Yevamot

And should you reply that this Tanna holds the opinion that the original marriage  causes the subjection;  behold, [it may be pointed out, the case of] the HALAL WHO MARRIED A WOMAN OF LEGITIMATE STATUS  where it is not said that 'the original marriage causes the subjection'!  — This  is certainly due to the final clause. As it was desired to teach in the final clause, IF A HIGH PRIEST WHO MARRIED A WIDOW HAD A BROTHER A HIGH PRIEST OR A COMMON PRIEST, where [the prohibition  applies to] a WIDOW only  but [not to] a virgin who is eligible to marry him,  therefore, WIDOW was taught [here also]. R. Papa demurred: If the law is in agreement with the following ruling  which R. Dimi, when he came,  reported in the name of R. Johanan, viz., that if an Egyptian of the second generation married an Egyptian woman of the first generation her son is regarded as belonging to the second generation,  [our Mishnah] should also have taught: If an Egyptian of the second generatlon married two Egyptian women, one of the first, and the other of the second generation, and he had sons from the first and from the second, [the wives of these sons], if they  married in the proper manner,  are permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their levirs,  and if they married in the reverse order  [the wives] are permitted to their levirs  and forbidden to their husbands;  proselyte women  are permitted to the one as well as to the other,  and women who are incapable of procreation are forbidden to the one as well as the other!  — He taught some cases and omitted others. What else did he omit that he should have omitted this also? — He omitted [the case of the man] wounded in the stones.  If this is all that can be pointed out,  the case of the man wounded in the stones cannot be regarded as an instance of an omission, since those that are subject to the penalty of negative precepts were [already] mentioned!  — Were not several specific cases mentioned  of those that are subject to the penalty of negative precepts? Surely it was stated, IF A COMMON PRIEST MARRIED A WIDOW and then again IF A HALAL MARRIED A WOMAN OF LEGITIMATE STATUS!  That case  was required [for the specific purpose] of informing us [that the law is] in agreement with [the ruling] Rab Judah reported in the name of Rab. For Rab Judah reported in the name of Rab: Women of legitimate [priestly] status were not forbidden to be married to men of tainted birth. But, surely, he taught regarding A HALAL WHO MARRIED A WOMAN OF LEGITIMATE STATUS and then again regarding AN ISRAELITE WHO MARRIED THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE AND HE HAD A BROTHER A BASTARD!  — This also is not a repetition of what was already taught, since thereby he taught us [first] regarding a negative precept which is not applicable to all  and then he taught us regarding a negative precept which is applicable to all. But did he not teach  IF AN ISRAELITE WHO MARRIED A BASTARD HAD A BROTHER AN ISRAELITE!  Con sequently  it must be concluded that he taught some cases while others he omitted. This proves it. [Reverting to] the main text, 'Rab Judah reported in the name Of Rab: Women of legitimate [priestly] status were not forbidden to be married to men of tainted birth'. Might it be suggested that the following provides support for his view? [It was stated], A HALAL WHO MARRIED A WOMAN OF LEGITIMATE STATUS; does not [this refer to] a priestess (who was fitting unto him);  and is not the meaning of  LEGITIMATE STATUS eligible for priesthood!  — No; [it might refer to] the daughter of an Israelite, and LEGITIMATE STATUS means  eligible for the assembly.  If so, HAD A BROTHER OF LEGITIMATE STATUS would also [mean] 'eligible for the assembly', from which it would follow that he himself is ineligible for the assembly!  Consequently it must refer to a priest; and since he is a priest she also must be a priestess.  What an argument! Each phrase may bear its own peculiar interpretation. Rabin b. Nahman raised an objection: They shall not take … they shall not take  teaches  that the prohibition was addressed to the woman through the man!  — Raba replied, [This is the meaning]: Where the prohibition is applicable to him it is also applicable to her, but where it is not applicable to him it is also inapplicable to her.  Is this,  however, deduced from this text? Surely it was deduced from a text which Rab Judah expounded in the name of Rab! For Rab Judah stated in the name of Rab and so it was taught at the school of R. Ishmael: When a man or woman shall commit any sin that men commit;  Scripture compared the woman to the man in respect of all the punishments in the Torah!  — If deduction had been made from that [text]  it might have been assumed [to apply only to] a prohibition that is equally applicable to all, but not to a prohibition that is not equally applicable to all.