Shevuot

What is unwitting transgression of oath of utterance in the past?1 If he knew,2 it is wilful transgression; if he did not know, it is accidental transgression? — He replied to him: [It is possible in the case of] one who says, ‘I know that this oath is prohibited, but I do not know whether one is liable to bring an offering for it or not.’3 According to whom will this be? According to Monobaz, who holds that ignorance of [liability for] an offering is termed ignorance!4 — You may [however] say that it will be even in accordance with the view of the Rabbis;5 for the Rabbis disagree with Monobaz only in the rest of the Torah where there is no innovation,6 but here where there is an innovation — for in the whole Torah we do not find that [the unwitting transgression of] a negative precept [for the wilful transgression of which kareth is not inflicted] should make him liable for an offering, for we deduce it from the ruling concerning idolatry;7 yet here, it does make him liable to bring [an offering] even the Sages admit.8 Rabina enquired of Raba: If he swore concerning a loaf [not to eat it], and he was dangerously ill on account of [not being able to eat] it, what is the ruling? — If he is dangerously ill, [of course] you may permit it to him!9 Well then, if he is distressed,10 and he ate it, unwittingly transgressing the oath, what is the ruling?11 — He said to him, it has been taught: He who would turn back if he knew12 brings an offering for his unwitting transgression; he who would not turn back if he knew, does not bring an offering for his unwitting transgression.13 Samuel said: If he decided in his mind,14 he must utter it with his lips,15 for it is said: to utter with the lips.16 An objection was raised: with the lips, but not in the mind. If he decided in his mind, how do we know [that he is liable]? Because it is said: whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath.16 This itself is contradictory! You say, with the lips, but not in the mind; and then you say, if he decided in his mind, how do we know [that he is liable]? — R. Shesheth said: This is no question; thus he means: with the lips, but not if he decided in his mind to utter it with his lips, and did not utter it.17 If he decided in his mind, simply,18 how do we know [that he is liable]? Because it is said: whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly. But against Samuel the question remains!19 — R. Shesheth said: Answer it thus: with the lips, but not if he decided in his mind to utter ‘wheat bread’, and he uttered ‘barley bread’.20 If he decided in his mind to utter ‘wheat bread’, and he uttered ‘bread’ simply, how do we know [that he is liable]?21 Because it is said: whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly.22 An objection was raised: That which is gone out of thy lips thou shalt observe and do;23 from this we know only, if he uttered it with his lips; if he decided in his mind, how do we know [that he must keep his promise]? Because it is said: all who were willing-hearted [brought . . . an offering of gold unto the Lord].24 — There it is different, because it is written: all who were willing-hearted.25 But let us deduce from it.26 — [No!] because [tabernacle] offerings and holy things are ‘two verses which come as one’;27 and all [cases of] ‘two verses which come as one’ do not teach [for other cases].28 — That is well, according to the one who holds that ‘they do not teach’; but according to the one who holds that ‘they do teach’, what shall we say?29 — This is hullin, and [the others are] holy things; and hullin we cannot deduce from holy things.30 termed accidental transgression, and he is exempt; how is unwittingly transgression (for which he is liable) possible? offering. innovation in the Torah, in the case of oaths, to make him liable for an offering for unwitting transgression, when for wilful transgression the punishment is merely stripes. refers to idolatry (Hor. 8a); an offering is brought for unwitting transgression (verse 27); ye shall have one law for him that doeth aught in error (verse 29): this implies that one law, the same law, applies both to idolatry and to other sins; in idolatry, wilful transgression is punished by kareth: but the soul that doeth aught with a high hand (i.e., wilfully) . . . shall be cut off (verse 30); therefore all sins, for the wilful transgression of which kareth is inflicted, are punished by the bringing of an offering for unwitting transgression. v. Bez. 22a. wilfully, does he not bring an offering? does not bring an offering for eating it when he forgot the oath, for it is not absolutely unwitting transgression; it is almost (though not quite) like wilful transgression; and though stripes are not inflicted, for it is not actually wilful transgression, yet he is not allowed to bring an offering (which would serve to cleanse him from his sin): it is not a sufficiently heavy punishment for his sin. it is uttered. Samuel's statement cannot be explained in the same way as R. Shesheth explains the Baraitha, because Samuel, being an amora, should have explained it clearly himself, had he intended it thus; v. Tosaf. a.l. bread, because he had not intended it in his mind; v. R. Han. a.l. utter it with his lips, i.e., he must utter at least the main portion of his oath (e.g., ‘bread’, and not necessarily ‘wheat bread’); but if he does not utter it with his lips, it is no oath: an oath in the mind is not an oath. their promise. Why then, does Samuel say, in the case of an oath, that it must be uttered with the lips in order to make him liable? of holy things (when Hezekiah re-consecrated the Temple, and the people brought free-will offerings: 2 Chron. XXIX, 31) the phrase willing-hearted is used. When the same phrase (or, rule) is used in the case of two things, the implications is that only in these two things is this phrase (or, rule) applicable, and in no other, for, if Holy Writ had desired other cases to be the same, then the phrase would have been used only in one case, and all others could have been deduced from it: the fact that it is used in two cases implies that it is limited to these two, and that no others are to be deduced from them. when there are three similar cases we cannot deduce others from them. According to him, let us deduce from these two cases the case of oaths that intention should suffice. hullin, dealing with ordinary, unconsecrated objects) from that which obtains in connection with holy things: the law with reference to holy things may be stricter.