Yevamot

or not clear,  though [in either case] it Is always in the same condition,  or is it possible that he has no doubt that the [deaf man's] mind is feeble and that it is not clear,  but [his doubt] here is due to this reason: Because [the deaf man] may sometimes be in a normal state  and sometimes in a state of imbecility? In what respect would this constitute any practical difference? — In respect of releasing his wife  by a letter of divorce.  If you grant that his mind is always in the same condition,  his divorce [would have the same validity] as his betrothal.  If, however, you contend that sometimes he is in a normal state  and sometimes he is in a state of imbecility, he would indeed be capable of betrothal; in no way, however, would he be capable of giving divorce.  What then is the decision? — This remains undecided. IF SHE BECAME AN IMBECILE etc. R. Isaac stated: According to the word of the Torah, an imbecile may be divorced,  since her case is similar to that of a woman of sound senses [who may be divorced] without her consent. What then is the reason why it was stated that she may not be divorced? — In order that people should not treat her as a piece of ownerless property. What kind [of imbecile, however, is here] to be understood? If it be suggested [that it is one] who is capable of taking care of her letter of divorce and who is also capable of taking care of herself, would people [it may be asked] treat her as if she were ownerless property! If, however, [she is one] who is unable to take care either of her letter of divorce or of herself, [how could it be said that] in accordance with the word of the Torah she may be divorced? Surely, it was stated at the school of R. Jannai, And giveth it in her hand  [only to her] who is capable of accepting her divorce,  but this one  is excluded since she is incapable of accepting her divorce; and, furthermore, it was taught at the school of R. Ishmael, And sendeth her out of his house,  only one who, when he sends her out, does not return, but this one  is excluded since she returns even if he sends her out! — This  was necessary  in respect of one who is capable of preserving her letter of divorce but is unable to take proper care of herself. Hence, in accordance with the word of the Torah, such an imbecile may well be divorced for, surely, she is capable of preserving her letter of divorce; the Rabbis, however, ruled that she shall not be dismissed in order that people might not treat her as a piece of ownerless property. Abaye remarked: This  may also be supported by deduction. For in respect of her  it was stated, IF SHE BECAME AN IMBECILE HE MAY NOT DIVORCE HER, while in respect of him  [the statement was]. HE MAY NEVER DIVORCE HER. In what respect [it may be asked] does he  differ [from her] that the statement [concerning him] is NEVER while in respect of her 'NEVER' is not mentioned?  The inference, then, must be that the one is Pentateuchal, the other Rabbinical. R. JOHANAN B. NURI ASKED etc. The question was raised: Was R. Johanan b. Nuri certain [of the law concerning] the man  and his question related to that of the woman, or is it possible that he was certain concerning that of the woman  and his question related to that of the man? — Come and hear: Since they answered him: A MAN WHO GIVES A DIVORCE IS NOT LIKE A WOMAN WHO IS DIVORCED. FOR WHILE A WOMAN MAY BE DIVORCED WITH HER CONSENT AS WELL AS WITHOUT IT, A MAN CAN GIVE A DIVORCE ONLY WITH HIS FULL CONSENT, it may be inferred  that his question related to the man.  On the contrary; since they said to him: THE OTHER ALSO IS IN A SIMILAR POSITION,  it may be inferred that his question related to the woman! — But [the fact is this]: R. Johanan b. Nuri was addressing [them  in the light] of their own statement. 'According to my view', [he argued], 'as well as a man  is incapable of giving a divorce, so also is a woman  incapable of receiving a divorce;  but according to your view,  why should there be a difference between a man and a woman?'  [To this] they replied: A MAN WHO GIVES A DIVORCE IS NOT LIKE A WOMAN WHO IS DIVORCED. R. JOHANAN … TESTIFIED etc. Raba stated: From the testimony of R. Johanan b. Gudgada  [it may be inferred that if a husband] said to witnesses, 'See this letter of divorce which I am giving [to my wife]', and to her he said,  'Take this bill of indebtedness', she is nevertheless divorced. For did not R. Johanan b. Gudgada imply that [the woman's] consent was not required?  Here also, then, her consent is not required. Is not this obvious!  — It might have been assumed that since he said to her, 'Take this bill of indebtedness'  he has thereby cancelled [the letter of divorce], hence we were taught [that it remains valid, for] had he in fact cancelled it, he would have made his statement to the witnesses. Since, however, he did not make the statement to the witnesses he did not cancel it at all; and the only reason why he made that statement to her was  to conceal [his] shame. R. Isaac b. Bisna once lost the keys of the school house in a public domain  on a Sabbath.  When he came to R. Pedath  the latter said to him, 'Go and