1MISHNAH. BOTH CIVIL AND CAPITAL CASES DEMAND INQUIRY AND EXAMINATION. AS IT IS WRITTEN: YE SHALL HAVE ONE MANNER OF LAW. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIVIL AND CAPITAL CASES? — CIVIL SUITS [ARE TRIED] BY THREE; CAPITAL CASES BY TWENTY-THREE CIVIL SUITS MAY BE OPENED EITHER FOR ACQUITTAL OR CONDEMNATION; CAPITAL CHARGES MUST BE OPENED FOR ACQUITTAL, BUT NOT FOR CONDEMNATION. CIVIL SUITS MAY BE DECIDED BY A MAJORITY OF ONE, EITHER FOR ACQUITTAL OR CONDEMNATION; WHEREAS CAPITAL CHARGES ARE DECIDED BY A MAJORITY OF ONE FOR ACQUITTAL, BUT [AT LEAST] TWO FOR CONDEMNATION. IN MONETARY CASES THE DECISION MAY BE REVERSED BOTH FOR A ACQUITTAL AND FOR CONDEMNATION; WHILST IN CAPITAL CHARGES THE VERDICT MAY BE REVERSED FOR ACQUITTAL ONLY, BUT NOT FOR CONDEMNATION; WHILST IN CAPITAL CHARGES THE VERDICT MAY BE REVERSED FOR ACQUITTAL ONLY, BUT NOT FOR CONDEMNATION. IN MONETARY CASES, ALL MAY ARGUE FOR OR AGAINST THE DEFENDANT; WHILST IN CAPITAL CHARGES, ANYONE MAY ARGUE IN HIS FAVOUR, BUT NOT AGAINST HIM. IN CIVIL SUITS, HE WHO HAS ARGUED FOR CONDEMNATION, MAY THEN ARGUE FOR ACQUITTAL, AND VICE VERSA; WHEREAS IN CAPITAL CHARGES, ONE WHO HAS ARGUED FOR CONDEMNATION MAY SUBSEQUENTLY ARGUE FOR ACQUITTAL, BUT NOT VICE VERSA. CIVIL SUITS ARE TRIED BY DAY, AND CONCLUDED AT NIGHT. BUT CAPITAL CHARGES MUST BE TRIED BY DAY AND CONCLUDED BY DAY. CIVIL SUITS CAN BE CONCLUDED ON THE SAME DAY, WHETHER FOR ACQUITTAL OR CONDEMNATION; CAPITAL CHARGES MAY BE CONCLUDED ON THE SAME DAY WITH A FAVOURABLE VERDICT, BUT ONLY ON THE MORROW WITH AN UNFAVOURABLE VERDICT. THEREFORE TRIALS ARE NOT HELD ON THE EVE OF A SABBATH OR FESTIVAL. IN CIVIL SUITS. AND IN CASES OF CLEANNESS AND UNCLEANNESS, WE BEGIN WITH [THE OPINION OF] THE MOST EMINENT [OF THE JUDGES]; WHEREAS IN CAPITAL CHARGES, WE COMMENCE WITH [THE OPINION OF] THOSE ON THE SIDE [BENCHES]. ALL ARE ELIGIBLE TO TRY CIVIL SUITS, BUT NOT ALL ARE ELIGIBLE TO TRY CAPITAL CHARGES, ONLY PRIESTS, LEVITES, AND ISRAELITES [LAYMEN] WITH WHOM PRIESTS CAN ENTER INTO MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP. GEMARA. Do civil suits really need inquiry and examination? The following opposes it: If a bond is dated the first of Nisan in the Shemittah, and witnesses came and said: 'How can ye testify to this bond: were ye not with us on that day in such and such a place?' the bond is valid, and its signatories remain competent [witnesses], for we presume that they might merely have postponed writing it. Now if you should think that inquiry and examination are necessary, how 'presume that they might merely have postponed writing it? — But on your reasoning, one should object rather to the [following] Mishnah: Ante-dated bonds of indebtedness are invalid; if post-dated, they are valid. Now, if you should think that examination and inquiry are necessary, why are post-dated notes valid? — This is no difficulty, for a more powerful objection is raised, viz., that even in the case of a bond dated the first of Nisan in the Sabbatical year, when people, as a rule, do not transact loans, and when, consequently, we cannot [plausibly] say that the writing [of the bond] might have been postponed, since no one would intentionally weaken the validity of his document: yet since the annulment of debts is effectuated only at the expiration of the Sabbatical year, we declare the bond valid. At all events, however, the difficulty remains. (Mnemonic: HaRPaSH. ) R. Hanina said: By Biblical law, both monetary and capital cases require inquiry and investigation, as it is written: One manner of judgment ye shall have. Why then were civil suits exempted from this procedure? In order not to lock the door against borrowers. But if so,ᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷˣʸᶻᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈ
