Shevuot

each [oath], whether [uttered] before the Beth Din or not before the Beth Din,1 yet deals only with a money claim; testimony, where the law does not make women equal to men, relatives equal to non-relatives, those ineligible [to bear testimony] equal to those eligible, and where he is liable only once [if adjured] before the Beth Din, how much more that it should deal only with a money claim!2 — [No! We may argue:] Deposit [is restricted to money claims] because the law does not make him who is adjured [by others] equal to him who swears [of his own accord], or him who swears wilfully like him who swears unwittingly; but how can you say in [the case of] testimony [that it should be restricted to money claims], since the law makes him who is adjured [by others] equal to him who swears [of his own accord], and him who swears wilfully equal to him who swears unwittingly? — It is said: sin, sin, for deduction by analogy;3 here4 it is said: [If any one] sin,5 and there6 it is said: [If any one] sin;7 just as there it deals only with a money claim, so here it deals only with a money claim. Rabbah b. Ulla raised an objection:8 Or . . . or of [the oath of] utterance9 will prove [that a money claim is not intended], for they are or . . . or, and are concerned with an oath, and not concerned with a priest, and yet deal not with a money claim!10 — It is more reasonable to deduce it from deposit, because [we may deduce] ‘sin’11 from ‘sin’.12 — On the contrary, we should deduce it from [the oath of] utterance, for [we may deduce] sin offering from sin offering!13 — Well, it is more reasonable to deduce it from deposit, because [they are both equal in respect of] sin,14 wilful,15 claim and denial,16 past.17 On the contrary, we should deduce it from [oath of] utterance, because [they are both equal in respect of] sin offering, sliding scale, fifth!18 — The others are more.19 ‘R. Akiba said: And it shall be, when he shall be guilty in one of these things — in some of these things he is liable, and in some of these things he is exempt; how is this? If he claimed from him money, he is liable; if he claimed from him something else, he is exempt.’20 Let me reverse it!21 — R. Akiba relies on the or . . . or of R. Eliezer.22 — [If so,] what is the difference between R. Eliezer and R. Akiba?23 — The difference between them is, if he adjures witnesses for land: according to R. Eliezer24 they are liable, according to R. Akiba they are exempt. — But according to R. Johanan who says there25 that if he adjures witnesses for land, they are exempt even according to R. Eliezer, what will be the difference here between R. Eliezer and R. Akiba? — The difference between them will be witnesses for a fine.26 ‘R. Jose the Galilean said: He being a witness, whether he hath seen or known — of such testimony as may be established by seeing without knowing, and by knowing without seeing, the verse deals.’27 R. Papa said to Abaye: Shall we say that R. Jose the Galilean28 does not agree with R. Aha? For it was taught: R. Aha said; If a camel copulates among other camels, and one camel is found killed at his side, it is known that he killed him.29 Now, if he would agree with R. Aha, it is possible also in capital cases, as [in the incident related by] R. Simeon b. Shetah, for we learnt, R. Simeon b. Shetah said; May I not see the consolation [of Zion] if I did not see a man running after his neighbour into a ruin, and I ran after him, and found him with a sword in his hand with the blood dripping, and the victim writhing in agony. I said to him: ‘Wicked one! Who killed this man? I or you? But what can I do, since your blood is not given into my hand, for Scripture says: At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is to die be put to death.30 But the Omnipresent will exact retribution from you!’ It is said, they had not yet moved from there, when a serpent bit him, and he died!31 — You may say, he does agree with R. Aha. Granted, knowing without seeing is possible,32 but seeing without knowing how is that possible?33 Does he not need to know if he killed a heathen or a Jew,34 if he killed a man suffering from a fatal disease or a healthy man? We may deduce that R. Jose the Galilean holds that if he adjures witnesses for a fine,35 they are exempt, for if you will say they are liable, granted that knowing without seeing is possible,36 but seeing without knowing — [how is that possible]? Does he not need to know if he cohabited with a heathen woman or a Jewish woman, with a virgin or with a woman who is not a virgin?37 R. Hamnuna sat before Rab Judah, and Rab Judah sat and enquired; [If one said;] ‘A hundred zuz I counted out to you before So-and-So and So-and-So’; only, the law concerning the oath of testimony, which is restricted in many points, should the more so be restricted to money claims. whereas for transgression of oath of deposit a guilt offering is brought. brought only for unwitting transgression. anything with me’ — deposit); but the oath of utterance is mainly concerned with the future (‘I swear I shall eat’), for Scripture clearly implies the future: to do evil, or to do good (though according to R. Akiba it is possible to deduce the past also; supra 25a). the principal is imposed, whereas in the case of deposit, the liability is for a guilt offering, which is a fixed sacrifice, and a fine of a fifth of the principal is imposed. to deduce testimony from deposit (and infer that it deals only with money claims) rather than deduce it from utterance (and infer that it is not restricted to money claims). mention money claims. Akiba says that in some cases (of money claims) the witnesses are liable, and in some they are exempt. adjures witnesses in a case where only a fine would be imposed, they are liable if they withhold their testimony; according to R. Akiba they are exempt. without seeing; but in other matters both seeing and knowing are necessary. R Aha thus holds that circumstantial evidence is equivalent to definite knowledge, v. B.B. 93a; Sanh. 37b. definite knowledge, why does he say that only in money matters is it possible to have testimony based on knowing without seeing? Hence, he does not agree with R. Aha. whether or not the victim e.g., suffered from a fatal disease (in which case the murderer does not pay the extreme penalty;)? Sanh. 78a? R. Jose therefore rightly says that only in money matters is it possible to have evidence based on seeing without knowing. adjured in the case of a fine, and they withhold testimony, they are exempt; for he holds that the oath of testimony is applicable only in such a case where testimony may be established by seeing without knowing, and by knowing without seeing.