Bava Kamma — Daf 31a

סליקוסתא

בשלמא רב אדא בר אהבה כשמעתיה אלא רב הונא לימא הדר ביה

הנהו מותרין הוו:

מתני׳ שני קדרין שהיו מהלכין זה אחר זה ונתקל הראשון ונפל ונתקל השני בראשון הראשון חייב בנזקי שני:

גמ׳ אמר רבי יוחנן לא תימא מתני' ר' מאיר היא דאמר נתקל פושע הוא וחייב אלא אפילו לרבנן דאמרי אנוס הוא ופטור הכא חייב שהיה לו לעמוד ולא עמד

רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר אפילו תימא לא היה לו לעמוד היה לו להזהיר ולא הזהיר

ורבי יוחנן אמר כיון דלא היה לו לעמוד לא היה לו להזהיר דטריד

תנן היה בעל קורה ראשון ובעל חבית אחרון נשברה חבית בקורה פטור ואם עמד בעל קורה חייב

מאי לאו שעמד לכתף דאורחיה הוא וקתני חייב דהוה ליה להזהיר

לא כשעמד לפוש

אבל עמד לכתף מאי פטור אדתני סיפא ואם אמר לו לבעל חבית עמוד פטור לפלוג וליתני בדידה בד"א כשעמד לפוש אבל עמד לכתף פטור

הא קמ"ל דאע"ג דעמד לפוש כי קאמר לו לבעל חבית עמוד פטור

ת"ש הקדרין והזגגין שהיו מהלכין זה אחר זה נתקל הראשון ונפל ונתקל השני בראשון והשלישי בשני ראשון חייב בנזקי שני ושני חייב בנזקי שלישי ואם מחמת ראשון נפלו ראשון חייב בנזקי כולם ואם הזהירו זה את זה פטורין מאי לאו שלא היה להן לעמוד

לא שהיה להן לעמוד

אבל לא היה להם לעמוד מאי פטור אי הכי אדתני סיפא אם הזהירו זה את זה פטור לפלוג וליתני בדידה במה דברים אמורים שהיה להן לעמוד אבל לא היה להן לעמוד פטורין

הא קמ"ל דאע"ג דהיה להן לעמוד כי הזהירו זה את זה פטורין

אמר רבא ראשון חייב בנזקי שני בין בנזקי גופו בין בנזקי ממונו שני חייב בנזקי שלישי בנזקי גופו אבל לא בנזקי ממונו

ממה נפשך אי נתקל פושע הוא שני נמי ליחייב אי נתקל לאו פושע הוא אפילו ראשון נמי ליפטר

the refuse of boiled dates [that had been placed on public ground] ownerless? We can well understand this in the case of R. Adda b. Ahabah who acted in accordance with his own dictum, but in the case of R. Huna, are we to say that he changed his view? — These owners [in that case] had been warned [several times not to repeat the nuisance]. MISHNAH. IF TWO POTTERS WERE FOLLOWING ONE ANOTHER AND THE FIRST STUMBLED AND FELL DOWN AND THE SECOND STUMBLED BECAUSE OF THE FIRST, THE FIRST IS LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGE DONE TO THE SECOND. GEMARA. R. Johanan said: Do not think [that the Tanna of] this Mishnah is R. Meir who considers stumbling as implying carelessness that involves liability.  For even according to the Rabbis who maintain [that stumbling is] mere accident for which there is exemption,  there should be liability here where he  had [meanwhile had every possibility] to rise and nevertheless did not rise. [But] R. Nahman b. Isaac said: You may even say that [the Mishnah speaks also of a case] where he  did not yet have [any opportunity] to rise, for he  was [surely able] to caution  and nevertheless did not caution. R. Johanan, however, considers that where he  did not yet have [any opportunity] to rise, he  could hardly be expected to caution as he was [surely] somewhat distracted. We have learnt: If the carrier of the beam was in front, the carrier of the barrel behind, and the barrel broke by [colliding with] the beam, he  is exempt. But if the carrier of the beam stopped suddenly, he is liable.  Now, does this not mean that he stopped for the purpose of shouldering the beam as is usual with carriers, and it yet says that he is liable, [presumably] because [he failed] to caution?  — No, he suddenly stopped to rest [which is rather unusual in the course of carrying]. But what should be the law  in the case where he stopped to shoulder the beam? Would there then be exemption? Why then state in the subsequent clause,  'Where he, however, warned the carrier of the barrel to stop, he is exempt'? Could the distinction not be made in the statement of the same case [in the following manner]: 'Provided that he stopped to rest; but if he halted to shift the burden on his shoulder, he is exempt'? — It was, however, intended to let us know that even where he stopped to rest, if he warned the carrier of the barrel to stop, he is exempt. Come and hear: If a number of potters or glass-carriers were walking in line and the first stumbled and fell and the second stumbled because of the first and the third because of the second, the first is liable for the damage [occasioned] to the second, and the second is liable for the damage [occasioned] to the third. Where, however, they all fell because of the first, the first is liable for the damage [sustained] by them all. If [on the other hand] they cautioned one another, there is exemption. Now, does this teaching not deal with a case where there has not yet been [any opportunity] to rise?  — No, [on the contrary] they [have already] had [every opportunity] to rise. But what should be the law  in the case where they [have not yet] had [any opportunity] to rise? Would there then be exemption? If so, why state in the concluding clause, 'If [on the other hand] they cautioned one another, there is exemption'? Could the distinction not be made in the statement of the same case [in the following manner]: 'Provided that they have already had every opportunity to rise; but if they have not yet had any opportunity to rise, there is exemption'? — This is what it intended to let us know: That even where they [have already] had [every opportunity] to rise, if they cautioned one another, there is exemption. Raba said: The first is liable for damage [done] to the second whether directly by his person  or by means of his chattels,  whereas the second is liable for damage to the third only if done by his person  but not if caused by his chattels. [Now,] in any case [how could these rulings be made consistent]? [For] if stumbling implies carelessness, why should not also the second be liable [for all kinds of damage]?  If [on the other hand] stumbling does not amount to carelessness, why should even the first not enjoy immunity?