Yevamot

manumission cancel a mortgage. Rab Judah stated: If a wife brought to her husband  two articles worth a thousand zuz, and their value increased to two thousand, she receives one  in settlement of her kethubah;  and for the other  she pays its price and receives it, since it represents assets of her paternal property. What are we taught by this  statement! That assets of her paternal property belong to her? This, surely, has already been stated by Rab Judah!  — It might have been assumed that that statement  applied only where she came to claim [paternal property] as part of her kethubah, but not where she desired to take it in return for payment of its value, hence we were taught [that she may also pay its price and receive it]. MISHNAH. IF THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE WAS MARRIED TO A PRIEST WHO DIED AND LEFT HER PREGNANT, HER SLAVES MAY NOT EAT TERUMAH  IN VIRTUE OF THE SHARE OF THE EMBRYO,  SINCE AN EMBRYO MAY DEPRIVE  [ITS MOTHER]  OF THE PRIVILEGE [OF EATING TERUMAH]  BUT HAS NO POWER TO BESTOW IT UPON HER;  SO R. JOSE. THEY  SAID TO HIM: SINCE YOU HAVE TESTIFIED TO US IN RESPECT OF THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE WHO WAS MARRIED TO A PRIEST,  THE SLAVES OF THE DAUGHTER OF A PRIEST, WHO A MARRIED TO A PRIEST WHO DIED AND LEFT HER WITH CHILD, SHOULD ALSO BE FORBIDDEN TO EAT TERUMAH ON ACCOUNT OF THE SHARE OF THE EMBRYO! GEMARA. A question was raised: Is R. Jose's reason  because he is of the opinion that an embryo in the womb of a lay woman  is regarded as a nonpriest,  or is his reason because only the born may bestow the right of eating but the unborn may not? — In what respect could this difference matter?  — In respect of an embryo in the womb of a priest's daughter.  Now, what is the reason? Rabbah replied: R. Jose's reason is this. He is of the opinion that an embryo in the womb of a lay woman  is regarded as a non-priest.  R. Joseph replied: The born may bestow the privilege of eating while the unborn may not. An objection was raised: They said to R. Jose: Since you have testified to us in respect of the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a priest, what is the law in respect of the daughter of a priest who was married to a priest? 'The first',  he replied, 'I heard;  but the other  I have not heard'.  Now, if you agree [that R. Jose's reason is because] an embryo in the womb of a lay woman  is regarded as a non-priest,  it was correct for him to say, 'The first I heard, but the other I did not'. If you maintain, however, [that R. Jose's reason is because] the born may bestow the right of eating and the unborn may not, what [could he have meant by] 'The first I have heard but the other I have not heard', when the principle is the same! — This is indeed a difficulty. Said Rab Judah in the name of Samuel: This  is the opinion of R. Jose; but the Sages said: If he  has children,  they  may eat [terumah] by virtue of his children;  if he has no children, they  may eat by virtue of his  brothers, and if he has no brothers they  may eat by virtue of the entire family.  'This',  would imply that he  himself does not share the view;  but, surely, Samuel said to R. Hana of Bagdad, 'Go bring me a group of ten men that I may tell you in their presence  that if title is conferred upon an embryo [through the agency of a third party], it does acquire ownership'!  The fact is that 'this' here denotes that he  also holds the same opinion. What, then, does he  teach us?  That the Rabbis disagree with R. Jose! But do they, in fact, disagree? Surely R. Zakkai stated:  This evidence  was submitted by R. Jose in the name of Shemaiah and Abtalion and they  agreed with him! — R. Ashi replied: Does it read, 'and they accepted'? It was only said, 'and they agreed', [which may only mean] that his view is logical. Our Rabbis taught: If he  left children,  both these and the others  may eat terumah.  If he  left his widow with child,  neither these nor the others  may eat it.  If he left children and also left his widow with child, the melog slaves may eat as she may eat;  but the zon barzel slaves may not eat, on account of the share of the embryo which may deprive [its mother]  of the privilege [of eating terumah] but has no power to bestow it;  so R. Jose. R. Ishmael son of R. Jose stated in the name of his father: A daughter may bestow the right of eating; a son may not.  R. Simeon b. Yohai said: [If the children  are] males, all [the slaves] may eat.  [If however they are] females, [the slaves] are not permitted to eat, since it is possible that the embryo might be a male;  and daughters, where there is a son, have no share at all.  What need was there to point  to the possibility that the embryo might be a male when this  might be equally deduced [from the fact] that [even when the embryo is] a female it deprives them of the privilege!  — He meant to say: There is one reason and also an additional one. 'There is the one reason' that a female embryo also deprives [the slaves] of the privilege; and, furthermore,  'it is possible that the embryo might be a male and daughters, where there is a son, have no share at all'. '[If the children are] males, [the slaves] may eat'. But, surely, there is an embryo in existence!  — He is of the opinion