1 to them: If he wilfully transgressed the oath of deposit, and [witnesses] warned him, what is the ruling? Since it presents an anomaly in that in the whole Torah we do not find that a wilful transgressor brings an offering, and here he brings an offering; there is therefore no difference whether he is warned or not warned; or, it applies only when he is not warned; but when he is warned, he receives stripes, and does not bring an offering; or, do we impose both [punishments] on him? — They said to him: We have it stated [in a Baraitha]: The oath of deposit is more severe than it; for one is liable for its wilful transgression, stripes, and for its unwitting transgression, a guilt offering of [the value of] two silver shekels. Now, since it says: ‘for its wilful transgression, stripes,’ we deduce they warned him; and yet it says stripes only and not an offering! And wherein lies then the greater severity? [In that] a man prefers to bring an offering rather than suffer stripes. Said Raba b. Ithi to them: [No! this affords no solution, for] who is the Tanna [who holds that] wilful transgression of oath of deposit is not atoned for by an offering? It is R. Simeon; but according to the Rabbis, he brings an offering also. — R. Kahana said to them: Away with this [Baraitha]; for I learnt it, and thus l learnt it: Both for its wilful and unwitting transgression [the penalty is] a guilt offering of [the value of] two silver shekels. And wherein lies its greater severity? There [he may bring] a sin offering of the value of a danka, whereas here [he must bring] a guilt offering of the value of two shekels of silver. Let us then deduce from this! — Perhaps [it refers to the case where] they did not warn him. Another version. Come and hear: One is not liable for its unwitting transgression. To what is one liable for its wilful transgression? A guilt offering of [the value of] two shekels of silver. Now does this not refer to the case where they warned him? — [No!] Here also it may refer to the case where they did not warn him. Come and hear: No! If you say in the case of a nazirite who had become unclean [that such and such is the case], it is because he receives stripes, but how can you say in the case of the oath of deposit [that such and such is the case], since its transgressor does not receive stripes? Since it says, ‘he receives stripes,’ we deduce that they warned him; and it says, ‘how can you say in the case of the oath of deposit [that such and such is the case], since its transgressor does not receive stripes?’ — but [presumably] an offering he brings! — What is meant by ‘he does not receive stripes’ is that he is not freed by stripes. Do we infer then that a nazirite who had become unclean is freed by stripes? Surely an offering is [specifically] mentioned with reference to him! — There he brings an offering merely in order that his naziriteship should recommence in cleanliness. The Scholars told this to Rabbah. He said to them: Hence, if they did not warn him, though there are witnesses, he is liable, [but surely] it is [like] a merely [useless] denial of words! This shows that Rabbah [himself] holds, he who denies money for which there are witnesses, is exempt. R. Hanina said to Rabbah: There is [a Baraitha] taught in support of your view: And denieth it — except if he admits it to one of the brothers or one of the partners; and sweareth falsely — except if he borrowed on a bond or borrowed in the presence of witnesses! — He said to him: From this you can bring no support to my view. [It refers to a case where] he says, ‘I borrowed, but I did not borrow in the presence of witnesses’; ‘I borrowed, but I did not borrow on a bond.’ How [do we know it refers to such a case]? Because it states: ‘and denieth it — except if he admits it to one of the brothers or one of the partners.’ [Now,] ‘to one of the brothers’ — what does it mean? Shall we say [it means] he admits his half? But there is the denial of the other! Obviously then, it means, they say to him: ‘From both of us you borrowed,’ and he replies to them: ‘No! From one of you I borrowed’; and this is simply a denial of words. And since the first clause refers to a denial of words, the second clause also refers to a denial of words. (Mnemonic: Liable, sets [of witnesses], of the trustee, the severity, of the nazirite. ) Come and hear: He is not liable for its unwitting transgression; and to what is he liable for its wilful transgression? A guilt offering of [the value of] two silver shekels. Does it not mean wilful transgression [after warning by] witnesses? — No! [It may mean] wilful transgression on his own account. Come and hear: If there were two sets of witnesses, and the first denied, and then the second denied, they are both liable, because the testimony could be upheld by [either of] the two. Now granted, the second set should be liable, for the first set have denied; but the first set — why should they be liable?ᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷˣʸᶻᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠᵃʳᵃˢᵃᵗ
