זבחים 108 — Soncino English Talmud

¹the head of a pigeon. which is not as much as an olive, but the salt makes it up to an olive? Said Raba of Parzakia to R. Ashi: Is not that the controversy of R. Johanan and Resh Lakish? — [No:] You may ask on R. Johanan's view, and you may ask on the view of Resh Lakish. You may ask on R. Johanan's view: R. Johanan gives his ruling only there, in respect of the bone, which is related to the flesh, but not in the case of salt, which is not related to the flesh; [or perhaps, there is no difference]? You may ask on the view of Resh Lakish: Resh Lakish gives his ruling only there in respect of the bone, because if it parts from it [the flesh], there is no obligation to take it up [on the altar]; but not here, where if it parts, there is an obligation to take it up; or perhaps, there is no difference? The question stands over. R. JOSE THE GALILEAN SAID etc. Rabbi answered on behalf of R. Jose the Galilean: As for one who slaughters within and offers up without, the reason is because it had a time of fitness; will you say [the same] when one slaughters without and offers up without, where it never had a period of fitness? R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon answered on behalf of R. Jose the Galilean: As for slaughtering within and offering up without, that is because the sanctuary [the alter] receives it; will you say [the same] when one slaughters without and offers up without, where the Sanctuary does not receive it ? Wherein do they differ? — Said Ze'iri: They differ in respect to slaughtering at night. Rabbah said: They disagree where one received it [the blood] in a non-sacred vessel. AN UNCLEAN [PERSON] WHO EATS [OF SACRIFICES], WHETHER UNCLEAN SACRIFICES etc. The Rabbis say well to R. Jose the Galilean? — Said Raba: Where the [priest's] body [first] became unclean, and then the flesh became unclean, none disagree that he is liable, because personal defilement involves kareth. They disagree where the flesh [first] became unclean and then the [priest's] body became unclean : the Rabbis hold, We say miggo [‘since’]; whereas R. Jose the Galilean holds: We do not say miggo. Now according to R. Jose, granted that we do not say miggo, yet let his personal uncleanness, which is graver, come and fall upon the uncleanness of the flesh? — Said R. Ashi: How do you know that personal uncleanness is more stringent? Perhaps uncleanness of the flesh is more stringent, since it cannot be purified in a mikweh. MISHNAH. SLAUGHTERING [WITHOUT] IS MORE STRINGENT THAN OFFERING UP [WITHOUT], AND OFFERING UP [IS MORE STRINGENT] THAN SLAUGHTERING. SLAUGHTERING IS MORE STRINGENT, FOR HE WHO SLAUGHTERS [A SACRIFICE] ON BEHALF OF MAN IS CULPABLE, WHEREAS HE WHO OFFERS UP TO A MAN IS NOT CULPABLE. OFFERING UP IS MORE STRINGENT: TWO WHO HOLD A KNIFE AND SLAUGHTER [WITHOUT] ARE NOT CULPABLE, [WHEREAS] IF THEY TAKE HOLD OF A LIMB AND OFFER IT UP, THEY ARE CULPABLE. IF ONE OFFERED UP, THEN OFFERED UP AGAIN, THEN OFFERED UP AGAIN, HE IS CULPABLE IN RESPECT OF EACH [ACT OF] OFFERING UP: THESE ARE THE WORDS OF R. SIMEON. R. JOSE SAID: HE IS LIABLE ONLY TO ONE [SIN-OFFERING]. HE IS LIABLE ONLY WHEN HE OFFERS UP ON THE TOP OF AN ALTAR; R. SIMEON SAID: HE IS LIABLE EVEN IF HE OFFERS UP ON THE TOP OF A ROCK OR A STONE. GEMARA. Why is offering up to a man [without] different, that it is not culpable? [presumably] because unto the Lord is written! Then in the case of slaughtering too, surely ‘unto the Lord’ is written? — There it is different, because Scripture saith, ‘What man soever’. ‘What man soever’ is written in connection with offering up too? — That is required for teaching that when two men offer up a limb, they are liable. If so, [say that] here too it is required for teaching that if two men hold the knife and slaughter, they are liable? — There it is different, because Scripture saith, that [man]: [this implies,] one, but not two. If so, ‘that [man]’ is written in connection with offering up too? — That is required^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ

^ᵃnote:V. supra 10b, p. 50, n. 5.
^ᵇnote:Lit., ‘which is of the kind of the flesh’.
^ᶜnote:If the salt springs off the altar, the piece must be resalted, because it is written, neither shalt thou suffer the salt of the covenant of thy God to be lacking (Lev. II, 13).
^ᵈnote:If after being taken out, it is taken in again and offered up on the altar, the altar receives it, and it is not taken down (v. supra 84a).
^ᵉnote:If it is offered up on the altar after it was slaughtered without, it must be removed.
^ᶠnote:Rabbi and R. Eleazer b. R. Simon.
^ᵍnote:According to Rabbi, if one slaughtered a sacrifice within at night and then offered it up, he is not liable, since it never had a period of fitness, for a sacrifice slaughtered at night is unfit. According to R. Eliezer, he is culpable, for if it is laid on the altar, it does not descend.
