Zevachim

— Infer it from both combined.1 But if so,2 let it not be stated in connection with sprinkling, which may be inferred from both [shechitah and offering up] combined. [Thus: when you say,] let it be inferred from shechitah, [you can argue], as for shechitah, the reason is because it is invalid in the case of the Passover-offering [when done] on behalf of such who cannot eat. Let it be inferred from offering up: As for offering up, the reason is because it applies to a meal-offering [too].3 Then infer it from both combined? Rather, for that reason a text is written [to include sprinkling] to intimate that you may not infer from both combined.4 R. Abbahu said: If one slaughtered [a sacrifice] and sprinkled [its blood without]: according to R. Ishmael he is liable to one [sin-offering], [whereas] according to R. Akiba he is liable to two.5 Abaye said: Even on R. Akiba's view, he is liable to one only, because Scripture saith, There thou shalt offer up thy burnt-offerings, and there thou shalt do all that I command thee:6 Scripture thus ranked them as one ‘doing’ [rite].7 If one sprinkled and offered up [without], according to R. Ishmael he is liable to two [sin-offerings], [whereas] according to R. Akiba he is liable to one only.8 Abaye said: Even on R. Akiba's view he is liable to two, that being the reason that Scripture divided them, [vis.] ‘There thou shalt offer-up . . . and there thou shalt do’. If one slaughtered, sprinkled, and offered up all agree that he is liable to two. Our Rabbis taught: [Or that killeth it] without the camp:9 You might think [that that means] without the three camps;10 therefore it states, . . . or goat, in the camp.’9 If [you thus stress] ‘in the camp’, you might think that [even] one who slaughters a burnt-offering in the south is culpable;11 therefore it is stated, or that killeth it without the camp: as ‘without the camp’ is distinguished in that it is not eligible for the slaughtering of most sacred sacrifices or for the slaughtering of any sacrifice, so ‘in the camp’ means in a place which is not eligible for the slaughtering of any sacrifice: hence the south [side of the Temple court] is excluded, for though it is not fit for the slaughtering of most sacred sacrifices, it is eligible for the slaughtering of lesser sacrifices. ‘Ulla said: One who slaughters on the roof of the Hekal is culpable, since it is not eligible for the slaughtering of any sacrifice. To this Raba demurred: If so, let Scripture write, ‘in the camp or . . . without the camp’, and ‘unto the door of the tent of meeting’ will not be necessary; what is the purpose of ‘[and hath not brought it] unto the door of the tent of meeting’: surely it is to exclude the roof?12 Now according to Raba, if that is so,13 let [Scripture] write, ‘unto the door of the tent of meeting’ [only]: what is the purpose of ‘in the camp’ and ‘without the camp’?14 Surely that is to include the roof?15 — Said R. Mari: No: it includes [the case where] the whole of [the animal] is within, but its throat is without.16 If its throat is without, it is obvious [that one is culpable]; [for] to what does the Divine Law object? to slaughtering without; and this is slaughtering without! — Rather, it includes [the case where] the whole of the animal is without, while its throat is within. 17 It was stated: One who offers up nowadays.18 R. Johanan maintained: He is culpable;19 Resh Lakish said: He is not liable. R. Johanan maintained, He is culpable: The first sanctity hallowed it for the nonce and for the future. Resh Lakish said, He is not liable: the first sanctity hallowed it for the nonce, but did not hallow it for the future.20 Shall we say that they differ in the same controversy as that of R. Eliezer and R. Joshua? For we learnt: R. Eliezer said: [I have heard that] when they were building the Temple.21 they made curtains for the Temple and curtains for the courts;22 but that they built the Temple [walls] on the outside [of these curtains]. whereas they built the courts on the inside [of these curtains]. R. Joshua said: I have heard that they offered [sacrifices] though there was no Temple; and they ate most sacred sacrifices though there were no curtains, and lesser sacrifices and second tithe though there was no wall,23 because the first sanctity hallowed it for the nonce and hallowed it for the future.24 Hence it follows that R. Eliezer holds that it did not hallow it [for the future].25 Said Rabina to R. Ashi: Whence [does this follow]? Perhaps all agree that the first sanctity hallowed it for the nonce and hallowed it for the future, and one master reported what he had heard, while the other master reported what he had heard. And should you say. What was the purpose of curtains, according to R. Eliezer? Simply for privacy. It was stated: If one offers up [a limb] less than an olive [in size],26 but the bone makes it up to an olive,27 R. Johanan maintained: He is culpable; Resh Lakish said: He is not culpable. R. Johanan maintained, He is culpable: that which is attached to what ascends [the altar] is as what is ascends [in its own right]. Resh Lakish said, He is not liable: that which is attached to what ascends is not as what ascends.28 Raba asked: What if one offers up other. Their only common feature is that they are both sacrificial rites; hence the same law should apply to all other sacrificial rites. in respect of taking the fistful or receiving, and so no text is required to show that these do not involve liability. connection with slaughtering: thus we have a single interdict covering both, and the same kareth is written in connection with both. Hence when he commits both in one state of ignorance, they rank as one offence, and render him liable to one sin-offering only. R. Akiba, however, infers it from ‘or a sacrifice’, which is written in reference to offering-up. Hence slaughtering and sprinkling are separate interdicts and involve separate sin-offerings. rites which are ‘done’ as another single act. Hence they involve one offering only. ‘Offer up’ means to burn on the altar. The other sacrificial rites (do) comprise slaughtering, receiving the blood and carrying it to the altar, and sprinkling. he who slaughters on the roof has brought it. of meeting. This would shew that killing anywhere outside the Temple court makes one liable, while killing anywhere inside (e.g. on the roof, or a burnt-offering in the south) does not. bamoth are forbidden, and so there is culpability. holds that the bone nevertheless counts as something which is itself offered up, and therefore in the present case one is culpable. Resh Lakish takes the reverse view.