Yevamot

THE DAUGHTER OF A PRIEST WHO WAS MARRIED TO AN ISRAELITE MAY NOT EAT TERUMAH.  IF HE DIED AND SHE HAD A SON BY HIM SHE MAY NOT EAT TERUMAH. IF SHE WAS [SUBSEQUENTLY] MARRIED TO A LEVITE SHE MAY EAT TITHE. IF THE LATTER DIED AND SHE HAD A SON BY HIM SHE MAY EAT TITHE. IF SHE WAS [SUBSEQUENTLY] MARRIED TO A PRIEST SHE MAY EAT TERUMAH. IF THE LATTER DIED AND SHE HAD A SON BY HIM SHE MAY EAT TERUMAH. IF HER SON BY THE PRIEST DIED SHE MAY NOT EAT TERUMAH. IF HER SON BY THE LEVITE DIED SHE MAY NOT EAT TITHE. IF HER SON BY THE ISRAELITE DIED SHE RETURNS TO THE HOUSE OF HER FATHER; AND IT IS CONCERNING SUCH A WOMAN THAT IT WAS SAID, AND IS RETURNED UNTO HER FATHER'S HOUSE, AS IN HER YOUTH, SHE MAY EAT OF HER FATHER'S BREAD. GEMARA. IF HER SON BY THE LEVITE DIED SHE MAY AGAIN EAT TERUMAH, because she is again entitled to eat it by virtue of her son;  whence is this  derived? — R. Abba replied in the name of Rab: [From the use of the expression,] But a daughter  [instead of] 'a daughter'.  In accordance with whose view?  Is it in accordance with that of R. Akiba who bases expositions on Wawin!  — It may be said [to be in agreement] even [with the view of the] Rabbis, since the entire expression But a daughter  is superfluous. Our Rabbis taught: When she  returns,  she returns only to [the privilege of eating] terumah, but does not return to [the privilege of eating] the breast and the shoulder.  Said R. Hisda in the name of Rabina b. Shila, 'What Scriptural text proves this?  — She shall not eat of the terumah of the holy things,  she must not eat of that which is set apart  from the holy things'.  R. Nahman replied  in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: Of [her father's] bread,  but not all [her father's] bread;  this excludes the breast and the shoulder.  Rami b. Hama demurred: Might it not be suggested that this  excludes the invalidation of vows!  Raba replied: A Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael has long ago settled this difficulty. For a Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael taught: What need was there for Scripture to state, But the vow of a widow, or of her that is divorced … shall stand against her?  Is she not free from the authority of her father and also from that of her husband!  The fact is that where the father had entrusted [his daughter] to the representatives of the husband, or where the representatives of the father had entrusted her to the representatives of the husband, and on the way  she became a widow or was divorced, [it would not have been known] whether she was to be described as of  the house of her father  or as of the house of her husband;  hence the need for the text  to tell you that as soon as she had left her father's authority, even if only for a short while, he may no more invalidate her vows. R. Safra replied:  She may eat of her father's bread,  only bread but no flesh.  R. Papa replied:  She may eat of her father's bread,  only the bread which is the property of her father;  excluding however, the breast and the shoulder which [priests] obtain from the table of the Most High. Raba, however, replied:  And the breast of the waving and the thigh of heaving shall ye eat … thou, and thy daughters with thee,  only when they are with thee. R. Adda b. Ahabah stated that a Tanna taught: When she  returns to her father's house, she returns [only to the privilege of eating] terumah, but does not return to [the privilege of eating] the breast and the shoulders. [If she  returns, however,] by virtue of her son,  she returns also to [the privilege of eating] the breast and the shoulder.  R. Mordecai went and recited this traditional statement in the presence of R. Ashi, when the latter said to him, 'Whence [has this case]  been included?  From "But a daughter".  Should she, then, be more important than the other!'  — There,  the excluding texts were written;  but here  no excluding texts were written. THE DAUGHTER OF A PRIEST WHO WAS MARRIED TO AN ISRAELITE etc. Our Rabbis taught: And is returned unto her father's house,  excludes one who is awaiting the decision of the levir;  as in her youth,  excludes a pregnant woman.  But could not this [law,  however, be arrived at by] logical argument: If where a child by a first husband is not regarded as the child by the second husband, in respect of exempting the woman from the levirate marriage,  the embryo is nevertheless regarded as a born child,  how much more should the embryo be regarded as a born child where a child by the first husband is regarded as the child of the second, in respect of depriving a woman of her right to terumah!  No; this is no argument.  If an embryo was regarded as a born child in respect of the levirate marriage, where the dead were given the same status as the living,  should an embryo be regarded as a born child in respect of terumah, where the dead were not given the same status as the living?  Consequently Scripture expressly stated, As in her youth,  to exclude a pregnant woman. And it was necessary for Scripture to write, As  in her youth, to exclude the pregnant woman; and also  And have no child,  to  exclude one who has a born child. For had the All Merciful written only And have no child,  it might have been assumed [that only a woman who has a born child is forbidden to eat terumah, because] at first  there was one body and now there are two bodies,  but that a pregnant woman, who formed at first  one body and is now also one body on]y, may eat, [hence the second text  was] required. And had the All Merciful written of the pregnant woman only it might have been assumed [that only she is forbidden to eat terumah] because at first  her body