Yevamot

for originally  its status in relation to him was one of permissibility; then  it was forbidden, and again  permitted; consequently one might assume that it reverts to its first status of permissibility, hence it was specifically stated, It shall be eaten without leaven in a holy place,  it is a commandment'. Now, according to Raba who said that it  represents the view of  the Rabbis, one could well explain that what is meant here  is this: It shall be eaten without leaven in a holy place  is a commandment, for at first  its status in relation to him was one of permissibility since, if he desired, he could eat it and, if he preferred, he could abstain from eating it; then  it was forbidden, and again  permitted; consequently it might be assumed that it reverts to its first status of permissibility  so that, if he wished, he could eat it and, if he preferred, he could abstain from eating it. — [You say,] 'If he preferred he could abstain from eating it'? Surely it is written in the Scriptures, And they shall eat those things wherewith atonement was made  which teaches that the priests must eat them, and that the owner attains thereby atonement! Say rather: [it might be assumed that] if he wished, he  may eat it  himself and, if he preferred, another priest may eat it, hence it was specifically stated, It shall be eaten' without leaven in a holy place,  it is a commandment.  According to R. Isaac b. Abdimi, however, who said that it  [represents the view of] Abba Saul, what two alternatives  exist here?  And were you to suggest  that if he wished he could eat it  to appease his appetite and, if he preferred, he could devour it gluttonously can eating gluttonous]y [it may be retorted] be described as proper eating? Surely Resh Lakish said, 'He who eats gluttonously on the Day of Atonement  is exempt [from kareth],  since [Scripture has stated], Shall not be afflicted'!  [Were you to suggest], however,  that if he wished he could eat it  unleavened and, if he preferred, he could eat it leavened, surely [it might be retorted] it is written in Scripture, It shall not be baked with leaven their portion  from which Resh Lakish inferred that even their portion  must not be baked with leaven! Again [Were you, to suggest,]  that if he wished he could eat it  unleavened and, if he preferred, he could eat it as a dumpling,  how [it could be retorted] is one to imagine [such a dumpling]? If it is unleavened, well, then it is unleavened;  and if it is not unleavened, the All Merciful, surely, has said without leaven!  — No;  it  may indeed be assumed to be unleavened; but the object of the exposition of the Scriptural text  was to forbid it.  In respect of what practical issue, then,  has it been stated that a dumpling may be regarded as unleavened bread? — [The statement was made] to indicate that a man may perform with it  his duty  on the Passover. Though he made it first into a dumpling, it is nevertheless designated the 'bread of affliction', since he subsequently baked it in an oven. Consequently a man may perform with it his duty  on the Passover. MISHNAH. IF A LEVIR PARTICIPATED IN HALIZAH WITH HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIFE HE IS REGARDED AS ONE OF THE OTHER BROTHERS IN RESPECT OF INHERITANCE.  IF, HOWEVER, THE FATHER  WAS LIVING,  THE ESTATE BELONGS TO THE FATHER. HE WHO MARRIES HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIFE GAINS POSSESSION OF HIS BROTHER'S  ESTATE. R. JUDAH SAID: IN EITHER CASE,  IF THE FATHER  WAS LIVING  THE ESTATE BELONGS TO THE FATHER. GEMARA. Is not this  obvious? — It might have been presumed that halizah takes the place of the levirate marriage and he receives, therefore, all the estate, hence it was taught [that he does not].  If so,  why was it stated that HE IS REGARDED AS ONE OF THE OTHER BROTHERS when it should have been stated, he is to be regarded only as one of the brothers! — In truth [this is the purpose of our Mishnah]: It might have been assumed that because he deprived her [of levirate marriage]  he shall be penalized,  hence we were taught [that he does receive a share]. IF, HOWEVER, THE FATHER WAS LIVING, [THE ESTATE BELONGS TO HIM], for a Master said that a father takes precedence over all his lineal descendants. HE WHO MARRIES HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIFE etc. What is the reason? — The All Merciful said, Shall succeed in the name of his brother,  and behold he  has succeeded. R. JUDAH SAID etc. Said 'Ulla: The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah, and R. Isaac Nappaha likewise said: The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah. 'Ulla, furthermore, (others say, R. Isaac Nappaha) said: What is R. Judah's reason? — Because it is written in Scripture, And it shall be, that the firstborn that he beareth,  [he is] like the firstborn; as the firstborn has nothing while his father is alive, so has this one  also nothing while his father is alive. If [one were to suggest that] as the firstborn receives a double portion after his father's death so shall this one also receive a double portion  after his father's death, [it might be retorted]: Is it written, 'Shall succeed in the name of his father'? It is written, surely, Shall succeed in the name of his brother,  not 'in the name of his father'.  Might it be suggested that, where the father is not alive to receive the inheritance,  the law of the levirate marriage should be carried out, but where the father is alive [and the levir] does not receive the inheritance the law of the levirate marriage shall not be carried out? — Has the All Merciful in any way made the levirate marriage dependent on the inheritance? The levir must contract the levirate marriage in any case, and if any inheritance is available he receives it; if not, he does not receive it. The Bible teacher, R. Hanina, once sat before R. Jannai, and as he sat there he stated: The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah. The other called out to him: Go out, read Biblical verses outside;  the halachah is not in agreement with R. Judah. A tanna recited in the presence of R. Nahman: The halachah is not in agreement with R. Judah. The other said to him: In agreement with whom, then? In agreement with the Rabbis? This is surely obvious, [since in a dispute between] one individual and a majority the halachah is in agreement with the majority! — 'Shall I', the first asked him, 'reject it'?  'No', the other replied, 'you were taught [that] the halachah is [in agreement with R. Judah] which, presenting to you a difficulty,  you reversed;  and in so far as you reversed it your wording is well justified. MISHNAH. IF A LEVIR PARTICIPATED IN HALIZAH WITH HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIFE HE IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY HER RELATIVES AND SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY HIS RELATIVES: