Yevamot

What is the point at issue between them?  -R. Jose's view  with regard to a comprehensive prohibition.  R. Hiyya is of the opinion that in the case of a comprehensive prohibition R. Jose deems the transgressor guilty of two offences,  while Bar Kappara is of the opinion that he deems him guilty of one offence only.  But what comprehensive prohibition. is here involved? In the case of a common man  this  may well be understood, since at first  he was permitted to do ordinary work though forbidden to perform the Temple service, and when Sabbath came in, as he was now forbidden to do any other work,  so he was also forbidden to perform the Temple service.  [Similarly with a priest] who had a blemish,  since he was at first  permitted to eat [of sacrificial meat] though forbidden to perform the Temple service, now that he became defiled, as he was forbidden to eat of sacrificial meat  so he was also forbidden to perform the Temple service.  Mehkah. however, is only an illustration  of prohibitions that set in simultaneously  but not of a comprehensive prohibition!  -Rather, the point at issue between them  is that of simultaneous prohibitions' and R. Jose's view  regarding them. R. Hiyya is of the opinion that in the case of simultaneous prohibitions R. Jose deems the transgressor guilty of two offences,  while Bar Kappara is of the opinion that he deems him guilty of one offence only.  But how are here simultaneous prohibitions possible?  — In the case of a common man who performed the Temple service on the Sabbath, when, for instance, he grew two hairs  on the Sabbath, so that the prohibitions of Temple service by a common man and of work on the Sabbath have simultaneously arisen.  [In the case of a priest] who had a blemish, also, when, for instance, he grew two hairs,  while he was unclean, so that [his disability as] a man with a blemish and his uncleanness  have simultaneously arisen.  Or else, if a man cut his finger with an unclean knife. Now according to [the statement of] R. Hiyya it is quite possible to explain  that he  was taught  in accordance with the view of R. Jose, and that Bar Kappara was taught in accordance with the view of R. Simeon.  According to [the statement of] Bar Kappara, however,  did R. Hiyya swear falsely?  -Rather, the question at issue between them  is that of simultaneous prohibitions, and the view of R. Simeon  on the subject. One can well understand why R. Hiyya took an oath. He did it in order to weaken the force  of R. Simeon s view.  What need, however, was there for Bar Kappara to take an oath? — This is a difficulty. Now according to [the statement of] Bar Kappara. it is possible to explain  that when Rabbi taught him he was enunciating the opinion of R. Simeon,  and that when he taught R. Hiyya he was enunciating the opinion of R. Jose.  According to [the statement] of R. Hiyya. however,  did Bar Kappara  tell a lie?  R. Hiyya can answer you:  When Rabbi taught him, he taught him two instances  only where the transgressor is exempt,