1We have thus found that 'fathers' [cannot testify] for the sons [of each other], and vice versa; and all the more, 'fathers' [cannot testify] in respect of each other. But whence is derived [the inadmissibility of] 'sons' [to give evidence] in respect of 'sons'? — If so [sc. that such evidence is admissible], the text should have read, The fathers shall not be put to death on account of [the evidence of] a son. Why 'sons'? [To teach] that they too [are ineligible] in respect of each other. Thus we have found that 'sons' [are inadmissible] for each other. Whence do we know their inadmissibility [as joint witnesses] concerning others? — Said Rami b. Hama: It is deduced by logic. For it has been taught: Witnesses cannot be declared Zomemim until both are proved Zomemim. Now, should you think that kinsmen are eligible [to testify in cases] concerning strangers, a witness declared a Zomem might suffer death because of his brother's evidence [which supported his own]. Raba demurred: But according to your argument, what of that which we learnt: If three brothers are [separately] supported by another witness, they count as three separate sets of witnesses. But they count as one set in respect of being proved Zomemim. It thus results that the perjured witness must pay money on account of the evidence given by his brother? Hence [it must be assumed that the penalty for] false testimony is brought about through outsiders; so here too, [the penalty for] false testimony comes about through strangers! — But if so, the text should have read: and a son on account of fathers, or, and they on account of the fathers. Why and sons? — To show that 'sons' [are not eligible] in respect of strangers. We have thus deduced [the exclusion of] paternal relations. Whence do we know [the same] of maternal relations? — Scripture says, 'fathers' twice. Since [the repetition] is unnecessary in respect to paternal relations, we may refer it to maternal relations. Now, we have thus learnt [the exclusion of relatives' evidence] for condemnation. Whence do we know [the same] of acquittal? — Scripture states, they shall be put to death, twice. Since that [the repetition] is unnecessary in respect of condemnation, refer it to acquittal. Again, we have learnt [the exclusion of relatives] in capital cases. Whence is the same known of civil suits? — Scripture says, Ye shall have one manner of law, meaning that the law must be administered similarly in all cases. Rab said: My paternal uncle, his son and his son-in-law may not bear testimony for me; nor may I, my son nor my son-in-law testify for him. But why so? Does not this involve relationships of the third and the first degrees? whereas we learnt that a relative of the second degree [may not testify] for a relative of the second degree; and also that one of the second degree cannot testify for one of the first; but not that a relative of the third degree may not bear testimony for one of the first? — What is meant by HIS SON-IN-LAW, stated in the Mishnah, is the son-in-law of his [the uncle's] son. But should he not include [instead] his [the uncle's] grandson? — He [the Tanna] teaches us incidentally that the husband bears the same relationships as his wife. But what of that which R. Hiyya taught: [The Mishnah enumerates] eight chief relations who make up the number of twenty-four. But these [on the assumption that a son-in-law of the uncle's son ranks as a relative of the third degree] amount to thirty-two! — But in fact, SON-IN-LAW is literally meant. Why then does he [Rab] designate him the son-in-law of his [the uncle's] son? — Because since his relationship comes from without, he is regarded as one degree further removed. If so, it is a case of the third degree vis a vis the second [which is forbidden], whereas Rab allowed [the testimony of] the second degree to the third! — But Rab agrees with R. Eleazar. For it has been taught: R. Eleazar said: Just as my paternal uncle, his son and son-in-law may not testify for me so the son of my paternal uncle, his son and son-in-law may not testify for me. But still, that includes relatives of the third and the second degrees, whereas Rab permitted the testimony of such relatives! — Rab agrees with R. Eleazar in one point, but differs from him in another. What is Rab's reason? — Scripture states, Fathers shall not be put to death for sons ['al banim]; and sons … : this [the 'and'] teaches the inclusion of another generation [as ineligible to testify]. And R. Eleazar? — Scripture states, 'al banim, implying that the fathers' disqualification is carried over to the sons. R. Nahman said: My mother-in-law's brother, his son, and my mother-in-law's sister's son, may not testify for me. The Tanna [of the Mishnah] supports this: A SISTER'S HUSBAND; THE HUSBAND OF ONE'S PATERNAL OR MATERNAL AUNT, … ALL THESE WITH THEIR SONS AND SONS-IN-LAW [ARE INELIGIBLE AS WITNESSES]. R. Ashi said: While we were with 'Ulla, the question was raised by us: What of one's father-in-law's brother, the father-in-law's brother's son, and the father-in-law's sister's son? — He answered us: We learnt this: A BROTHER, FATHER'S BROTHER, AND MOTHER'S BROTHER … ALL THESE WITH THEIR SONS AND SONS-IN-LAW [ARE INELIGIBLE]. It once happened that Rab went to buyᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷˣʸᶻᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠᵃʳᵃˢᵃᵗᵃᵘᵃᵛᵃʷᵃˣᵃʸ
