Sanhedrin

Our Rabbis taught: If a man says to them:  'I saw your father hiding money, [say,] in a strong box, a chest, or a store-room, and he told me that it belonged to so and so, or that it was [for the redemption] of the second tithe:' nbsp if it [the hiding place] is in the house, his statement is valueless,  if in a field, his words stand. This is the general rule of the matter: Wherever he has access [to the hiding place] his statement stands;  but otherwise, it is of no value. If they [the heirs] saw their father hide money in a strong box, chest or store-room, saying, 'It belongs to so and so,' or 'It is for the payment of the second tithe': if it [his statement] was by way of giving directions, his words stand; but if it was in the nature of an evasion,  his statement is of no value. If one felt distressed over some money which his father had left him,  and the dispenser of dreams  appeared to him and named the sum, indicated the place, and specified its purpose, saying that it was [for the redemption] of the second tithe — such an incident once occurred, and they [the Rabbis on that occasion] said: Dreams have no importance for good or ill. IF TWO DECLARE HIM NOT LIABLE etc. How is it [the judgment] worded?  — R. Johanan said: [Thus; 'The defendant is] not liable.' Resh Lakish said: 'So and so [of the judges] acquit; so and so holds him liable.' R. Eleazar said: 'As a result of their [the judges'] discussion, [it is decided that] he is not liable.' Wherein do they [practically] differ? — As to whether he is to share in the payment of compensation, [in case of error,] together with the others.  On the view [that the verdict is to be worded]: 'He [the defendant] is not liable,'  he [the dissenting judge] must pay his share;  while on the view [that the wording should be]: 'So and so acquit, and so and so holds him liable,' he makes no restitution.  But even on the view [that the wording should be]: 'He is not liable,' he [the dissentient] might argue, 'Had you accepted my opinion, you too would not have to pay!  — But the difference arises concerning their liability to pay his share in addition to their own. According to the view [that the verdict is framed thus]: 'He is not liable,' they bear [the whole] liability;  but on the view [that it is worded]: 'So and so [of the judges] acquit, and so and so holds him liable,' they do not pay [the dissentient's share].  But even according to the opinion [that the wording should be]: 'He [the defendant] is not liable,' why should they pay [the whole amount]? They might surely argue:  Hadst thou not been with us, the trial would have had no result at all! — The difference must arise therefore with reference to, Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy people.  R. Johanan says: [The verdict is to be framed thus:] He is not liable,' because of this injunction against talebearing.  Resh Lakish holds [that the wording must be]: 'So and so acquit; so and so holds him liable,' since [otherwise] it [the verdict] would appear a falsehood,  while R. Eleazar agrees with both; therefore it [the verdict] must be framed thus: 'After a decision by the judges, he was found not liable.' WHEN THE VERDICT IS ARRIVED AT, etc. Whom [do they admit]? Shall we say, the litigants: but they are there already?  But [if it refers to] the witnesses: whose view is this? Assuredly it does not agree with R. Nathan, for it has been taught: The evidence of witnesses cannot be combined,  unless they simultaneously saw what they state in evidence. R. Joshua b. Korha said: Evidence is valid even if they witnessed it consecutively. Again, their evidence is not admissible by the court unless they both testify together. R. Nathan said; The court may hear the evidence of one witness one day, and when the other appears the next day, they may hear his evidence!  No. In reality, the litigants are meant, and this represents the view of R. Nehemiah. For it has been taught: R. Nehemiah said: This was the custom of the fair-minded  in Jerusalem; first the litigants were admitted and their statements heard; then the witnesses were admitted and their statements heard. Then they  were ordered out, and the matter was discussed. [And when the verdict was arrived at etc.]  But has it not been explicitly taught: When the deliberations come to an end, the witnesses are readmitted?  That certainly does not agree with R. Nathan. The above text [reads]: 'The evidence of witnesses cannot be combined unless they simultaneously saw what they state in evidence. R. Joshua b. Korha said: It is valid even if they saw it consecutively.' Wherein do they differ? — If you wish, I might say, in the interpretation of a Biblical verse; alternatively, in a matter of logic. On the latter assumption, [the first Tanna argues,] the [loan of the] maneh to which the one testifies, is not attested by the other, and vice versa.  Whereas the other [Tanna][argues that, after all,] both testify to a mina in general.  Alternatively, they differ in respect to a Biblical verse. For it is written, And he is a witness whether he has seen or known of it.  Now, it has been taught:  From the implications of the verse, A witness shall not rise up etc.,  do I not know that one is meant? Why then state 'one'.? — That it may establish the principle that wherever it says A witness, it implies two, unless one is specified by the verse.  And the Divine Law expressed it in the singular to teach that they must witness [the act in question] both together as one man.  And the other?  — He is a witness whether he hath seen or known of it,  teaches that in all circumstances [the evidence is admissible]. 'Again, their evidence is not admissible by the court unless they both testify together. R. Nathan said: The court may hear the evidence of one witness one day, and when the other witness appears the next day, they may hear his evidence.' Wherein do they differ? — Either in a matter of logic or in [the interpretation of] a Biblical text. 'Either in a matter of logic.' One Master argues: A single witness comes to impose an oath, but not to prove liability.  The other  argues: Even if they appear simultaneously, do they testify with one mouth?  But [nevertheless], their evidence is combined. So here too [where they come separately] their evidence may be combined. 'Or [in interpretation of] a Biblical text.' [And he is a witness whether he has seen or known of it;] If he do not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity.