Shevuot

Said R. Papa to them: If the Rabbis deduce it from [the law of] deposit, none disagrees that we ‘deduce from it, and [entirely] from it’;1 but this is the reason of the Rabbis; they deduce it by inference from minor to major:2 since, if [adjured] by others, he is liable; if [he swears] of his own accord, how much more so should he be liable; and because they deduce it by inference from minor to major, [they hold] it is sufficient for that which is deduced by this inference to be similar to that from which it is deduced:3 just as, if adjured by others, he is liable before the Beth Din only, but not outside the Beth Din; so, if he swears of his own accord, he is liable before the Beth Din only, but not outside the Beth Din. Said the Scholars to R. Papa: How can you say that they do not disagree on [the principle of] ‘deduce from it, and [entirely] from it’? Surely we learnt concerning a deposit: The oath of deposit applies to men and women, to non-relatives and relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and those unqualified, before the Beth Din and not before the Beth Din, if [uttered] from his own mouth; but if [adjured] by the mouth of others, he is not liable unless he denies it before the Beth Din: this is the opinion of R. Meir. And the Sages say, whether [uttered] by his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others, since he denied it, he is liable.4 [Now,] if adjured by the mouth of others, in [the case of] a deposit, how do the Sages know that he is liable?5 Is it not because they deduce it from [the case of] testimony?6 Hence, you must infer from this that they disagree on [the principle of] ‘deduce from it, and [entirely] from it’!7 — [R. Papa replied:] From this, yes;8 but from the other it is not possible to infer it. AND THEY ARE LIABLE FOR THE WILFUL TRANSGRESSION OF THE OATH. How do we know this? — For our Rabbis taught: In all of them9 it is said, and it be hid [from him]; but here it is not said, and it be hid, in order to make him liable for wilful as for unwitting transgression. 10 AND FOR ITS UNWITTING TRANSGRESSION COUPLED WITH WILFUL [DENIAL OF KNOWLEDGE OF] TESTIMONY. How is unwitting transgression possible coupled with wilful [denial of knowledge of] testimony? — Said Rab Judah that Rab said: If one says, ‘I know that this oath is prohibited, but I do not know if one is liable to bring an offering for it or not.’ BUT THEY ARE NOT LIABLE FOR ITS UNWITTING TRANSGRESSION ONLY. Shall we say that we are here taught [a confirmation of] that which R. Kahana and R. Assi [were told]?11 — No! Although we learnt it [here], it was necessary,12 for I might have thought, here,13 because it is not written and it be hid, we require unwitting to be like wilful transgression;14 but there,15 since it is written and it be hid, even unwitting transgression in a slight degree [makes him liable],16 therefore he17 teaches us [that this is not so].18 MISHNAH. WHAT KIND IS THE OATH OF TESTIMONY? HE SAID TO TWO [PERSONS]: ‘COME AND BEAR TESTIMONY FOR ME’; [AND THEY REPLIED:] ‘WE SWEAR WE KNOW NO TESTIMONY FOR YOU’; OR THEY SAID TO HIM: ‘WE KNOW NO TESTIMONY FOR YOU’, [AND HE SAID:] ‘I ADJURE YOU’, AND THEY SAID, ‘AMEN!’, THEY ARE LIABLE.19 IF HE ADJURED THEM FIVE TIMES OUTSIDE THE BETH DIN,20 AND THEY CAME TO THE BETH DIN, AND ADMITTED [KNOWLEDGE OF TESTIMONY], THEY ARE EXEMPT;21 BUT IF THEY DENIED,22 THEY ARE LIABLE FOR EACH [OATH].23 IF HE ADJURED THEM FIVE TIMES BEFORE THE BETH DIN, AND THEY DENIED [KNOWLEDGE OF TESTIMONY], THEY ARE LIABLE ONLY ONCE. SAID R. SIMEON: WHAT IS THE REASON?24 BECAUSE THEY CANNOT AFTERWARDS ADMIT [KNOWLEDGE].25 IF BOTH [PERSONS] DENIED [KNOWLEDGE] TOGETHER,26 THEY ARE BOTH LIABLE; IF ONE AFTER ANOTHER, THE FIRST IS LIABLE, AND THE SECOND EXEMPT.27 IF ONE DENIED, AND THE OTHER ADMITTED, THE ONE WHO DENIED IS LIABLE. IF THERE WERE TWO SETS OF WITNESSES, AND THE FIRST DENIED, AND THEN THE SECOND DENIED, THEY ARE BOTH LIABLE, BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY COULD BE UPHELD BY [EITHER OF] THE TWO. GEMARA. Samuel said: If they28 saw him running after them, and they said to him, ‘Why are you running after us? We swear we know no testimony for you’, they are exempt, [being liable only] when they hear from his mouth.29 — What does he teach us? We have learnt it: If he sent [the adjuration] by his slave,30 or if the defendant said to them: ‘I adjure you that, if you know any testimony for him,31 you should come and bear testimony for him’, they are exempt32 obviously they deduce liability for adjuration by others from the case of testimony, though they do not make the case of deposit entirely like the case of testimony; for in the latter they hold the denial must always be before the Beth Din; whereas in the case of deposit, once they have deduced that there is liability for adjuration by others, they say, ‘establish it in its own place’, i.e., make the law of adjuration by others equal to the law of swearing of his own accord, which (in the case of a deposit) does not need to be before the Beth Din. not possible to draw this inference, for it may be that the Sages deduce their ruling by inference from minor to major, as explained above. made a genuine mistake. Why was it necessary for Rab to re-assure him? Does not this mishnah teach us that one is not liable for absolutely unwitting transgression? able to bear testimony (for the principle that one cannot testify again after having testified once, v. Sanh. 44b). Hence, even if they denied it at the end, all the adjurations except the first are in vain; for, if silence at the beginning implies denial, they cannot be adjured again; and if silence at the beginning implies acquiescence (that they do know testimony), why the further oaths? But adjurations outside the Beth Din are all counted, because denial outside does not impose liability, and they can still bear testimony, and can therefore be adjured again and again; then, when they deny the knowledge at the Beth Din they are liable for all the adjurations.