2 The second set are still available! — Rabina said: Here we are discussing [a case] where the second set, at the time of the denial of the first set, were related through their wives, and their wives were dying; you might have thought that [because we say] the majority of dying people actually die [the second set are reckoned eligible witnesses]; therefore he teaches us [that they are not, because] as yet the wives are alive and not dead. Come and hear: If the trustee pleaded the plea of theft in the case of a deposit, and swore, then confessed, and witnesses came — if before the witnesses came he confessed, he pays the principal, the fifth, and brings a guilt offering; if after the witnesses came he confessed, he pays double, and brings a guilt offering! — Here also, as Rabina said. Rabina said to R. Ashi: Come and hear: The oath of deposit is more severe than it, for one is liable for its wilful transgression, stripes, and for its unwitting transgression, a guilt offering of [the value of] two silver shekels. Now, since he says he receives stripes, it follows that there are witnesses; and yet he says, for its unwitting transgression a guilt offering of [the value of] two silver shekels. — R. Mordecai said to them: Away with this [Baraitha]; for, lo. R. Kahana said to them: I learnt it, and thus I learnt it: Both for its wilful and unwitting transgression [the penalty is] a guilt offering of [the value of] two silver shekels. Come and hear: No! If you say in the case of a nazirite who had become unclean [that such and such is the case], it is because he receives stripes, but how can you say in the case of an oath of deposit [that such and such is the case] since its transgressor does not receive stripes! — Now, how is this? If there are no witnesses, why does he receive stripes? Obviously, therefore, there are witnesses; and yet he states: ‘How can you say in the case of an oath of deposit [that such and such is the case] since its transgressor does not receive stripes?’ — stripes he does not receive, but an offering he brings! Verily, a refutation of Rabbah's view! It is a refutation! R. Johanan said: He who denies [on oath] money for which there are witnesses, is liable; for which there is a bond, is exempt. R. Papa said: What is R. Johanan's reason? Because witnesses are likely to die, but the bond remains. Said R. Huna the son of R. Joshua to R. Papa: But a bond, too, is likely to be lost! — However, said R. Huna the son of R. Joshua: This is R. Johanan's reason: A bond is a hypothecary pledge of lands, and an offering is not brought for a denial of a hypothecary pledge of lands. It was stated: He who adjures witnesses for land, — R. Johanan and R. Eleazar disagree: one says they are liable, and the other says they are exempt. It may be concluded that it is R. Johanan who says they are exempt, for R. Johanan said: He who denies money for which there are witnesses is liable; for which there is a bond, is exempt; and as R. Huna the son of R. Joshua [explained it]. It is conclusive. R. Jeremiah said to R. Abbahu: Shall we say that R. Johanan and R. Eleazar disagree on the same principle on which R. Eliezer and the Rabbis [disagree]? For we learnt: He who robs a field from his neighbour and a river flooded it, must restore a field to him: this is the opinion of R. Eliezer; but the Sages say: He may say to him, ‘Lo, thine own is before thee.’ And we said: On what do they disagree? R. Eliezer expounds ‘amplifications and limitations,’ and the Rabbis [Sages] expound ‘generalisations and specifications.’ R. Eliezer expounds ‘amplifications and limitations’: and lie unto his neighbour — this amplifies; in deposit or loan — this limits; or any thing about which he hath sworn — this again amplifies; since it amplifies, limits, and amplifies, it includes all. What does it include? It includes all things: and what does it exclude? It excludes bonds. And the Rabbis expound ‘generalisations and specifications’: and lie unto his neighbour — this generalises; in deposit or loan or robbery — this specifies; or any thing about which he hath sworn — this again generalises; since it generalises, specifies, and generalises, you may include only that which is similar to the specification: just as the specification is clearly movable and intrinsically money, so everything which is movable and intrinsically money [may be included], but exclude lands, which are not movable, and exclude slaves, which have been likened to lands, and exclude bonds, which, though they are movable, are not intrinsically money. — [Now, shall we say that] he who makes them liable agrees with R. Eliezer, and he who exempts them agrees with the Rabbis? — He said to him: No! He who makes them liable agrees with R. Eliezer; but he who exempts them, may tell you that in this even R. Eliezer agrees, for Scripture say's, ‘of all’, and not, ‘all’. R. Papa said in the name of Raba: Our Mishnah too is evidence, for it states: ‘THOU HAST STOLEN MY OX,’ AND THE OTHER SAYS, ‘I HAVE NOT STOLEN IT.’ — ‘I ADJURE THEE,’ AND HE RESPONDS, ‘AMEN!’ HE IS LIABLE. — Now, ‘Thou hast stolen my slave’ it does not state. What is the reason? is it not because a slave is likened to land, and an offering is not brought for a denial of a hypothecary pledge of lands? — Said R. Pappi in the name of Raba: Say the final clause: THIS IS THE PRINCIPLE: WHENEVER HE PAYS ON HIS OWN ADMISSION, HE IS LIABLE; AND WHEN HE DOES NOT PAY ON HIS OWN ADMISSION, HE IS EXEMPT. — This is the principle: What does this include? Does it not include [the case where he claims], ‘Thou hast stolen my slave’?37ᵃᵘᵃᵛᵃʷᵃˣᵃʸᵃᶻᵇᵃᵇᵇᵇᶜᵇᵈᵇᵉᵇᶠᵇᵍᵇʰᵇⁱᵇʲᵇᵏᵇˡᵇᵐᵇⁿᵇᵒᵇᵖᵇᵠᵇʳᵇˢᵇᵗᵇᵘᵇᵛᵇʷᵇˣᵇʸᵇᶻᶜᵃᶜᵇᶜᶜᶜᵈᶜᵉ