1Beyond this, the act is no more than superficial contact and one is exonerated in regard to it'. He thus differs from Samuel. WHETHER HE PASSED ONLY THE FIRST, OR ALSO THE FINAL STAGE OF CONTACT HE CONSTITUTES THEREBY A KINYAN. In what respect is kinyan constituted? — Rab replied: Kinyan is constituted in all respects; and Samuel replied: Kinyan is constituted only in respect of the things specified in the section, viz., to inherit the estate of his brother and to exempt her from the levirate marriage. If [she became subject to the levir] after her marriage she may, according to the view of all, eat [terumah], since she has been eating it before. They differ only [where she became subject to the levir] after betrothal. Rab maintains that she may eat, since the All Merciful has included cohabitation in error, [giving it the same validity] as when done presumptuously. But Samuel maintains that the All Merciful has included it in so far only as to put him in the same position as the husband, but not to confer upon him more power than upon the husband. And [in giving this ruling] Samuel is consistent with his own view, for R. Nahman stated in the name of Samuel: wherever the husband entitles her to eat, the levir also entitles her to eat; and wherever the husband does not entitle her to eat the levir also does not entitle her to eat. An objection was raised: 'If the daughter of an Israelite, capable of bearing, was betrothed to a priest capable of hearing, who became deaf before he had time to marry her, she may not eat [terumah]. If he died and she became subject to a deaf levir, she may eat; and in this respect the power of the levir is superior to that of the husband'. Now, according to Rab, this statement is perfectly satisfactory. According to Samuel, however, a difficulty arises! Samuel can answer you: Read thus … who became deaf before he had time to marry her, she may not eat [terumah]; if, however, he married her and then became deaf she may eat it; if he died and she became subject to a deaf levir, she may eat it'. 'Then what is meant by 'in this respect'? — While if the husband had been deaf before, she would not have been entitled to eat, if the levir had been deaf before she may eat. Others say: If [she became subject to the levir] after her betrothal all agree that she may not eat [terumah], since 'she was not allowed to eat it during the lifetime of her husband. They differ only [when she became subject to the levir] after her marriage. Rab maintains that she may eat, since she has been eating before; but Samuel maintains that she may not eat, because the All Merciful has included cohabitation in error, [giving it the same force] as cohabitation in presumption, only in respect of the things that were enumerated in the section, but not in all other respects. But surely R. Nahman stated in the name of Samuel, 'Wherever the husband entitles her to eat the levir also entitles her to eat'! — Read: Every cohabitation whereby a husband entitles her to eat also entitles her to eat if performed by the levir, and every cohab itation whereby the husband does not entitle her to eat, does not entitle her to eat if performed by the levir. An objection was raised: 'If the daughter of an Israelite capable of hearing was betrothed to a priest capable of hearing, who became deaf before he had time to marry her, she may not eat [terumah]. If he died and she became subject to a deaf levir she may eat; and in this respect the power of the levir is superior to that of the husband'. Now, according to Rab, this might well be explained as was explained above; according to Samuel, however, a difficulty arises! — This is indeed a difficulty. Our Rabbis taught: If the daughter of an Israelite capable of hearing was betrothed to a priest capable of hearing, who became deaf before he had time to marry her, she may not eat [terumah]. If a son was born to her she may eat. If the son died, R. Nathan said, she may eat; but the Sages said: She may not eat. What is R. Nathan's reason? Rabbah replied: Because she was eating before. Said Abaye to him: What now? would the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a priest who subsequently died be entitled to eat [terumah] because she was eating it before? But [the fact is that] as soon as [her husband] died his sanctity is withdrawn from her; so here also as soon as [the son] died his sanctity is withdrawn from her! — Rather, said R. Joseph, R. Nathan holds that marriage with a deaf [priest] does entitle the woman to eat terumah, and that no prohibition is to be made in respect of the marriage of a deaf priest as a preventive measure against the betrothal of a deaf priest. Said Abaye to him: If so, what need was there [to state] 'If a son was born to her'? — Because of the Rabbis. Then R. Nathan should have expressed his disagreement with the Rabbis in the first clause! — He allowed the Rabbis to finish their statement and then expressed his disagreement with them. If so, the statement should have read, 'If the son died she may not eat; R. Nathan said: She may eat'? — This is a difficulty. SIMILARLY, IF A MAN HAD INTERCOURSE WITH ANY OF THE FORBIDDEN RELATIVES. R. Amram said: The following statement was made to us by R. Sheshethᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷˣʸᶻᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠᵃʳᵃˢᵃᵗᵃᵘᵃᵛᵃʷᵃˣᵃʸᵃᶻᵇᵃᵇᵇᵇᶜᵇᵈᵇᵉ
