1 if someone had slain them outside before the doors of the Temple had been open, he would be free, because the lack of opening is like the lack of a [direct] action. But does R. Hisda adopt the principle of ‘since’? Surely R. Hisda said: If someone had slaughtered the Passover sacrifice outside on any of the other days of the year, then, if he did it in its own name, he is free, but if he did it not in its own name, he is culpable. The reason [that he is culpable] lies in his having slaughtered it not in its own name. But if he had slaughtered it without any indication it is [as if — slaughtered] in its name, and he would be free? Why that? Let us say: Since it would be fit for a sacrifice not in its own name, within the Temple [he should be liable]? Now, how compare? There a removal is necessary, whereas this needs no such removal. Rabbah b. Shimi taught these [two statements of R. Hisda] as [emanating] from Rabbah. He then raises a difficulty from [the one view of] Rabbah against [the other given by] Rabbah; but answers [the difficulty] as we have answered. When R. Dimi [came from Palestine] he said in the name of R. Jeremiah, who said it in the name of R. Johanan: If one slaughtered a Paschal sacrifice outside on any of the other days of the year, whether in its name or not in its name, he is exempt. Said R. Dimi: I have reported this statement in the presence of R. Jeremiah [and queried]: It is all correct [in the case where it was slaughtered] in its name, since it is not fit [for the Temple], but [where it was] not in its name [why should it be exempt]? Surely it would be fit as a sacrifice not in its own name within the Temple? And he said this [in reply]: The removal [of the name of a sacrifice] outside [the Temple] is not deemed [an effective] removal. — When Rabin came [from Palestine], [he said that] R. Jeremiah said in the name of R. Johanan: If one had slain a Passover sacrifice outside on any of the other days of the year, whether in its own name or not in its own name, he is culpable. Even ‘in its own name’? But have we not learnt: A sacrifice whose time has not yet come [may be such] either because of itself or because of its owner. Which is a sacrifice whose time has not yet come because of its owner? If the owner, either man or woman, was afflicted with gonorrhoea, or was a woman after child-birth or a leper and had offered up their sin-offering or their guilt-offering outside [before the appointed time], they are free. But if they offered up their whole-offerings or their peace-offerings outside, they are culpable. And R. Hilkiah b. Tobi said: They did not teach thus only if they were offered up in their own name, but if they were not offered up in their own name, they were not culpable. Now at any rate, then, when offered up in their own name, the owners are culpable. But why that? Let us say, Since they are fit to be offered up in their own name within [they should be culpable]?- How compare? There a removal is necessary, but here Passover sacrifice during the rest of the days of the year is a peace-offering. R. Ashi taught: the owner is culpable, as we had stated above. R. Jeremiah of Difti taught he is not culpable, because he is of the opinion that the Passover sacrifice during the rest of the days of the year requires a removal, and the removal outside [the Temple] is not [effective]. Therein he disputes with R. Hilkiah b. Tobi. The Master said: ‘When the lot has been cast, he is culpable in respect of the one [he-goat] cast ‘for the Lord’, and free with respect to the one cast ‘for Azazel’. Our Rabbis taught: What man soever there be of the house of Israel that killeth an ox or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that killeth it without the camp, and hath not brought it unto the entrance of the tent of meeting to present it as an offering unto the Lord.15ᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒ
2 From [the word] ‘offering’ I might have assumed that even offerings for the temple repair [are included], which are also called ‘offerings’, in accord with the Scriptural words: And we have brought the Lord's offering, therefore the text reads: ‘And hath not brought it unto the entrance of the tent of meeting’, i.e., whatsoever is fit to be brought to the tent of meeting, if offered up outside, involves culpability; but whatsoever is fit to be brought to the entrance of the tent of meeting, if offered up outside, does not involve culpability. Thus I would exclude only those which are not fit to be offered up at the entrance of the tent of meeting, but I would not exclude [the cow for the sin-offering and] the he-goat-to-be-sent-away, which are fit to be brought to the entrance of the tent of meeting, therefore the text reads: ‘Unto the Lord’ i.e., only those assigned to the Lord, to the exclusion of such as are not assigned to the Lord. But do the words ‘Unto the Lord’ imply exclusion,? I shall raise a contradiction: It may be accepted for an offering made by fire unto the Lord, i.e., the fire-offerings. Whence do we know that one may not dedicate it before its time has come? Therefore the text reads: ‘As an offering’. ‘Unto the Lord’, includes the he-goat-to-be-sent-away! Said Raba: There [the meaning is determined] by the context, and here too [its meaning is determined] by the context: There ‘Unto the entrance implies inclusion, therefore ‘Unto the Lord’ implies exclusion; here ‘An offering made by fire’ implies exclusion, hence ‘Unto the Lord’ has inclusive meaning. Now the only reason then is that the Divine Law included it, but if it had not done so I would have assumed that the he-goat-to-be-sent-away could be dedicated before its time. But the lot does not determine except such [an animal] as is fit ‘for the Lord’? — Said R. Joseph: This is in accord with Hanan the Egyptian, for it was taught: Hanan the Egyptian says: Even if the blood is in the cup, may he bring its mate and pair them. But admitted that Hanan does not accept the opinion concerning ‘rejection’ you surely did not hear that Hanan does not accept the opinion as to the necessity of casting the lots? Perhaps he [the high priest] would have to bring [two] and cast lots [afresh]? — Rather, said R. Joseph, this [Baraitha] is in accord with R. Simeon, for it was taught: If one of them died, he brings another one without casting lots, this is the view of R. Simeon! Rabina said: The reference [in the Baraitha] is to a case in which one of them became blemished and was redeemed with another one. But whence will you say that a blemish renders it [the scapegoat] invalid? As it was taught: Nor make an offering by fire of them, this refers to the pieces of fat. From here I could infer only as to all the pieces. Whence do we know that it applies also to parts thereof? Therefore the text reads: ‘Of them’. ‘The altar’ i.e., the sprinkling of the blood. Unto the Lord, that includes the he-goat-to-be-sent-away. Now it was necessary [for the Scripture] to write [disqualifying a scapegoat], the blemished animal and one whose time has not yet come. For if the Divine Law had written only about the animal whose time has not yet come, I would have assumed there [it is disqualified] applies because its time has not yet come, but in the case of one blemished whose time had come, I might have assumed that [the disqualification does] not [apply]. And if the Divine Law had written about the blemished animal alone, I might have assumed the reason [for its being disqualified] there lies in repulsiveness, but with the animal whose time has not yet come, and where there is no repulsive feature, one might have assumed [the law] does [not] apply, hence it was necessary [to write about both].ᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷˣʸᶻᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