2Raba said: Our Mishnah refers to a case of Kenas, the other teachings to the admission and transaction of loans. R. Papa said: Both this and the other teachings deal with the admission and transaction of loans. In our Mishnah, however, the suit is [suspected of being] dishonest, while in the other, the claim is [i.e., appears] genuine. This agrees with Resh Lakish, for Resh Lakish opposed [two verses to each other]: It is written, In justice shalt thou judge thy neighbour; but elsewhere, Justice, justice shalt thou follow. How so? — The latter refers to a suit suspected to be dishonest; the former, to an [apparently] genuine claim. R. Ashi said: The [contradictory] teachings are reconciled as above; but as for the [Scriptural] verses, one refers to a decision based on strict law, the other to a compromise. As it has been taught: Justice, justice shalt thou follow; the first [mention of justice] refers to a decision based on strict law; the second, to a compromise. How so? — E.g., where two boats sailing on a river meet; If both attempt to pass simultaneously, both will sink, whereas, if one makes way for the other, both can pass [without mishap]. Likewise, if two camels met each other while on the ascent to Beth-Horon; if they both ascend [at the same time] both may tumble down [into the valley]; but if [they ascend] after each other, both can go up [safely]. How then should they act? If one is laden and the other unladen, the latter should give way to the former. If one is nearer [to its destination] than the other, the former should give way to the latter. If both are [equally] near or far [from their destination,] make a compromise between them, the one [which is to go forward] compensating the other [which has to give way]. Our Rabbis taught: Justice, justice shalt thou follow, means, Thou shalt follow an eminent Beth din, as for example, [follow] R. Eliezer [b. Hyrkanus] to Lydda. or R. Johanan b. Zakkai to Beror Hail. It has been taught: The noise of grindstones at Burni [announced] a circumcision [was being performed]; and the light of a candle [by day, and many candles by night] at Beror Hail, showed that a feast [was being celebrated] there. Our Rabbis taught: justice, justice shalt thou follow,' this means, Follow the scholars to their academies. e.g.. R. Eliezer to Lydda, R. Johanan b. Zakkai to Beror Hail, R. Joshua to Peki'in, Rabban Gamaliel [II] to Jabneh, R. Akiba to Benai Berak, R. Mathia to Rome, R. Hanania b. Teradion to Sikni, R. Jose [b. Halafta] to Sepphoris. R. Judah b. Bathyra to Nisibis, R. Joshua to the Exile, Rabbi to Beth She'arim, or the Sages to the chamber of hewn stones. CIVIL SUITS MAY BE OPENED EITHER FOR ACQUITTAL etc. What is said? Rab Judah said: We speak thus to them: Who can tell that it is as ye say? 'Ulla objected: But do we not thereby shut their lip? — Then let them be shut! Has it not been taught: R. Simeon b. Eliezer said: The witnesses are moved from place to place, that they may become confused, and withdraw [their evidence]. What comparison is there! In that case, they are automatically repelled, whereas here, we repel them by our own act! But, said 'Ulla: We say thus: Have you [sc. the defendant] any witnesses to refute them? Rabbah demurred: Can we then open the defence of one in a manner which involves the condemnation of another? — But does this really involve his condemnation? Have we not learnt: Witnesses declared Zomemim are not executed unless the verdict has [already] been given! — I mean this: Should the defendant remain silent until the verdict is given, and then produce witnesses and refute the others, it involves their condemnation? — Therefore Rabbah said: We say to him: Have you any witnesses to contradict them? R. Kahana said: [We open the defence by saying,] From your words it appears that so and so is not guilty. Abaye and Raba both say: We say to him: If you did not commit the murder, have no fear. R. Ashi says: [We begin thus:] Whoever knows anything in his [sc. the accused's] favour, let him come forward and state it. It has been taught in agreement with Abaye and Raba: Rabbi said, If no man have lain with thee and if thou hast not gone aside to uncleanness, etc.; ᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠᵃʳᵃˢᵃᵗᵃᵘᵃᵛᵃʷᵃˣᵃʸᵃᶻᵇᵃᵇᵇᵇᶜᵇᵈᵇᵉᵇᶠᵇᵍᵇʰᵇⁱᵇʲᵇᵏᵇˡᵇᵐᵇⁿᵇᵒᵇᵖᵇᵠᵇʳᵇˢᵇᵗᵇᵘᵇᵛᵇʷᵇˣ