Shevuot

We mean in the case of a sin offering.1 Rabina said: The Tanna mentions only that which is applicable to foods, but an oath, which can take effect even on that which is not a food, he does not mention. But [he mentions] holy things, which are applicable also to wood and stone!2 — Well then, he mentions only that which is applicable to that which has substance, but an oath, which can take effect also on that which has no substance, as, for example, ‘I shall sleep’, or, ‘I shall not sleep.’ he does not mention. 3 MISHNAH. IT IS THE SAME [WHETHER HE SWEARS OF] THINGS CONCERNING HIMSELF, OR OF THINGS CONCERNING OTHERS, OR OF THINGS WHICH HAVE SUBSTANCE, OR OF THINGS WHICH HAVE NO SUBSTANCE. HOW SO? [IF] HE SAID, ‘I SWEAR THAT I SHALL GIVE TO SO-AND-SO,’4 OR, ‘I SHALL NOT GIVE;’ ‘I HAVE GIVEN,’ OR ‘I HAVE NOT GIVEN;’ ‘I SHALL SLEEP,’5 OR, ‘I SHALL NOT SLEEP;’ ‘I HAVE SLEPT,’ OR, ‘I HAVE NOT SLEPT;’ ‘I SHALL THROW A PEBBLE IN THE SEA.’6 OR, ‘I SHALL NOT THROW;’ ‘I HAVE THROWN,’ OR, ‘I HAVE NOT THROWN’; [HE IS LIABLE.] R. ISHMAEL SAYS, HE IS LIABLE ONLY FOR [AN OATH IN] THE FUTURE, FOR IT IS SAID: TO DO EVIL OR TO DO GOOD.7 R. AKIBA SAID TO HIM: IF SO,8 WE KNOW ONLY SUCH CASES WHERE DOING EVIL AND DOING GOOD ARE APPLICABLE; BUT HOW DO WE KNOW SUCH CASES WHERE DOING EVIL AND DOING GOOD ARE NOT APPLICABLE.? HE REPLIED TO HIM: FROM THE AMPLIFICATION OF THE VERSE.9 WHEREUPON HE SAID TO HIM: IF THE VERSE AMPLIFIES FOR THAT, IT AMPLIFIES FOR THIS ALSO.10 GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: There is a greater restriction in vows than in oaths [in one respect]; and there is a greater restriction in oaths than in vows [in another respect] — The greater restriction in vows is that vows take effect on a precept as on an optional matter, which is not the case in oaths.11 The greater restriction in oaths is that oaths take effect on a thing which has no substance as on a thing which has substance, which is not the case in vows.12 HOW SO? [IF] HE SAID, ‘I SWEAR THAT I SHALL GIVE TO SO-AND-SO,’ OR, ‘I SHALL NOT GIVE.’ What is meant by, ‘I shall give’? Shall we say, charity to the poor? [For that] he already stands adjured from Mount Sinai, for it is said: Thou shalt surely give him.13 — It must therefore mean a gift to a rich man. ‘I SHALL SLEEP,’ OR, ‘I SHALL NOT SLEEP.’ This cannot be,14 for R. Johanan said: He who says, ‘I shall not sleep three days,’ is given stripes, and he may sleep immediately.15 — There, he said ‘three’; here, he did not say ‘three’. 16 I SHALL THROW A PEBBLE IN THE SEA,’ OR, ‘I SHALL NOT THROW’. It was stated: [If a man says,] ‘I swear that So-and-so threw a pebble in the sea,’ or, ‘that he did not throw,’ Rab said, he is liable; and Samuel said, he is exempt. Rab said, he is liable, because it is applicable in both negative and positive [forms];17 and Samuel said, he is exempt, because it is not applicable in the future.18 Shall we say that they disagree on the same principle on which R. Ishmael and R. Akiba disagree? For we learnt: R. ISHMAEL SAYS, HE IS LIABLE ONLY FOR [AN OATH IN] THE FUTURE, FOR IT IS SAID: TO DO EVIL OR TO DO GOOD. R. AKIBA SAID TO HIM: IF SO, WE KNOW ONLY SUCH CASES WHERE DOING EVIL AND DOING GOOD ARE APPLICABLE; BUT HOW DO WE KNOW SUCH CASES WHERE DOING EVIL AND DOING GOOD ARE NOT APPLICABLE? HE REPLIED TO HIM: FROM THE AMPLIFICATION OF THE VERSE. WHEREUPON HE SAID TO HIM: IF THE VERSE AMPLIFIED FOR THAT, IT AMPLIFIED FOR THIS ALSO. [Shall we say that] Rab agrees with R. Akiba,19 and Samuel agrees with R. Ishmael?20 — [No!] With reference to R. Ishmael's view they do not disagree; for since even in a case which is [possible of application] in the future,21 R. Ishmael does not make him liable for the past, obviously in a case which is not [possible of application] in the future,22 he most certainly [does not make him liable for the past]. But they disagree with reference to R. Akiba's view: Rab agrees with R. Akiba; and Samuel says, R. Akiba makes him liable there23 for [an oath in] the past, because in a case which is [possible of application] in the future, R. Akiba makes him liable for the past, but in a case which is not [possible of application] in the future, he does not [make him liable for the past]. Shall we say that they disagree on the same principle on which stripes are inflicted; all these are sins for which a sin offering is brought for unwitting transgression; but he mentions the case of a trespass offering, through for wilful transgression only stripes are inflicted. but if he says: ‘I swear that I shall not sit in the sukkah,’ his oath cannot take effect; v. infra 27a; Ned. 16a, b. says, ‘I vow my eyes from sleep’ (i.e., I condemn my eyes to sleeplessness), the vow takes effect on the eyes (which are tangible). The reason is that uttering a vow (usually expressed by konam) is akin to dedicating to the Temple (konam is a substitute for korban, an offering to the Temple); and just as the korban must be tangible, so must the konam be tangible. falsity is apparent), and not huyc ,guca. ‘I shall eat’ = positive. An oath, to make the utterer liable, must therefore be applicable both negatively and positively. oath of utterance (huyc ,guca), because he has no power to compel that person to carry out his oath; and because the oath is inapplicable in the future, it imposes no liability when uttered in the past. why do Rab and Samuel (who are amoraim) state their view's as if they were disagreeing on a new principle? Let Rab say that he agrees with R. Akiba, and Samuel that he agrees with R. Ishmael.