2who enlightened us on the subject from our Mishnah. 'An Israelite's wife who was outraged, though she is permitted to her husband, is disqualified from the priesthood; and so it was taught by our Tanna: SIMILARLY, IF A MAN HAD INTERCOURSE WITH ANY OF THE FORBIDDEN RELATIVES ENUMERATED IN THE TORAH, OR WITH ANY OF THOSE WHO ARE INELIGIBLE TO MARRY HIM; now, what is the purport of SIMILARLY? Does it not mean, WHETHER IN ERROR OR IN PRESUMPTION, WHETHER UNDER COMPULSION OR OF HIS OWN FREE WILL? And yet it was stated, HE HAS THEREBY RENDERED HER INELIGIBLE'. — No; SIMILARLY might refer to the FIRST STAGE. 'To the first stage' with whom? If it be suggested, 'With one of the forbidden relatives', does this then imply [it might be retorted] that the case of the forbidden relatives is derived from that of the sister-in-law? On the contrary, the case of the sister-in-law was derived from the forbidden relatives, since the original prohibition of the first stage was written in connection with the forbidden relatives! — Rather, SIMILARLY refers to Unnatural intercourse with forbidden relatives. On the contrary; the original prohibition of the various forms of intercourse with a woman was written in connection with the forbidden relatives! — Rather, SIMILARLY refers to unnatural intercourse with those [cohabitation with whom is] subject to the penalty of negative precepts. Rabbah stated: If the wife of a priest had been outraged, her husband suffers the penalty of flogging on her account for [cohabiting with] a harlot. Only for [cohabiting with] a harlot, but not for 'defilement'? — Read, 'Also for [cohabitation with] a harlot'. R. Zera raised an objection: And she be not seized, she is forbidden; if, however, she was seized she is permitted. But there is another woman who is forbidden even though she was seized. And who is that? The wife of a priest. Now, a negative precept that is derived from a positive one has only the force of a positive precept! — Rabbah replied: All were included in the category of harlot. When, therefore, Scripture specified in the case of the wife of an Israelite that only if she be not seized she is forbidden but if she was seized she is permitted, it may be inferred that the wife of a priest retains her forbidden status. Others say: Rabbah stated, If the wife of a priest had been outraged, her husband suffers for her the penalty of flogging on account of 'defilement'. Only on account of 'defilement' but not for [connubial relationship with] a harlot. Thus it is obvious that [when the woman acted] under compulsion she is not to be regarded as a harlot. R. Zera raised an objection: 'And she be not seized, she is forbidden; if, however, she was seized she is permitted. But there is another woman who is forbidden even though she was seized. And who is that? The wife of a priest'. Now, a negative precept that is derived from a positive one has only the force of a positive precept! — Rabbah replied: All were included in [the prohibition to live with her] after that she is defiled. When, therefore, Scripture specified in the case of the wife of an Israelite that only when she be not seized she is forbidden, but if she was seized she is permitted, it may be inferred that the wife of a priest retains her forbidden status. MISHNAH. THE BETROTHAL OF A WIDOW TO A HIGH PRIEST AND OF A DIVORCED WOMAN OR A HALIZAH TO A COMMON PRIEST DOES NOT CONFER UPON THEM THE RIGHT TO EAT TERUMAH. R. ELEAZAR AND R. SIMEON, HOWEVER, DECLARE THEM ELIGIBLE. IF THEY BECAME WIDOWS OR WERE DIVORCED AFTER MARRIAGE THEY REMAIN INELIGIBLE; IF AFTER BETROTHAL THEY BECOME ELIGIBLE. GEMARA. It was taught: R. Meir said, [this may be arrived at by an inference] a minori ad majus: If permissible betrothal does not confer the right of eating terumah, how much less forbidden betrothal. They, however, replied: No; if you have said it in respect of permissible betrothal where the man may never confer the right of eating, would you also say it in respect of sinful betrothal where the [priest], in other circumstances, is entitled to confer the right of eating? R. Eleazar stated in the name of R. Oshaia: In the case where a priest who was wounded in the stones betrothed a daughter of an Israelite, we have a difference of opinion between R. Meir and R. Eleazar and R. Simeon. According to R. Meir who holds that a woman awaiting a pentateuchally forbidden cohabitation may not eat terumah, this woman also may not eat; but according to R. Eleazar and R. Simeon who maintain that a woman awaiting a pentateuchally forbidden cohabitation may eat ᵇᶠᵇᵍᵇʰᵇⁱᵇʲᵇᵏᵇˡᵇᵐᵇⁿᵇᵒᵇᵖᵇᵠᵇʳᵇˢᵇᵗᵇᵘᵇᵛᵇʷᵇˣᵇʸᵇᶻᶜᵃᶜᵇᶜᶜᶜᵈᶜᵉᶜᶠᶜᵍᶜʰᶜⁱᶜʲᶜᵏᶜˡᶜᵐᶜⁿᶜᵒᶜᵖᶜᵠᶜʳᶜˢᶜᵗᶜᵘᶜᵛᶜʷᶜˣᶜʸᶜᶻᵈᵃᵈᵇᵈᶜᵈᵈᵈᵉᵈᶠᵈᵍᵈʰ