2AND A STEP-FATHER, HE, HIS SON AND SON-IN-LAW. HIS SON! But that is his brother! — R. Jeremiah said: This is only added to indicate [the exclusion of] a brother's brother. R. Hisda declared a brother's brother eligible. Said the Rabbis to him: Are you unaware of R. Jeremiah's dictum? — 'I have not heard it,'he answered, that is to say, 'I do not accept it.' If so, [the difficulty remains,] he [i.e., his step-father's son] is HIS BROTHER! — He [the Tanna] enumerates both a paternal and a maternal brother. R. Hisda said: The fathers of the bride and bridegroom may testify for each other; their inter-relationship is no more than that of a lid to a barrel. Rabbah b. Bar Hana said: One may testify for his betrothed wife. Rabina remarked: That is only where his evidence is to her disadvantage; but if it is to her advantage, he is not to be believed. But [in reality] that is not so: it makes no difference whether his evidence is to her advantage or disadvantage; in neither case is he to be believed. [For] on what [do you base] your opinion [that you do not regard him as a relative]? On R. Hiyya b. Ammi's dictum stated on the authority of 'Ulla, viz.: When the betrothed wife [of a Priest dies], he is not obliged to mourn as an Onen nor may he defile himself. Similarly, she is not bound to mourn as an Oneneth [if he dies] nor to defile herself. If she dies, he does not inherit from her; but if he dies, she receives her Kethubah! But there, the Divine law has made it all depend on the fact that she is 'she'ero' [his wife], a designation which cannot be applied to a betrothed wife.Whereas here [the evidence of a relative is inadmissible] because of mental affinity; and such mental affinity does exist here [in the case of a betrothed woman and her groom]. ONE'S STEP-SON HIMSELF. Our Rabbis taught: A step-son himself. R. Jose said: A brother-in-law. Another [Baraitha] has been taught: A brother-in-law himself. R. Judah said: A step-son. What does this mean? Shall we assume it to mean as follows: A step-son himself, and the same applies to a brother-in-law; whereas R. Jose reversed this: A brother-in-law himself, and the same applies to a step-son? If so, when our Mishnah states: A BROTHER-IN-LAW, HIS SON AND SON-IN-LAW, whose view is this? It is neither R. Judah's nor R. Jose's! But [again] if this is its meaning: A step-son himself; while as for a brother-in-law, [the exclusion extends to] his son and son-in-law; whereas R. Jose reversed this: A brother-in-law himself; while as for a step-son, [the exclusion extends to] his son and son-in-law too: in that case, what R. Hiyya taught, viz., that the Mishnah enumerates eight chief relations which [together with the sons and sons-in-law] involve twenty-four in all, is neither the opinion of R. Judah nor that of R. Jose! — Hence this must be the meaning: A step-son himself; but as for a brother-in-law, his son and son-in-law too [are included]; whereas R. Jose ruled: A brother-in-law himself, and a fortiori his step-son. The Mishnah therefore agrees with R. Judah; while [the view expressed in] the Baraitha is R. Jose's. Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel; The halachah rests with R. Jose. A certain deed of gift had been attested by two brothers-in-law. Now, R. Joseph thought to declare it valid, since Rab Judah said in Samuel's name: The halachah rests with R. Jose. But Abaye said to him: How do we know that [he referred to] the ruling of R. Jose as stated in the Mishnah which permits the evidence of a brother-in-law: perhaps he meant the ruling of R. Jose in the Baraitha, which disqualifies a brother-in-law? — One cannot think so, for Samuel said: 'E.g., I and Phinehas, who are brothers and brothers-in-law (are inadmissible);' hence others who are only brothers-in-law are admissible. But [Abaye retorted] may it not be that Samuel, in saying, 'e.g., I and Phinehas,' meant only to illustrate the term 'brothers-in-law'? Thereupon [R. Joseph] said to him: Go and establish your title through those who witnessed the delivery, in accordance with R. Eleazar. But did not R. Abba say: Even R. Eleazar agrees that a deed bearing its own disqualification is invalid? — Thereupon R. Joseph said to him: Go your way; they do not permit me to give you possession. R. JUDAH SAID etc. R. Tanhum said in the name of R. Tabla in the name of R. Beruna in Rab's name: The halachah rests with R. Judah. Raba said in R. Nahman's name: The halachah is not in agreement with R. Judah. Rabbah b. Bar Hana said likewise in R. Johanan's name: The halachah does not rest with R. Judah. Some refer this dictum of Rabbah b. Bar Hana to the following: R. Jose the Galilean gave the following exposition: And thou shalt come unto the Priests, the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days. Is it then conceivable that, one could go to a judge who does not exist in his lifetime? But the text refers to a judge who was formerly a relative but who subsequently ceased to be one. [Whereon] Rabba b. Bar Hana said: The halachah rests with R. Jose the Galilean. The sons of Mar 'Ukba's father-in-law who ᵃᶻᵇᵃᵇᵇᵇᶜᵇᵈᵇᵉᵇᶠᵇᵍᵇʰᵇⁱᵇʲᵇᵏᵇˡᵇᵐᵇⁿᵇᵒᵇᵖᵇᵠᵇʳᵇˢᵇᵗᵇᵘᵇᵛᵇʷᵇˣᵇʸᵇᶻᶜᵃᶜᵇᶜᶜᶜᵈᶜᵉᶜᶠᶜᵍᶜʰ