Sanhedrin

But might it not be argued  that the reason the Divine Law wrote 'yumath' nbsp is to [indicate] an easier death, i.e., to commute death by the sword to death by strangulation?  Now, on the view that strangulation is a severer death,  it is correct;  but according to the view that strangulation is an easier death [than decapitation],  what is there to be said [against it]?  — This cannot be entertained, because it is written, If there be laid on him a ransom;  and, should you maintain that he is liable to death, is it not written, You shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer?  On the contrary, that fact [proves that the text is literal, Thus:] in case of a man's own crime, money is no adequate punishment, only death; whereas, when his beast kills, he can ransom himself with money?  — But, said Hezekiah, and thus said a Tanna of the school of Hezekiah: Scripture state, He that smote him [a human being] shall surely be put to death, he is a murderer.  For a murder committed by himself, you may put him to death, but you may not put him to death for a murder committed by his ox. The schoolmen asked: How many were needed [to judge] the ox [that sinned in approaching] Mount Sinai?  [The question is] whether we can derive a temporary enactment from permanent practice or not? — Come and hear! Rammi b. Ezekiel taught, Whether it be beast or man, it shall not live;  just as a man is judged by twenty-three, so is a beast judged by twenty-three. THE LION AND THE WOLF etc. … Resh Lakish said: Provided, however, that they killed [a human being], but not otherwise.  Thus he holds that they can be tamed and have owners.  R. Johanan says [that it is R. Eliezer's view] even when they have killed no one. Hence he holds that they cannot be tamed or have owners. We learnt: R. ELIEZER SAYS, WHOEVER IS FIRST TO KILL THEM [WITHOUT TRIAL], ACQUIRES. This is correct according to R. Johanan:  What does he acquire? — He acquires [the possession of] their skin. But according to Resh Lakish, what does he acquire? As soon as they killed someone, the Rabbis regarded them as sentenced [to death], in which case every benefit from them is prohibited!  What then does he acquire? — He acquires [merit] in the sight of Heaven. There is [a Baraitha] taught which is in agreement with Resh Lakish: It is all one whether it be an ox, or any other beast or animal that killed a man, [it is judged] by twenty-three. R. Eliezer says: Only an ox that killed [is tried] by twenty-three, but any other animal or beast who killed, whoever is first to kill them acquires merit in the sight of Heaven. R. AKIBA SAID etc. Is not R. Akiba's opinion identical with that of the first Tanna [of the Mishnah]?  — [No;] they differ in the case of a serpent. A WHOLE TRIBE MUST NOT BE JUDGED etc. What sin was committed by the tribe? Shall I say, that it is a case of a tribe that desecrated the Sabbath? But  if the Divine Law made a distinction between individual sinners and a multitude, it was only in cases of idolatry; did it then differentiate in cases [of the transgression] of other commandments? — It must therefore refer to a tribe that was beguiled [into idolatry]. Is it to imply that it must be tried like a multitude? [If so,] this coincides with the opinion of neither R. Josiah nor R. Jonathan. For it has been taught: How many inhabitants must a town have that it may be proclaimed condemned? Not less than ten and not more than a hundred:  this is the view of R. Josiah. R. Jonathan says: From a hundred to the majority of the tribe in question. And even R. Jonathan admits only the majority of a tribe, but not the whole of it.  The case in question, says R. Mathna, is one