^ʰnote:The sacrifice is immediately invalid, so it never had a period of fitness; nevertheless, the altar receives it.
^ⁱnote:A clean person who eats unclean flesh is not liable to a sin-offering; an unclean person who eats clean flesh is liable. Now, in the latter case posited by Raba the flesh was already forbidden on account of its own uncleanness. Nevertheless the Rabbis hold that the interdict of personal uncleanness can fall upon the first and be added to it, because it is more comprehensive, as now not only is that piece forbidden to him, but all other pieces, and so we argue: since (miggo) he is interdicted in respect of other pieces, he is also interdicted through his personal uncleanness in respect of this piece too, though that is forbidden in any case. Consequently he is liable to a sin-offering. R. Jose does not accept this argument of miggo, and holds that since the flesh is already forbidden, his own uncleanness does not count at all, and he is not liable. If, however, he became unclean first, he was already forbidden to eat any flesh on pain of a sin-offering, simply because the flesh became unclean.
^ʲnote:As an additional interdict. For even if a more comprehensive interdict does not fall upon a less comprehensive one, that is only where both are of equal gravity. Here, however, personal uncleanness is more stringent, since it involves a sin-offering, whereas the uncleanness of the flesh does not.
^ᵏnote:Whereas an unclean priest is cleansed in a mikweh.
^ˡnote:I.e., for lay consumption, not as a sacrifice.
^ᵐnote:On account of offering up without, though this constitutes idolatry and he is culpable on that account.
^ⁿnote:Each time part of the same animal. He offered them up in ignorance, but between each offering he became aware that it was forbidden, and then forgot.
^ᵒnote:I.e., he must first build an altar without and then offer up upon it.
^ᵖnote:Lev. XVII, 8f: Whatsoever man . . . offereth up a burnt-offering . . . and bringeth it not unto the door of the tent of meeting to sacrifice it unto the Lord, even that man shall be cut off from his people. ‘Unto the Lord’ shews that Scripture speaks of one who is offering to God, not to man, and only then does he incur kareth (or, a sin-offering if he acts in ignorance).
^ᵠnote:Ibid. 3f: What man soever . . . killeth all ox . . . and hath not brought it unto the door of the tent of meeting, to present it as an offering unto the Lord.
^ʳnote:Heb. ish ish, lit., a man, a man’, The repetition extends the law even to one who slaughters to a human being.
^ˢnote:Ibid. and that man shall be cut off from among his people.

²in order to exclude one who acts in ignorance, under constraint, or in error. If so, there too it is required in order to exclude one who acts in ignorance, under constraint, or in error? — ‘That’ is written twice. Then what is the purpose of ‘unto the Lord’? — It is to exclude the goat that is sent away. OFFERING UP IS MORE STRINGENT etc. Our Rabbis taught: A man, a man: why this [repetition]? To include two who take hold of a limb and offer it up, [and it teaches] that they are liable. For I might argue, is not [the reverse] logical: if two who hold a knife and slaughter are not liable, though when one slaughters to a man he is liable; is it not logical that when two take hold [of a limb and offer it up] they are not liable, seeing that one who offers up to a man is not liable? Therefore ‘a man, a man’ is stated: these are the words of R. Simeon. R. Jose said: ‘That [man]’ implies one but not two. If so, why is ‘a man, a man’ stated? — [Because] Scripture employs human idiom. And R. Simeon? — He requires that for excluding one who acts in ignorance, under constraint, or in error. And R. Jose? — [He infers that] from ha-hu [being written instead of] hu. And R. Simeon? — He does not attribute any particular significance to ha-hu [as opposed to] hu. Now, according to R. Jose, since [in] this ‘ish ish’ the Torah employs human idiom, in the other ish ish too [we must say that] the Torah employs human idiom; whence then does he know that one who slaughters to a man is liable? — He infers it from, blood shall be imputed unto that man, he hath shed blood: [this implies,] even one who slaughters to a man. IF ONE OFFERED UP, THEN OFFERED UP AGAIN etc. Resh Lakish said: The controversy is about four or five limbs, one master holds that the text, to sacrifice it, [which teaches that] a person is liable on account of a whole, but not on account of an incomplete one, is written in connection with the whole animal the other master holds that it is written in connection with each limb. But in the case of one limb, all agree that he is liable to one [offering] only. But R. Johanan maintained: The controversy is about one limb; one master holds that if one offers up without [limbs] which were [first] burnt within and [thus] became incomplete, he is liable; while the other master holds that he is not liable, But in the case of four or five limbs, all agree that he is liable on account of each limb [separately]. Now, this disagrees with ‘Ulla. For ‘Ulla said: All agree that one is liable if he offers up without [limbs] which were burnt within and [thus] became incomplete. They disagree only where one offers up without [limbs] which were burnt without and [thus] became incomplete: there one master holds that he is not liable, while the other master holds that he is liable. Others say, ‘Ulla said: All agree that one is not liable if he offers up without [limbs] which were burnt without and [thus] became incomplete. They disagree only where one offers up without [limbs] which were burnt within and [thus] became incomplete: one master holds that he is not liable, while the other master holds that he is liable. Now, Samuel's father disagrees with ‘Ulla's [view] in its first version. For Samuel's father said: In accordance with whom do we replace on the altar [limbs] that spring off? It is not in accordance with R. Jose. HE IS LIABLE ONLY WHEN HE OFFERS UP [ON TOP OF AN ALTAR] etc. R. Huna said, What is R. Jose's reason? — Because it is written, And Noah builded an altar unto the Lord. R. Johanan said: What is R. Simeon's reason? — Because it is written, So Manoah took the kid with the meal-offering, and offered it upon the rock unto the Lord. Now as to the other too, surely it is written, And Noah builded an altar unto the Lord? — That was merely for its elevation. And as to the other too, surely it is written, So Manoah took [etc.]? — That was a temporary dispensation. Alternatively, this is R. Simeon's reason, [viz.,] as it was taught: R. Simeon said: [There is] the altar [of the Lord] at the door of the tent of meeting, but there is no altar at the bamah; therefore if one offered up [without] on a rock or on a stone, he is liable. [‘He is liable’!] Surely he should say, [he] is excluded? — This is what he means: Therefore if one offers up on a rock or on a stone when bamoth are forbidden, he is liable. R. Jose son of R. Hanina asked: As to the horn, the ascent, the base and squareness, are these indispensable at the bamoth? — Said R. Jeremiah to him. It was taught: The horn, the ascent, the base and squareness were indispensable at the great bamoth, but were not indispensable at minor bamoth. MISHNAH^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ^ᵃʰ^ᵃⁱ^ᵃʲ^ᵃᵏ^ᵃˡ^ᵃᵐ^ᵃⁿ^ᵃᵒ^ᵃᵖ^ᵃᵠ^ᵃʳ^ᵃˢ^ᵃᵗ^ᵃᵘ

^ᵗnote:‘In error’ means when he is led into error by another.
^ᵘnote:Blood shall be imputed unto that man . . . and that man shall be cut off. Thus we have two limitations.
^ᵛnote:Written in connection with slaughtering.
^ʷnote:On the Day of Atonement, Lev. XVI, 21. A man is not liable for slaughtering that without, because ‘unto the Lord’ implies that liability is incurred only when it could be sacrificed, and its rites performed, within.
^ˣnote:V. n. 2.
^ʸnote:Where this repetition is quite common.
^ᶻnote:Does he not admit the implication of ‘that’?
^ᵃᵃnote:Whence does he know this?
^ᵃᵇnote:Both mean ‘that’, The longer form implies a further limitation.
^ᵃᶜnote:Lit., ‘he does not interpret’.
^ᵃᵈnote:Sc. in connection with slaughtering.
^ᵃᵉnote:That is implied in the emphatic ‘he hath shed blood’ — no matter to whom.
^ᵃᶠnote:One is liable only when he offers up the whole animal; therefore even if he offered up several limbs, he is liable to one offering only, viz., on account of the first, because the animal was still whole then.
^ᵃᵍnote:One is liable only when he offers up a whole limb, but not when he offers up part of a limb. Hence each limb imposes a separate liability.
^ᵃʰnote:I.e., if a man offered up one limb in several portions consecutively.
^ᵃⁱnote:Because if such a limb springs off the altar, it must be replaced. This shews that it still requires haktarah after it has become incomplete, therefore when one offers it up without, performing haktarah there, he is liable. Consequently, each successive offering up of a portion of the same limb entails a separate sacrifice.
^ᵃʲnote:Save for a whole limb. Therefore when he offers up the limb in several parts, he incurs one offering only.
^ᵃᵏnote:The latter holds that ‘it’ excludes less than the size of an olive, but not an incomplete limb.
^ᵃˡnote:For if R. Jose held thus, then since they still require haktarah within, though when they spring off they are already incomplete, he should also hold that one is liable for offering up without limbs which were incomplete through having been burnt within. This proves that in the opinion of Samuel's father, R. Jose disagrees, and holds that one is not liable, even if he offers up without limbs which were incomplete through having been first burnt within.
^ᵃᵐnote:Gen. VIII, 20. This proves that only an altar makes the act one of offering up.
^ᵃⁿnote:Judg. XIII, 19.
^ᵃᵒnote:To facilitate the act of offering up, but not because an actual altar was necessary.
^ᵃᵖnote:Lev. XVII, 6.
^ᵃᵠnote:Only at the door of the tent of meeting was a proper altar required. But when bamoth were permitted, no proper altar was necessary, and one could sacrifice and offer up on a simple stone.
^ᵃʳnote:‘But there is no altar at a bamah’, obviously means when this is permitted. But one is not liable then for offering up without, and so he should have said, this excludes (from liability) one who offers up on a rock or on a stone.
^ᵃˢnote:These were indispensable to the altar in the Tabernacle: v. supra 62a.
^ᵃᵗnote:Sc. at Nob and Gibeon; these were public bamoth.
^ᵃᵘnote:Sc. private bamoth, which individuals built for themselves.