OTHER, BOTH OF THEM ARE EXEMPT. GEMARA. Our Mishnah is not in accordance with Issi b. Judah. For it has been taught: Issi b. Judah maintains that the man who had been running is liable, since his conduct was unusual. Issi, however, agrees [that if it were] on a Sabbath eve before sunset there would be exemption, for running at that time is permissible. R. Johanan stated that the halachah is in accordance with Issi b. Judah. But did R. Johanan [really] maintain this? Has R. Johanan not laid down the rule that the halachah is in accordance with [the ruling of] an anonymous Mishnah?  Now, did we not learn … ONE [ OF THEM] RUNNING AND THE OTHER WALKING OR BOTH OF THEM RUNNING … BOTH OF THEM ARE EXEMPT? — Our Mishnah [deals with a case] of a Sabbath eve before sunset. What proof have you of that? — From the text, OR BOTH OF THEM RUNNING … BOTH OF THEM ARE EXEMPT; [for indeed] what need was there for this to be inserted? If in the case where one was running and the other walking there is exemption, could there be any doubt  where both of them were running?  It must accordingly mean thus: 'Where one was running and the other walking there is exemption; provided, however, it was on a Sabbath eve before sunset. For if on a weekday, [in the case of] one running and the other walking there would be liability, [whereas where] both of them were running even though on a weekday they would be exempt.' The Master stated: 'Issi, however, agrees [that if it were] on a Sabbath eve before sunset there would be exemption, for running at that time is permissible.' On Sabbath eve, why is it permissible? — As [shown by] R. Hanina: for R. Hanina used to say: