Yevamot

[the Rabbis] have penalized him [by ordering him to pay her] kethubah.  And why was it ordained that relatives of the second grade of kinship, [who are forbidden] by the ordinances of the Rabbis, are not to receive their kethubah? Because the man remains fit and the woman remains fit, and wherever he as well as she remains fit [the Rabbis] have penalized her [by depriving her of her] kethubah.  Rabbi said, 'The former  are prohibitions  of the Torah, and prohibitions of the Torah require no reinforcement;  while the latter  are prohibitions of the scribes, and the prohibitions of the scribes require reinforcement.  Another reason  is: In the former case the man induces the woman  [into the marriage];  in the latter case she induces him.  Who stated the 'other reason'? One opinion asserts  that it was R. Simeon b. Eleazar who stated it; and he gave an answer  [to the question] 'what is the reason'. 'What is the reason', [he said in effect,] 'why it was ordained that when the man is unfit and the woman is unfit the man is penalized by having to pay the kethubah? Because he induces the woman into the marriage.  And what is the reason why when he remains fit and she remains fit she is penalized by losing her kethubah? Because she induces him, [into the marriage'].  Another opinion asserts  that it was Rabbi  who stated it, because the case of the haluzah presented to him the following difficulty: A haluzah, surely, is only Rabbinically [forbidden to be married to a common priest]  and yet she receives her kethubah.  Thereupon he stated: Since the man disqualifies her by Rabbinical law  it is he, [who in the former case], induces  her [into marriage]  but in the latter case it is she that induces him [into marriage]. What practical difference is there between [the reason given by] Rabbi and [that given by] R. Simeon b. Eleazar? — R. Hisda replied: The practical difference between them is the case of a bastard or a nethinah [who was married] to an Israelite. According to him who gave the reason  that [the prohibitions were] Pentateuchal, then this case  also is Pentateuchal;  but according to him who gave as the reason,  that the man induces the woman  then here, it is she that induces him [into the marriage].  According to R. Eliezer, however, who  stated, 'Behold he  is both a slave and a bastard',  the woman, surely, would not induce the man at all!  — Rather, said R. Joseph, the practical difference between them  is the case of the man who remarried his divorced wife after she had been married.  According to him who gave the reason  that [the prohibitions were] Pentateuchal, then this case  also is Pentateuchal;  but according to him who gave as the reason  that the man induces the woman  then here, surely, she induces him. But according to R. Akiba who stated that the offspring of a union forbidden under the penalty of a negative precept is deemed to be a bastard,  she,  surely, would not induce the man at all! Rather, said R. Papal the practical difference between them  is the case of a be'ulah  [who was married] to a High Priest.  According to him who gave as the reason  that [the prohibitions were] Pentateuchal, then this case also is Pentateuchal;  but according to him who gave as the reason  that the man induces the woman,  then here, surely, it is she that induces him. According to R. Eliezer b. Jacob, however, who stated that the offspring of a union that is forbidden under a positive precept is deemed a halal,  she,  surely, would not at all induce him!  Rather, said R. Ashi, the practical difference between them  is the case of the man who cohabits again with his doubtful sotah.  According to him who stated that the reason  is that [the prohibition is] Pentateuchal, then this case also is Pentateucha  but according to him who stated that the reason  is that the man induces the woman  here it is she that induces him. And according to R. Mathia b. Heresh who stated that even a woman whose husband, while going to arrange for her drinking [of the water of bitterness]  cohabited with her on the way, is rendered a harlot, she,  surely, would not at all induce him [to such a marriage]!  Rather, said Mar b. R. Ashi, the practical difference between them  is the case of a confirmed sotah. MISHNAH. THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE WHO WAS BETROTHED TO A PRIEST, WAS PREGNANT FROM A PRIEST, OR WAS AWAITING THE DECISION OF A LEVIR WHO WAS A PRIEST; AND, SIMILARLY, THE DAUGHTER OF A PRIEST [WHO STOOD IN SUCH RELATIONSHIP] TO AN ISRAELITE, MAY NOT EAT TERUMAH.  THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE WHO WAS BETROTHED TO A LEVITE, WAS PREGNANT FROM A LEVITE, OR WAS AWAITING THE DECISION OF A LEVIR WHO WAS A LEVITE; AND, SIMILARLY, THE DAUGHTER OF A LEVITE [WHO STOOD IN SUCH RELATIONSHIP] TO AN ISRAELITE MAY NOT EAT TITHE.  THE DAUGHTER OF A LEVITE WHO WAS BETROTHED TO A PRIEST, WAS PREGNANT FROM A PRIEST, OR WAS AWAITING THE DECISION OF A LEVIR WHO WAS A PRIEST; AND, SIMILARLY, THE DAUGHTER OF A PRIEST [WHO STOOD IN SUCH RELATIONSHIP TO A LEVITE, MAY EAT NEITHER TERUMAH NOR TITHE. GEMARA. And granted that she  is [no more than] an ordinary woman,  is not any ordinary woman permitted to eat tithe?  R. Nahman replied in the name of Samuel: This ruling represents the view of R. Meir  who stated: The first tithe is forbidden to common people.  For it was taught: