Yevamot

If the Temple service which is of high importance and supersedes the Sabbath  is itself superseded by [a death sentence for] murder, as it is said, Thou shalt take him from Mine altar, that he may die,  how much more reasonable is it that the Sabbath which is superseded by the Temple service should be superseded by [a death sentence for] murder'. How, then, could it be said, 'Or it might rather [etc.]'?  — He means this: The burial of a meth mizwah  might prove [the contrary], since it supersedes the Temple service  and does not nevertheless supersede the Sabbath.  Then  he argued: It might be inferred a minori ad majus that the burial of a meth mizwah should supersede the Sabbath, [thus]: If the Temple service which super sedes the Sabbath is superseded by the burial of a meth mizwah, by deduction from Or for his sister,  how much more should the Sabbath which is superseded by the Temple service be superseded by the burial of a meth mizwah; hence it was explicitly stated, Ye shall kindle no fire.  [etc]. According to our previous assumption, however, that a positive precept supersedes a prohibition, what is meant by, 'Or it might rather [etc.]'?  — It is this that was meant: 'As regards the application of the text, Every one that profaneth it  shall surely be put to death,  it might have been said to apply to the several kinds of labour other than the execution of a judicial death sentence, but that a judicial death sentence does supersede the Sabbath, for a positive precept  supersedes the prohibition. Then  he argued: It might be suggested that a positive precept supersedes a prohibition in the case of a mere prohibition only; has it, however, been heard to supersede a prohibition which involves kareth? Then he concluded: 'Even where  a positive precept supersedes a prohibition, is not the prohibition of a more serious nature than the precept?  And yet the positive precept comes and supersedes the prohibited; on what grounds, then, should a distinction be made between a minor and a major prohibition?  Hence it was explicitly stated, Ye shall kindle no fire  [etc.].' But  [this is the reason why a specific text] was needed:  It might have been assumed that this [case of a] brother's wife should be regarded as a subject which was included in a general proposition  and was subsequently singled out in order to predicate another law,  the predication of which is not intended to apply to itself alone but to the whole of the general proposition. For it was taught: 'A subject which was included in a general proposition and was subsequently singled out, etc. How [is this to be understood]? But the soul that eateth of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace-offerings [that pertain unto the Lord], having his uncleanness upon him;  were not peace-offerings included among the other holy things?  Why, then, were they subsequently singled out? In order that [the others] may be compared to them, and in order to tell you that as peace-offerings are distinguished by being consecrated objects of the altar so must also all other things  be consecrated objects of the altar, the objects consecrated for Temple repair only being excluded.'  Similarly here it might have been argued:  Since a brother's wife was included among all the other forbidden relatives, why was she singled out? In order that [the others] may be compared to her, and in order to tell you that as a brother's wife is permitted  so also are all the other forbidden relatives permitted. Are these, however, similar? There,  both the general proposition  and the particular specification  relate to a prohibition, but here  the general proposition relates to a prohibition while the particular specification relates to something which is permitted!  This, surely, is rather to be compared to an object that was included in a general proposition and was subsequently singled out in order to be made the subject of a fresh statement, which you cannot restore to the restrictions of the general proposition unless Scripture specifically restores it; for it was taught: Anything which was included in a general proposition and was subsequently excluded in order to be made the subject of a fresh statement, cannot be restored to the restrictions of the general proposition unless Scripture has explicitly restored it.  How  [may this principle be illustrated]? And he shall kill the he-lamb in the place where they kill the sin-offering and the burnt-offering in the place of the Sanctuary; for as the sin-offering is the priest's so is the guilt-offering.  Now since there was no need to state, 'As the sin-offering so is the guilt-offering.'  why did Scripture explicitly state. As the sin-offering so the guilt-offering? Because seeing that the guilt-offering of the leper was singled out  in order to impart a new law concerning the thumb of the right hand and the great toe of the right foot,  it might have been assumed that it required no application of blood to, and no burning of the prescribed portions of the sacrifice upon the altar;