Yevamot

Beyond this, the act is no more than superficial contact and one is exonerated in regard to it'. He thus differs from Samuel. WHETHER HE PASSED ONLY THE FIRST, OR ALSO THE FINAL STAGE OF CONTACT HE CONSTITUTES THEREBY A KINYAN. In what respect is kinyan constituted? — Rab replied: Kinyan is constituted in all respects;  and Samuel replied: Kinyan is constituted only in respect of the things specified in the section,  viz., to inherit the estate of his brother  and to exempt her  from the levirate marriage.  If [she  became subject to the levir] after her marriage  she may, according to the view of all,  eat [terumah],  since she has been eating it before.  They differ only [where she became subject to the levir] after betrothal.  Rab maintains that she may eat, since the All Merciful has included cohabitation in error, [giving it the same validity] as when done presumptuously. But Samuel maintains that the All Merciful has included it  in so far only as to put him  in the same position as the husband,  but not to confer upon him more power than upon the husband.  And [in giving this ruling] Samuel is consistent with his own view, for R. Nahman stated in the name of Samuel: wherever the husband entitles her to eat, the levir also entitles her to eat; and wherever the husband does not entitle her to eat the levir also  does not entitle her to eat. An objection was raised: 'If the daughter of an Israelite, capable of bearing, was betrothed to a priest capable of hearing, who became deaf before he had time to marry her, she may not eat [terumah].  If he died  and she became subject to a deaf levir, she may eat;  and in this respect the power of the levir is superior to that of the husband'. Now, according to Rab, this statement is perfectly satisfactory.  According to Samuel, however, a difficulty arises!  Samuel can answer you: Read thus … who became deaf before he had time to marry her, she may not eat [terumah]; if, however, he married her and then became deaf she may eat it; if he died and she became subject to a deaf levir, she may eat it'.  'Then what is meant by 'in this respect'?  — While if the husband had been deaf before,  she would not have been entitled to eat, if the levir had been deaf before  she may eat. Others say: If [she  became subject to the levir] after her betrothal  all  agree that she may not eat [terumah], since 'she was not allowed to eat it during the lifetime of her husband. They differ only [when she became subject to the levir] after her marriage.  Rab maintains that she may eat, since she has been eating before; but Samuel maintains that she may not eat, because the All Merciful has included cohabitation in error, [giving it the same force] as cohabitation in presumption, only in respect of the things that were enumerated in the section,  but not in all other respects. But surely R. Nahman stated in the name of Samuel, 'Wherever the husband entitles her to eat the levir also entitles her to eat'!  — Read: Every cohabitation whereby a husband entitles her to eat also entitles her to eat if performed by the levir, and every cohab itation whereby the husband does not entitle her to eat, does not entitle her to eat if performed by the levir. An objection was raised: 'If the daughter of an Israelite capable of hearing was betrothed to a priest capable of hearing, who became deaf before he had time to marry her, she may not eat [terumah].  If he died  and she became subject to a deaf levir she may eat;  and in this respect the power of the levir is superior to that of the husband'. Now, according to Rab,  this  might well be explained as was explained above;  according to Samuel, however, a difficulty arises!  — This is indeed a difficulty. Our Rabbis taught: If the daughter of an Israelite capable of hearing was betrothed to a priest capable of hearing, who became deaf before he had time to marry her, she may not eat [terumah].  If a son was born to her she may eat.  If the son died,  R. Nathan said, she may eat;  but the Sages said: She may not eat. What is R. Nathan's reason?  Rabbah replied: Because she was eating  before. Said Abaye to him: What now? would the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a priest who subsequently died  be entitled to eat [terumah] because she was eating it before? But  [the fact is that] as soon as [her husband] died his sanctity is withdrawn from her; so here also as soon as [the son] died his sanctity is withdrawn from her!  — Rather, said R. Joseph, R. Nathan holds that marriage with a deaf [priest]  does entitle the woman to eat terumah,  and that no prohibition  is to be made in respect of the marriage of a deaf priest  as a preventive measure against the betrothal of a deaf priest.  Said Abaye to him: If so,  what need was there [to state] 'If a son was born to her'? — Because of the Rabbis.  Then  R. Nathan should have expressed his disagreement with the Rabbis in the first clause!  — He allowed the Rabbis to finish their statement and then expressed his disagreement with them.  If so,  the statement should have read, 'If the son died she may not eat;  R. Nathan said: She may eat'?  — This is a difficulty. SIMILARLY, IF A MAN HAD INTERCOURSE WITH ANY OF THE FORBIDDEN RELATIVES. R. Amram said: The following statement was made to us by R. Shesheth