Shabbat

you might say, His intention has been cancelled;  hence we are informed that whenever one does anything, he does it with his original purpose. Rab Judah said in Samuel's name: R. Meir maintained that one is culpable even if he carries out a single [grain of] wheat for sowing. But that is obvious, [for] we learnt, WHATEVER ITS SIZE? — You might say, WHATEVER ITS SIZE is to exclude [the standard of] the quantity of a dried fig, yet even so [one is not guilty unless there is as much as an olive: hence we are informed [otherwise]. R. Isaac son of Rab Judah demurred: If so,  if one declares his intention of carrying out his whole house, is he really not culpable unless he carries out his whole house? — There his intention is null vis a vis that of all men. BUT ALL OTHERS ARE NOT CULPABLE THEREFOR SAVE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS STANDARD. Our Mishnah does not agree with R. Simeon b. Eleazar. For it was taught: R. Simeon b. Eleazar stated a general rule: That which is not fit to put away, and such is not [generally] put away, yet it did become fit to a certain person,  and he did put it away, and then another came and carried it out, the latter is rendered liable through the former's intention. Raba said in R. Nahman's name: If one carries out as much as a dried fig for food, and then decides to [use it] for sowing, or the reverse, he is liable. But that is obvious: consider it from this point of view  [and] there is the standard, and consider it from that point of view, [and] there is the standard? — You might say, [Both] removal and depositing  must be done with the same intention, which is absent [here]: hence he informs us [otherwise]. Raba asked: What if one carries out half as much as a dried fig for sowing, but it swells  and he decides [to use it] for food? Can you argue, only there  is he culpable, because consider it from this point of view [and] there is the standard, and consider it from that point of view and there is the standard: whereas here, since it did not contain the standard of food when he carried it out, he is not culpable. Or perhaps, since he would be culpable for his intention of sowing if he were silent and did not intend it [for another purpose],  he is still culpable now? Now, should you rule that since he would be culpable for his intention of sowing if he were silent and did not intend it for another purpose, he is still culpable now: what if one carries out as much as a dried fig for food and it shrivels up and he decides [to keep it] for sowing?  Here it is certain that if he remained silent he would not be culpable on account of his original intention; or perhaps we regard  the present [only]; hence he is culpable? Should you rule that we regard the present, hence he is culpable: what if one carries out as much as a dried fig for food, and it shrivels and then swells up again? Does [the principle of] disqualification operate with respect to the Sabbath or not?  The question stands over. Raba asked R. Nahman: What if one throws terumah  of the size of an olive into an unclean house? In respect of what [is the question]? If in respect of the Sabbath,  we require the size of a dried fig? If in respect of defilement,  we require food as much as an egg? — After all, it is in respect of the Sabbath, [the circumstances being] e.g., that there is food less than an egg in quantity  and this makes it up to an egg in quantity.  What then: since it combines in respect of defilement he is also culpable in respect to the Sabbath; or perhaps in all matters relating to the Sabbath we require the size of a dried fig? — Said he to him, We have learnt it: Abba Saul said: As for the two loaves of bread,  and the shewbread,  their standard is the size of a dried fig.  But why so: let us say, since in respect of