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שבועות 43

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1 If a man give unto his neighbour — is a generalisation; silver or vessels — are specifications; to keep — is another generalisation: where there is generalisation, specification, and generalisation, you may include only those things which are similar to the specification: just as the specification is clearly a thing which is movable and intrinsically worth money, so everything which is movable, and intrinsically worth money [may be included], but exclude lands, which are not movable, exclude slaves, which are likened to land, and exclude bonds which, though they are movable, are not intrinsically worth money. As for dedicated things, it is written, his neighbour. A PAID GUARDIAN DOES NOT PAY. Whence do we know this? — Our Rabbis taught: If a man give unto his neighbour — is a generalisation; an ass, or an ox, or a sheep — are specifications; or any beast, to keep — is another generalisation: where there is generalisation, specification, and generalisation, etc. till: as for dedicated things, it is written, his neighbour. R. MEIR SAID: THERE ARE THINGS WHICH ARE [ATTACHED] TO LAND, BUT ARE NOT LIKE LAND, ETC. Hence, R. Meir holds that which is attached to land is not counted like land? — Then why do they disagree about laden [vines], let them disagree about fruitless [trees]! — R. Jose son of R. Hanina said: Here they disagree about grapes which are ready to be cut, R. Meir holding they are as if they are already cut; whereas the Rabbis hold they are not as if they are already cut. AN OATH IS IMPOSED ONLY FOR A THING [DEFINED] BY SIZE, WEIGHT, etc. Abaye said: They did not teach [that an oath is not imposed] except when he said to him: ‘A HOUSE’ merely; but if he said to him: ‘This house full etc.’ his claim is known. — Said Raba to him: If so, why does he teach in the later clause: THIS ONE SAID: ‘[I GAVE YOU PRODUCE REACHING] UP TO THE MOULDING [ABOVE THE WINDOW],’ AND THE OTHER SAID: ‘ONLY UP TO THE WINDOW,’ HE IS LIABLE. Let him make a distinction in teaching this [first] clause itself — [thus:] When is it stated [that an oath is not imposed] — only if he says: ‘A full house,’ but if he says: ‘This full house,’ he is liable! — But said Raba: He is never liable unless he claims from him a thing [that is defined] by size, weight, or number; and he admits to him a thing [that is defined] by size, weight, or number. It was taught in support of Raba: [If a man says,] ‘A kor of grain of mine you have in your possession’; and the other says: ‘I have not of yours in my possession,’ he is exempt. ‘A large candlestick of mine you have in your possession.’ — ‘I have of yours in my possession only a small candlestick,’ he is exempt. ‘A large girdle of mine you have in your possession.’ — I have of yours in my possession only a small girdle,’ he is exempt. But if he said to him: ‘A kor of grain of mine you have in your possession,’ and the other said: ‘I have of yours in my possession only a lethek [of grain],’ he is liable. ‘A candlestick of [the weight of] ten litras you have of mine in your possession.’ — ‘I have of yours in my possession [a candlestick of the weight of] only five litras,’ he is liable. The principle of the matter is: He is never liable unless he claims from him a thing [that is defined] by size, weight, or number; and he admits to him a thing [that is defined] by size, weight, or number. Now, ‘The principle of the matter’: what does this include? Does it not include [the case where he says]: ‘This house full etc.’