Sanhedrin

What was the reason that Rab was not authorised to permit the slaughter of firstborn animals? Was it that he was not learned  enough? But have we not just said that he was very learned? Was it because he was not an expert in judging defects? But did not Rab himself say: I spent eighteen months with a shepherd in order to learn which was a permanent and which a passing blemish? — Rabbi withheld that authorisation from Rab, as a special mark of respect to Rabbah b. Hana.  Or, if you prefer, I might say that for the very reason that Rab was a special expert in judging blemishes, he might in consequence declare permissible, with a view to slaughter, [permanent] defects which to others might not be known as such. These latter might thus be led to maintain that Rab had passed cases of such a kind and so to declare permissible transitory blemishes. We were told above that Rabbi authorised him, Rabbah, and Rab respectively, to] decide in matters of ritual law. Since he was learned in the law, what need had he to obtain permission? — Because of the following incident, for it has been taught: Once Rabbi went to a certain place and saw its inhabitants kneading the dough without the necessary precaution against levitical uncleanness.  Upon inquiry, they told him that a certain scholar on a visit taught them: Water of bize'im [ponds] does not render food liable to become unclean. In reality, he referred to [eggs], but they thought he said bize'im [ponds].  They further erred in the application of the following Mishnah:  The waters of Keramyon and Pigah,  because they are ponds, are unfit for purification purposes.  They thought that since this water was unfit for purification, it likewise could not render food liable to become unclean. But this conclusion is unwarranted, for whereas there, that is in connection with the purification offering, running water is required, waters, from any source, can render food liable to uncleanness. There and then  it was decreed that a disciple must not give decisions unless he was granted permission by his teacher. Tanhum son of R. Ammi happened to be at Hatar, and in expounding the law to its inhabitants, taught them that they might soak the grain before grinding for Passover.  But they said to him: Does not R. Mani of Tyre live here, and has it not been taught that a disciple should not give an halachic decision in the place where his teacher resides, unless there is a distance of three parasangs — the space occupied by the camp of Israel — between them? He answered: The point did not occur to me. R. Hiyya saw a man standing in a cemetery and asked him: 'Are you not the son of so and so who was a Priest?'  'Yes,' he answered, 'but my father being wilful, set his eyes upon a divorced woman, and by marrying her, profaned his priesthood.' It is obvious that a partial authorisation is valid,  as has already been said. But how is it with a conditional authorisation?  Come and hear! R. Johanan said to R. Shaman:  You have our authorisation until you return to us. The text [above states]: 'Samuel said, If two [commoners] try a case [instead of three] their decision holds good, but they are called a presumptuous Beth din.' R. Nahman sat and reported this teaching, but Rabbah objected to it on the ground of the following [Mishnah]:  Even if two acquit or condemn, but the third is undecided  the number of the judges must be increased. Now if it were so, as Samuel maintains, why add; why not let the decision of these two be as valid as that of two who have tried a case? — There [in the Mishnah] the case is different, since from the outset they sat with the intention of constituting a court of three; whereas here they did not sit with that intention. He raised a further objection:  'R. Simeon b. Gamaliel says: Legal judgment is by three; arbitration is valid if made by two. And the force of arbitration is greater than that of legal judgment, for if two judges decide a case, the litigants can repudiate their decision, whilst if two judges arbitrate, the parties cannot repudiate their decision.'