Shabbat

And should you object, But the people of Huzal do thus, their practice is null by comparison with that of all men. MISHNAH. IF ONE INTENDS TO CARRY OUT [AN OBJECT] IN FRONT OF HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND  BEHIND HIM, HE IS NOT CULPABLE; BEHIND HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND BEFORE HIM, HE IS CULPABLE. [YET] IN TRUTH IT WAS SAID: A WOMAN, WHO WRAPS HERSELF ROUND WITH AN APRON WHETHER [THE ARTICLE IS CARRIED] BEFORE OR BEHIND HER,  IS CULPABLE, BECAUSE IT IS NATURAL  FOR IT TO REVERSE ITSELF.  R. JUDAH SAID: ALSO THOSE WHO RECEIVE NOTES. GEMARA. What is the difference in [intending to carry it] BEFORE HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND BEHIND HIM, that HE IS NOT CULPABLE? [Presumably] because his intention was not fulfilled! But then [if he intended to carry it] BEHIND HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND BEFORE HIM, [there] too his intention was not fulfilled! Said R. Eleazar: There is a contradiction:  he who learnt the one did not learn the other. Raba said: But what is the difficulty: Perhaps [where he intended to carry it] BEFORE HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND BEHIND HIM, this is the reason that HE IS NOT CULPABLE, because he intended a strong vigilance whereas he succeeded [in giving it only] a weak vigilance;  but [if he intended to carry it] BEHIND HIM, BUT IT WORKED ROUND BEFORE HIM, this is the reason that HE IS CULPABLE, because he intended [only] a weak vigilance whereas he succeeded [in giving it] a strong vigilance.  But then what is R. Eleazar's difficulty? The implications of the Mishnah are a difficulty:  IF ONE INTENDS TO CARRY OUT [AN OBJECT] IN FRONT OF HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND BEFORE HIM, HE IS NOT CULPABLE: hence [if he intends to carry it] behind him and it comes behind him, he is culpable. Then consider the second clause: BEHIND HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND BEFORE HIM, only then is he CULPABLE: hence [if he intends to carry it] behind him and it comes behind him, he is not culpable?  — Said R. Eleazar: There is a contradiction: he who learnt the one did not learn the other. R. Ashi observed: But what is the difficulty: Perhaps he leads to a climax:  it is unnecessary [to rule that if he intended to carry it] behind him and it came behind him, he is culpable, since his intention was fulfilled. But even [if he intends to carry it] BEHIND HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND BEFORE HIM, it must be [stated]. [For] you might think that I will rule, since his intention was unfulfilled, he is not culpable; therefore he informs us that he intended [only] a weak vigilance whereas he succeeded [in giving it] a strong vigilance, So that he is culpable. [Shall we say that where he intends to carry it] behind him, and it comes behind him, there is a controversy of Tannaim? For it was taught: If one intends carrying out [an object] in his belt with its opening above, but he carries [it] out in, his belt with its opening below, [or] if one intends to carry out in his belt with its opening below, — R. Judah rules that he is culpable, but the Sages hold him not culpable. Said R. Judah to them: Do you not admit that [if one intends to carry out an object] behind him and it comes behind him, he is culpable?  Whilst they said to him: Do you not admit that [if one carries out an object] as with the back of his hand or with his foot, he is not culpable? Said R. Judah: I stated one argument, and they stated one argument. I found no answer to their argument, and they found no answer to mine. Now, since he says to them, 'Do you not admit,' does it not surely follow that the Rabbis hold that he is not culpable?  Then on your reasoning, when they say to him, 'Do you not admit,' does it follow that R. Judah holds him, culpable! But surely it was taught: With the back of his hand or his foot, all agree that he is not culpable! Rather [conclude thus: if one intends to carry out an object] behind him and it comes behind him, all agree that he is culpable; with the back of his hand or foot, all agree that he is not culpable. They differ when [he carries it out] in his belt with its opening below: one Master likens it to [intending to carry it out] behind him and it comes behind him, while the other Master likens it [to carrying] with the back of one's hand or foot. IN TRUTH IT WAS SAID: A WOMAN, etc. It was taught: Every [statement of] 'In truth [etc.]' is the halachah. R. JUDAH SAID: ALSO THOSE WHO RECEIVE NOTES. A Tanna taught: Because clerks of the State do thus. MISHNAH. IF ONE CARRIES OUT A LOAF INTO THE STREET, HE IS CULPABLE; IF TWO CARRY IT OUT, THEY ARE NOT CULPABLE. IF ONE COULD NOT CARRY IT OUT AND TWO CARRY IT OUT, THEY ARE CULPABLE; BUT R. SIMEON EXEMPTS [THEM]. GEMARA. Rab Judah said in Rab's name-others state, Abaye said — others again state, it was taught in a Baraitha: If each alone is able, — R. Meir holds [them] culpable, while R. Judah and R. Simeon hold [them] not culpable. If each alone is unable, R. Judah and R. Meir hold [them] culpable, while R. Simeon exempts [them]. If one is able but the other is not, all agree that he is culpable.  It was taught likewise: if one carries out a loaf into the street, he is culpable. If two carry it out: R. Meir declares him culpable; R. Judah rules: If one could not carry it out and both carry it out, they are culpable, otherwise they are not culpable; while R. Simeon exempts [them]. Whence do we know this? — For our Rabbis taught: [And if any one … sin…] in his doing [etc.]:  [only] he who does the whole of it [is culpable], but not he who does part of it. How so? If two hold a pitchfork and sweep [corn together];  [or] the shuttle, and press;  or a quill. and write; or a cane, and carry it out into the street, — I might think that they are culpable: hence it is stated, 'in his doing': [only] he who does the whole of it, but not he who does part of it.