Shevuot

The second set are still available!1 — Rabina said: Here we are discussing [a case] where the second set, at the time of the denial of the first set, were related through their wives, and their wives were dying; you might have thought that [because we say] the majority of dying people actually die [the second set are reckoned eligible witnesses];2 therefore he teaches us [that they are not, because] as yet the wives are alive and not dead.3 Come and hear: If the trustee4 pleaded the plea of theft in the case of a deposit,5 and swore, then confessed, and witnesses came — if before the witnesses came he confessed, he pays the principal, the fifth, and brings a guilt offering;6 if after the witnesses came he confessed, he pays double,7 and brings a guilt offering!8 — Here also, as Rabina said.9 Rabina said to R. Ashi: Come and hear: The oath of deposit is more severe than it,10 for one is liable for its wilful transgression, stripes, and for its unwitting transgression, a guilt offering of [the value of] two silver shekels. Now, since he says he receives stripes, it follows that there are witnesses; and yet he says, for its unwitting transgression a guilt offering of [the value of] two silver shekels.11 — R. Mordecai said to them:12 Away with this [Baraitha]; for, lo. R. Kahana said to them: I learnt it, and thus I learnt it: Both for its wilful and unwitting transgression [the penalty is] a guilt offering of [the value of] two silver shekels.13 Come and hear: No! If you say in the case of a nazirite who had become unclean [that such and such is the case], it is because he receives stripes, but how can you say in the case of an oath of deposit [that such and such is the case] since its transgressor does not receive stripes!14 — Now, how is this? If there are no witnesses, why does he receive stripes? Obviously, therefore, there are witnesses; and yet he states: ‘How can you say in the case of an oath of deposit [that such and such is the case] since its transgressor does not receive stripes?’ — stripes he does not receive, but an offering he brings! Verily, a refutation of Rabbah's view!15 It is a refutation! R. Johanan said: He who denies [on oath] money for which there are witnesses, is liable;16 for which there is a bond, is exempt. R. Papa said: What is R. Johanan's reason? Because witnesses are likely to die,17 but the bond remains.18 Said R. Huna the son of R. Joshua to R. Papa: But a bond, too, is likely to be lost! — However, said R. Huna the son of R. Joshua: This is R. Johanan's reason: A bond is a hypothecary pledge of lands,19 and an offering is not brought for a denial of a hypothecary pledge of lands. It was stated: He who adjures witnesses for land,20 — R. Johanan and R. Eleazar disagree: one says they are liable,21 and the other says they are exempt. It may be concluded that it is R. Johanan who says they are exempt, for R. Johanan said: He who denies money for which there are witnesses is liable; for which there is a bond, is exempt; and as R. Huna the son of R. Joshua [explained it].22 It is conclusive. R. Jeremiah said to R. Abbahu: Shall we say that R. Johanan and R. Eleazar disagree on the same principle on which R. Eliezer and the Rabbis [disagree]? For we learnt: He who robs a field from his neighbour and a river flooded it, must restore a field to him: this is the opinion of R. Eliezer; but the Sages say: He may say to him, ‘Lo, thine own is before thee.’23 And we said: On what do they disagree? R. Eliezer expounds ‘amplifications and limitations,’ and the Rabbis [Sages] expound ‘generalisations and specifications.’24 R. Eliezer expounds ‘amplifications and limitations’: and lie unto his neighbour25 — this amplifies;26 in deposit or loan — this limits; or any thing about which he hath sworn27 — this again amplifies; since it amplifies, limits, and amplifies, it includes all. What does it include? It includes all things: and what does it exclude? It excludes bonds.28 And the Rabbis expound ‘generalisations and specifications’: and lie unto his neighbour — this generalises; in deposit or loan or robbery — this specifies; or any thing about which he hath sworn — this again generalises; since it generalises, specifies, and generalises, you may include only that which is similar to the specification: just as the specification is clearly movable and intrinsically money, so everything which is movable and intrinsically money [may be included], but exclude lands,29 which are not movable, and exclude slaves, which have been likened to lands, and exclude bonds, which, though they are movable, are not intrinsically money. — [Now, shall we say that] he who makes them liable agrees with R. Eliezer,30 and he who exempts them agrees with the Rabbis?31 — He said to him:32 No! He who makes them liable agrees with R. Eliezer; but he who exempts them, may tell you that in this even R. Eliezer agrees,33 for Scripture say's, ‘of all’, and not, ‘all’.34 R. Papa said in the name of Raba: Our Mishnah too is evidence,35 for it states: ‘THOU HAST STOLEN MY OX,’ AND THE OTHER SAYS, ‘I HAVE NOT STOLEN IT.’ — ‘I ADJURE THEE,’ AND HE RESPONDS, ‘AMEN!’ HE IS LIABLE. — Now, ‘Thou hast stolen my slave’ it does not state. What is the reason? is it not because a slave is likened to land, and an offering is not brought for a denial of a hypothecary pledge of lands? — Said R. Pappi in the name of Raba: Say the final clause: THIS IS THE PRINCIPLE: WHENEVER HE PAYS ON HIS OWN ADMISSION, HE IS LIABLE; AND WHEN HE DOES NOT PAY ON HIS OWN ADMISSION, HE IS EXEMPT. — This is the principle: What does this include?36 Does it not include [the case where he claims], ‘Thou hast stolen my slave’?37 not harmed the claimant), we may deduce that a denial of money for which there are witnesses (in this case, the second set), though it is ineffective, is still deemed a denial; and the transgressor is liable. This is opposed to Rabbah's view. are counted as non-existent; he therefore brings an offering. from this Baraitha, refute Rabbah's view. offering is brought for a denial on oath in such a case. owner's property. therefore holds that he who robs a field, which was later flooded, must recompense the owner. on oath, are liable to bring an offering. He will therefore agree with R. Eliezer who holds that land may be stolen and is in the same category as other goods. it was at the time of the robbery (or the owner recompensed), he agrees that there is no liability to bring an offering for a false oath in a land claim, for with reference to oath Scripture says: of all things about which he hath sworn falsely . . . he hall bring his guilt offering; this implies that an offering is not brought for all things, but of all things: of excludes something, i.e., land, because land is (after bonds) least similar to the particulars mentioned by Scripture. something additional. oath.