Yevamot

And Abaye  maintains that a husband's rights  have the same force as his wife's.  Said Raba to him:  If she came into possession of property while she was still With her husband, no one  would dispute the view that his rights are superior to hers.  Both [clauses of our Mishnah], however, [deal with property] which came into her possession while she was awaiting [the decision of] the levir; the first clause speaking of one to whom a ma'amar had not been addressed,  and the final clause, of one to whom a ma'amar had been addressed.  And Raba is of the opinion that a ma'amar, according to Beth Shammai, renders [the widow] definitely betrothed and doubtfully married. She is deemed to be definitely betrothed in respect of excluding her rival;  and she is deemed to be doubtfully married in respect of taking a share in the property. A statement was made in the name of R. Eleazar in agreement with Raba and a statement was made in the name of R. Jose son of R. Hanina in agreement with Abaye. Could R. Eleazar, however, have made such a statement? Surely R. Eleazar said: A ma'amar, according to Beth Shammai, constitutes a kinyan in so far only as to keep out the rival!  — Reverse [the statements]. If you prefer I might say: There is really no need to reverse [them, for] R. Eleazar can tell you, 'What I said [amounted to this]: that a letter of divorce alone is not enough  but that she requires also halizah; did I state, however, that the ma'amar constitutes no kinyan even in respect of taking a share in her property'! Said R. Papa: The inference from our Mishnah is in agreement with the opinion of Abaye,  although 'IF SHE DIED' presents a difficulty.  Seeing that it was stated PROPERTY THAT COMES IN AND GOES OUT WITH HER, what is meant by COMES IN and what by GOES OUT? Obviously,  'COMES INTO the possession of her husband'  and 'GOES OUT from the possession of her husband into the possession of her father'. 'Although IF SHE DIED presents a difficulty': Why should they  dispute [on the question of the property] itself, which can arise only in the event of the woman's death,  let them rather dispute on the question of the usufruct which arises even when the woman is still alive!  The fact is that no further objection [can be raised]. WHERE HE MARRIED HER, SHE IS DEEMED etc. For what practical law [was this statement needed]? — R. Jose b. Hanina replied: To indicate that he may divorce her by means of a letter of divorce  and that he may remarry her. 'He may divorce her by means of a letter of divorce'; Is not this obvious?  — It might have been assumed that, since the All Merciful said  And perform the duty of a husband's brother unto her,  she retains the obligation of the first levirate relationship  and so may be set free  only through halizah but not through a letter of divorce, hence it was necessary to teach us [that the law is not so]. 'He may remarry her'; Is not this obvious?  — It might have been assumed that since he  has already performed  the commandment which the All Merciful has imposed upon him, she shall now be forbidden to him as the wife of his brother, hence it was necessary to teach us [that he may nevertheless remarry her]. Might it not be suggested that the law is so indeed?  — Scripture stated, And take her to him to wife;  as soon as he has taken her she is deemed to be his wife in every respect. SAVE THAT HER KETHUBAH etc. What is the reason? — A wife has been given  to him  from heaven.  If, however, she is unable nothing more'. The inference from our Mishnah is undoubtedly in agreement with the view of Abaye, the only difficulty being the one mentioned. to obtain her kethubah from her first [husband], provision was made that she [is to receive it] from the second  in order that it may not be easy for him to divorce her. MISHNAH. THE DUTY OF THE LEVIRATE MARRIAGE IS INCUMBENT UPON THE ELDEST [OF THE SURVIVING BROTHERS].  IF HE DECLINES, ALL THE OTHER BROTHERS ARE APPROACHED IN TURN.  IF THEY ALL DECLINE, THE ELDEST IS AGAIN APPROACHED AND HE IS TOLD, 'THE DUTY IS INCUMBENT UPON YOU; EITHER SUBMIT TO HALIZAH OR PERFORM THE LEVIRATE MARRIAGE. IF HE  WISHED TO SUSPEND ACTION  UNTIL A MINOR  BECOMES OF AGE, OR UNTIL THE ELDEST  RETURNS FROM A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA OR [UNTIL A BROTHER WHO WAS] DEAF  OR AN IMBECILE [SHOULD RECOVER],  HE IS NOT TO BE LISTENED TO, BUT IS TOLD, 'THE DUTY IS INCUMBENT UPON YOU; EITHER SUBMIT TO HALIZAH OR PERFORM THE LEVIRATE MARRIAGE. GEMARA. It was stated: [On the relative importance of] the intercourse of a younger, and the halizah of an elder brother there is a difference of opinion between R. Johanan and R. Joshua b. Levi. One holds that the intercourse of the younger is preferable and the other holds that the halizah of the elder is preferable. 'One  holds that the intercourse of the younger is preferable,' because the commandment, surely, is to perform the levirate marriage;  and 'the other  holds that the halizah of the elder is preferable', because in the presence of an elder brother the intercourse of the younger is valueless. We learned, IF HE DECLINED, ALL THE OTHER BROTHERS ARE APPROACHED IN TURN. Does not this mean that he declined to contract the levirate marriage but [was willing] to submit to the halizah? And yet it was stated, ALL THE OTHER BROTHERS ARE APPROACHED IN TURN, which proves  that the intercourse of a younger brother is preferred! — No; he wished neither to submit to halizah nor to perform the levirate marriage. Similarly, then, in the case of the other brothers, [the meaning is that] they declined both halizah and levirate marriage;  why, then, is THE ELDEST AGAIN APPROACHED with the object of bringing pressure upon him? Let pressure be brought to bear upon them!  — As the duty  is incumbent upon him, pressure also must be used against him. We learned, IF HE WISHED TO SUSPEND ACTION UNTIL A MINOR BECOMES OF AGE … HE IS NOT TO BE LISTENED TO. But if the intercourse of a minor is to be preferred, why IS HE NOT TO BE LISTENED TO? Let us rather wait, since on becoming of age he might contract the levirate marriage! — Following your view [it might similarly be objected], why [if he wished to wait] UNTIL THE ELDEST RETURNS FROM A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA … HE IS NOT TO BE LISTENED TO? Let us rather wait, since on his return he might contract the levirate marriage!  The fact is that the performance of a commandment must not be delayed.