? Now, what is the difference? [In the case of] ‘large candlestick and small candlestick,’ [he is exempt because] what he claimed from him, he did not admit to him; and what he admitted to him, he did not claim from him; if so, [in the case of] ‘ten litras and five litras [weight]’ he should also be exempt, because what he claimed from him, he did not admit to him; and what he admitted to him, he did not claim from him! — R. Samuel son of R. Isaac said: Here we are discussing a candlestick of sections, of which he admits a portion. — If so, [in the case of] girdle also let him teach [a similar law], and explain it as referring to pieces sewn together! But [you must conclude that] he [the Tanna] does not state [the case of a girdle made up of] pieces sewn together. Here also [then], he would not state [the case of a candlestick made up of] separate sections! — But said R. Abba b. Mammal: A candlestick is different, because he can scrape it and reduce it to five litras. MISHNAH. IF A MAN LENDS [MONEY] TO HIS NEIGHBOUR ON A PLEDGE, AND THE PLEDGE WAS LOST, AND HE SAID TO HIM: ‘I LENT YOU A SELA’ ON IT, AND IT WAS WORTH A SHEKEL,’ AND THE OTHER SAYS: ‘NO! YOU LENT ME A SELA’ ON IT, AND IT WAS WORTH A SELA’,’ HE IS EXEMPT. ‘I LENT YOU A SELA’ ON IT, AND IT WAS WORTH A SHEKEL,’ AND THE OTHER SAYS: ‘NO! YOU LENT ME A SELA’ ON IT, AND IT WAS WORTH THREE DENARII,’ HE IS LIABLE. ‘YOU LENT ME A SELA’ ON IT, AND IT WAS WORTH TWO,’ AND THE OTHER SAYS: ‘NO! I LENT YOU A SELA’ ON IT, AND IT WAS WORTH A SELA’,’ HE IS EXEMPT. ‘YOU LENT ME A SELA’ ON IT, AND IT WAS WORTH TWO,’ AND THE OTHER SAYS: ‘NO! I LENT YOU A SELA’ ON IT, AND IT WAS WORTH FIVE DENARII,’ HE IS LIABLE. AND WHO TAKES THE OATH? HE WHO HAD THE DEPOSIT, LEST, IF THE OTHER TAKE THE OATH, THIS ONE MAY BRING OUT THE DEPOSIT.29ʰʲˡʳˢʷˣʸᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜ

2 GEMARA. To what does it refer? Shall we say, to the last clause? You may infer this [in any case], for the oath devolves upon the lender! — Said Samuel: It refers to the first clause: and so said R. Hiyya b. Rab: It refers to the first clause; and so said R. Johanan: It refers to the first clause. — Which first clause? The latter part of the first clause: ‘I LENT YOU A SELA’ ON IT, AND IT WAS WORTH A SHEKEL,’ AND THE OTHER SAYS: ‘NO! YOU LENT ME A SELA’ ON IT, AND IT WAS WORTH THREE DENARII,’ HE IS LIABLE. For here the oath devolves upon the borrower, but the Rabbis removed it from the borrower, and imposed it upon the lender. But now that R. Ashi has said that we have established that this one swears that it is not in his possession, and the other one swears how much it was worth, he means thus: WHO TAKES THE OATH first? HE WHO HAD THE DEPOSIT, LEST, IF THE OTHER TAKE THE OATH [FIRST], THIS ONE MAY BRING OUT THE DEPOSIT. Samuel said: If one lent a thousand zuz to his neighbour, who deposited with him as a pledge the handle of a saw; if the handle of the saw was lost, the thousand zuz are lost; but in the case of two handles we do not say this. But R. Nahman Says, even in the case of two handles, if he lost one, he loses five hundred [zuz], if he lost [also] the other, he loses the whole [loan]; but in the case of a handle and a bar [of silver] we do not say this. The Nehardeans say, even in the case of a handle and silver bar, if he lost the silver bar, he loses half [the loan], if he lost [also] the handle, he loses the whole [loan]. We learnt: ‘I LENT YOU A SELA’ ON IT, AND IT WAS WORTH A SHEKEL,’ AND THE OTHER SAYS: ‘NO! YOU LENT ME A SELA’ ON IT, AND IT WAS WORTH THREE DENARII,’ HE IS LIABLE. — [Now why?] Let him say to him: ‘But you accepted it [as security]’! — Our Mishnah [refers to a case] where he stated explicitly; and Samuel [refers to a case] where he did not state this explicitly. Shall we say that Tannaim [disagree on this point]? [For it was taught:] If a man lends his neighbour [money] on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, he swears, and takes his money: this is the opinion of R. Eliezer. R. Akiba says: He may say to him: ‘Did you not lend me because of the pledge? Since the pledge is lost, your money is lost.’ But if one lends a thousand zuz on a bond, and he deposited a pledge with him, all agree that if the pledge is lost, the money is lost. — Now, how is this? If the pledge is equal to the amount of the loan,ᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠᵃʳᵃˢᵃᵗᵃᵘᵃᵛᵃʷ