1 that a levirate bond does exist but the halizah had previously removed that [levirate] bond. The Rabbis, however, hold that no levirate bond exists. If, then, he had said to her at first, 'Be thou betrothed unto me by the bond of the levirate' would not his word have been valid? Consequently it is now also valid. R. Sherabia said: Had a proper halizah been performed all would agree that if he said to her, 'Be thou betrothed unto me by the bond of the levirate', there is no validity in his betrothal. Here, however, the dispute relates to a halizah of an impaired character. One Master holds that a halizah of an impaired character provides [all the necessary] exemption, and the Masters hold that a halizah of an impaired character provides no exemption. R. Ashi said: [No;] All agree that a halizah of an impaired character provides no exemption. Here, however, the dispute centres round the question whether a condition may affect the validity of halizah. The Masters hold that a condition does affect the validity of a halizah and the Master holds that no condition may affect the validity of a halizah. Rabina said: [No;] All agree that a condition does affect a halizah. Here, however, the dispute is dependent on the question of the doubled condition. The Master holds that a doubled condition is essential and the Masters hold the opinion that a doubled condition is unnecessary. IF THE LEVIR SUBMITTED TO HALIZAH AND THEN ADDRESSED TO HER A MA'AMAR, GAVE HER A LETTER OF DIVORCE, OR COHABITED WITH HER etc. It should also have been stated, 'No act is valid after cohabitation'! — Both Abaye and Raba replied: Read, 'NO ACT IS VALID AFTER cohabitation'. But our Tanna? — [The statement regarding] the permissibility of the sister-in-law to marry anyone was preferred by him. THE LAW IS THE SAME WHETHER THERE IS ONE SISTER-IN LAW … OR TWO SISTERS-IN-LAW. Our Mishnah is not in agreement with the ruling of Ben 'Azzai. For it was taught: Ben 'Azzai stated: A ma'amar is valid after another ma'amar where it concerns two levirs and one sister-in-law, but no ma'amar is valid after a ma'amar where it concerns two sisters-in-law and one levir. HOW? … A MA'AMAR TO THE ONE etc. May it be suggested that this provides support to a ruling of Samuel, Samuel having stated that if the levir had participated in the halizah with her to whom he addressed a ma'amar, her rival was not thereby exempt; and an objection to the ruling of R. Joseph? — Does it state: He may participate in the halizah? What it states is 'had participated', implying a fait accompli. A LETTER OF DIVORCE TO THE ONE AS WELL AS TO THE OTHER etc. May it be suggested that this provides support to Rabbah son of R. Huna. For Rabbah son of R. Huna stated, 'A halizah of an impaired character must go the round of all the brothers'? — By IT IS NECESSARY FOR BOTH, widows generally were meant. IF HE GAVE A LETTER OF DIVORCE TO ONE AND SUBMITTED TO HALIZAH FROM THE OTHER. May it be suggested that this provides support to the ruling of Samuel and presents an objection against the ruling of R. Joseph? — Does it state: He may participate in the halizah? What it states is 'had participated', implying a fait accompli. IF THE LEVIR SUBMITTED TO HALIZAH FROM THE ONE AND FROM THE OTHER, OR SUBMITTED TO HALIZAH etc. It should also have been stated, 'No act is valid after cohabitation'! Both Abaye and Raba replied: Read, 'no act is valid after cohabitation'. But our Tanna? — [The statement on] the permissibility of the sister-in-law marrying anyone was preferred by him. THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE LAW WHETHER THERE WAS ONE LEVIR TO TWO SISTERS-IN-LAW etc. According to R. Johanan who ruled that the whole house stands under the prohibition of a negative precept, it is intelligible why it was necessary to inform us that betrothal with those whose intercourse involves the penalties of a negative precept is invalid; according to Resh Lakish, however, who ruled that all the house is subject to the penalty of kareth, was there any need to inform us that betrothal with those whose intercourse involves kareth is invalid? — Resh Lakish can answer you: And even according to your conception was it necessary to tell us in the final clause, which speaks of the case where the LEVIR COHABITED WITH HER AND THEN ADDRESSED TO HER A MA'AMAR, that there was no validity in a betrothal with a married woman? But the fact is that as he taught concerning the permissibility of one levir and one sister-in-law, he also taught concerning two sisters-in-law and one levir. And since he taught concerning two sisters-in-law and one levir, he also taught concerning two levirs and one sister-in-law.ᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷˣʸᶻᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠᵃʳᵃˢᵃᵗᵃᵘᵃᵛᵃʷᵃˣᵃʸ
2 IF THE LEVIR SUBMITTED TO HALIZAH AND THEN ADDRESSED TO HER A MA'AMAR [and] GAVE etc. One can well understand why it was necessary [to lay down a rule where] THE LEVIR SUBMITTED TO HALIZAH AND THEN ADDRESSED TO HER A MA'AMAR; since it might have been assumed that provision was to be made for a ma'amar that followed halizah as a preventive measure against a ma'amar that preceded halizah, it was consequently necessary to tell us that no such preventive measure was to be made. What need, however, was there for the ruling where THE LEVIR SUBMITTED TO HALIZAH AND THEN GAVE HER A LETTER OF DIVORCE? — Read, then, according to your own view, the final clause, IF HE COHABITED WITH HER AND THEN ADDRESSED TO HER A MA' AMAR or if he cohabited with her and then GAVE HER A LETTER OF DIVORCE. One can well understand [it might be argued here also] why it was necessary [to lay down a ruling where] the levir cohabited with her and then GAVE HER A LETTER OF DIVORCE; since it might have been assumed that provision was to be made for a divorce that followed cohabitation as a preventive measure against a divorce that preceded cohabitation, it was consequently necessary to tell us that no such preventive measure was required. But what need was there [for the ruling where] HE COHABITED WITH HER AND THEN ADDRESSED TO HER A MA'AMAR? But [the fact is that] as he taught, IF THE LEVIR SUBMITTED TO HALIZAH AND THEN ADDRESSED TO HER A MA'AMAR, he also taught: IF HE COHABITED WITH HER AND THEN ADDRESSED TO HER A MA'AMAR. And since he desired to teach the rule where 'he cohabited with her and then GAVE HER A LETTER OF DIVORCE' he also taught, IF THE LEVIR SUBMITTED TO HALIZAH and then GAVE HER A LETTER OF DIVORCE. IF IT TOOK PLACE etc. Our Mishnah cannot be reconciled with the opinion of the following Tanna: For it was taught: Abba Jose b. Johanan of Jerusalem reported in the name of R. Meir, 'Alike in the case of cohabitation or of halizah, [if it took place] first, no act that follows has any validity; but if it occurred in the middle or at the end, something valid still remains'. On this question, in fact, three different views have been expressed. The first Tanna is of the opinion that in the case of cohabitation, where a preventive measure is required, a preventive measure was made, but in the case of halizah where no preventive measure is called for no preventive measure was made. R. Nehemiah, on the other hand, is of the opinion that in the case of cohabitation also no preventive measure is called for. And as to your possible objection that provision should be made where cohabitation followed a letter of divorce as a preventive measure against cohabitation that followed a halizah, [it may be replied that] as halizah is a Pentateuchal law it is well known. And as to your objection that provision should be made where cohabitation followed a ma'amar as a preventive measure against cohabitation that followed another cohabitation, [it may also be replied that] as kinyan by cohabitation is a Pentateuchal law it is certainly well known. And Abba Jose b. Hanan, again, holds the same view as the Rabbis who ordained a preventive measure in the case of cohabitation, and he made similar provision in the case of halizah as a preventive measure against cohabitation. MISHNAH. IF A MAN COHABITED WITH HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIFE, WHETHER IN ERROR OR IN PRESUMPTION, WHETHER UNDER COMPULSION OR OF HIS OWN FREE WILL, EVEN IF HE ACTED IN ERROR AND SHE IN PRESUMPTION, OR HE IN PRESUMPTION AND SHE IN ERROR, OR HE UNDER COMPULSION AND SHE NOT UNDER COMPULSION, OR SHE UNDER COMPULSION AND HE NOT UNDER COMPULSION, WHETHER HE PASSED ONLY THE FIRST, OR ALSO THE FINAL STAGE OF CONTACT, HE CONSTITUTES THEREBY A KINYAN, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE NATURE OF THE INTERCOURSE. SIMILARLY, IF A MAN HAD INTERCOURSE WITH ANY OF THE FORBIDDEN RELATIVES ENUMERATED IN THE TORAH, OR WITH ANY OF THOSE WHO ARE INELIGIBLE TO MARRY HIM AS, FOR INSTANCE, A WIDOW WITH A HIGH PRIEST, A DIVORCED WOMAN OR A HALUZAH WITH A COMMON PRIEST, A BASTARD OR A NETHINAH WITH AN ISRAELITE OR THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE WITH A BASTARD OR A NATHIN, HE HAS THEREBY RENDERED HER INELIGIBLE, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE NATURE OF THE INTERCOURSE. GEMARA. What is the purport of EVEN? — [The formula of] 'It is not necessary' is thereby to be understood: It is not necessary [to state that a kinyan is constituted where] he acted in error and her intention was the performance of the commandment or where he acted in presumption and her intention was the performance of the commandment, but even if he acted in error and she in presumption, or he in presumption and she in error, so that the intention of neither of them was the fulfilment of the commandment, a kinyan is nevertheless effected. R. Hiyya taught: Even if both acted in error, both in presumption, or both under compulsion. How is one to understand the action UNDER COMPULSION in our Mishnah? If it be suggested [that] idolaters compelled him to cohabit with her, surely [it may be pointed out] Raba stated: There can be no compulsion in sexual intercourse since erection depends entirely on the will! But when he slept? Surely Rab Judah ruled ᵃᶻᵇᵃᵇᵇᵇᶜᵇᵈᵇᵉᵇᶠᵇᵍᵇʰᵇⁱᵇʲᵇᵏᵇˡᵇᵐᵇⁿᵇᵒᵇᵖᵇᵠᵇʳᵇˢᵇᵗᵇᵘᵇᵛᵇʷᵇˣᵇʸᵇᶻᶜᵃᶜᵇᶜᶜᶜᵈᶜᵉᶜᶠᶜᵍᶜʰᶜⁱᶜʲᶜᵏᶜˡᶜᵐ