פסחים 63 — Soncino English Talmud

¹Shall we [then] say that the ‘others’ hold, Slaughtering does not count save at the end, and [this is] in accordance with Raba, who said, There is still the controversy. Therefore if he put the circumcised before the uncircumcised, it operates in respect of the circumcised, but it does not operate in respect of the uncircumcised; while if he put the uncircumcised before the circumcised, it operates in respect of the uncircumcised, but it does not operate in respect of the circumcised? — Said Rabbah, Not so: in truth the ‘others’ hold [that] slaughtering counts from beginning to end, but the case we discuss here is this: e.g., where he mentally determined [it] for both of them, [i.e.,] both for circumcised and for uncircumcised, and he verbally expressed [his intention] for uncircumcised, but he had no time to say, ‘for the circumcised’ before the slaughtering was completed with [the expressed intention of] the uncircumcised [alone], and they differ in this: R. Meir holds [that] we do not require his mouth and his heart [to be] the same [in intention]; while the Rabbis hold, We require his mouth and his heart [to be] the same. Yet does R. Meir hold that we do not require his mouth and at the same service or at different services, because the first statement only is regarded. But the Rabbis maintain that his last words too count, so that if both are expressed at the same service there is a mixing of intentions, and it does not become piggul, for a sacrifice becomes piggul only when the blood has otherwise been properly sprinkled. This proves that the view that the first statement only is regarded is maintained even in respect of halves, for the sacrifice is large enough to permit us to assume that each wrongful intention was expressed with respect to a different part thereof, and yet R. Judah disagrees. To this Abaye answered, Do not think that the slaughtering counts only when it is completed, so that the two intentions come together at the same moment. On the contrary, the slaughtering counts from beginning to end, and in the passage quoted he cut one organ of the animal with the intention of eating it after time, and the second organ with the intention of eating it without the permitted area, R. Meir holding that you can make an animal piggul even at one organ only. (Ritual slaughtering — shechitah — consists of cutting across the two organs of the throat, viz, the windpipe and the gullet.) This proves that Raba, who raised this objection, holds that in the views of R. Meir and R. Judah slaughtering counts only at the end. Hence the present passage too can be explained on that basis too. Thus: he must express his intention for whom he is slaughtering the Passover sacrifice at the end of the slaughtering, and at that moment there is insufficient time to mention both, and so only the first expression is regarded, the second being entirely disregarded. Therefore if he first mentions the circumcised, it is fit; while if he first mentions the uncircumcised, it is unfit. his heart [to be] the same, but the following contradicts it: He who intended saying ‘[Let this be] terumah,’ but he said ‘tithe’ [instead], [or, ‘let this be] tithe,’ and he said ‘terumah,’ or, ‘[I swear] that I will not enter this house,’ but he said, ‘that [house],’ or, ‘[I vow] that I will not benefit from this [person],’ but he said ‘from that [person],’ he has said nothing, unless his mouth and his heart are alike? — Rather, said Abaye, The first clause means where he stated, ‘[I cut] the first organ for the circumcised and the second organ for the uncircumcised too,’ so that at the second organ also circumcised too are included. [But] the second clause means where he stated ‘[I cut] the first organ for uncircumcised, the second organ for circumcised’ so that at the first organ circumcised are not included. Now R. Meir is consistent with his opinion, for he maintained, You can render [a sacrifice] piggul at half of that which makes it permitted; while the Rabbis are consistent with their view, for they maintain, You cannot render [a sacrifice] piggul at half of that which makes it permitted. MISHNAH. HE WHO SLAUGHTERS THE PASSOVER OFFERING WITH LEAVEN [IN HIS POSSESSION] VIOLATES A NEGATIVE COMMAND. R. JUDAH SAID: [ALSO] THE [EVENING] TAMID TOO. R. SIMEON SAID: [IF HE SLAUGHTERS] THE PASSOVER OFFERING [WITH LEAVEN] ON THE FOURTEENTH FOR ITS OWN PURPOSE, HE IS LIABLE [TO PUNISHMENT]; [IF] FOR A DIFFERENT PURPOSE, HE IS EXEMPT. BUT [FOR] ALL OTHER SACRIFICES, WHETHER SLAUGHTERED FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSE OR FOR A DIFFERENT PURPOSE, HE IS EXEMPT. [BUT IF HE SLAUGHTERS THE PASSOVER SACRIFICE WITH LEAVEN] ON THE FESTIVAL, IF FOR ITS OWN PURPOSE, HE IS EXEMPT; IF FOR A DIFFERENT PURPOSE, HE IS LIABLE; BUT [FOR] ALL OTHER SACRIFICES [SLAUGHTERED ON THE FESTIVAL WITH LEAVEN], WHETHER FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSE OR FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE, HE IS LIABLE, EXCEPT [IN THE CASE OR] A SIN-OFFERING WHICH HE SLAUGHTERED FOR A DIFFERENT PURPOSE. GEMARA. R. Simeon b. Lakish said: He is never liable unless there is leaven belonging to him who slaughters or to him who sprinkles [the blood]^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ

^ᵃnote:Lit., ‘the circumcised fall’ (i.e., are counted). — The slaughtering counts as having been performed for the circumcised.
^ᵇnote:When a man would substitute an animal for another consecrated animal, both are holy (Lev. XXVII, 33), the former bearing the same holiness as that of the latter, and it must be offered as the same sacrifice. Now if he declares, ‘This animal be a substitute for a burnt-offering’, ‘This (the same) animal be a substitute for a peace-offering’, R. Meir rules that it is a substitute for the first only, for only his first words are regarded. R. Jose holds that his last words too are regarded, and therefore it is a substitute for both; hence it must be redeemed, and the redemption money expended on two animals, one for a burnt-offering and another for a peace-offering. Now a problem is raised in Zeb. 30a: What if he declares, ‘Half of this be a substitute for a burnt-offering, and half be a substitute for a peace-offering’; does R. Meir agree with R. Jose or not? Is R. Meir's reason in the former case because he regards the second statement as a change of mind, which is invalid, since by his first statement it has already become a burnt-offering? But that is obviously inapplicable to the case in question, hence R. Meir will agree. Or perhaps here too R. Meir holds that since the sanctity of the burnt-offering first takes possession of it, as it were, that of the peace-offering cannot operate? Abaye maintains that R. Meir does agree in this case, but Raba holds that there is still the controversy. Thereupon Raba raised an objection to Abaye from this: If a man slaughters a sacrifice with the intention of eating as much as an olive without the permitted area and as much as an olive after the permitted time, R. Judah disagrees with the Rabbis and rules as R. Meir, that only his first statement is counted, hence it is not piggul, which applies to the second only, and kareth is not incurred for eating it. For R. Judah states this as a general rule: If the intention of an illegitimate time is expressed before the intention of an illegitimate place, it is piggul, and kareth is incurred for eating it, whether these two intentions are both expressed
^ᶜnote:Lit., ‘uttered with his mouth’.
^ᵈnote:I.e., we merely regard the explicit intention. Hence since he mentioned the uncircumcised only, the sacrifice is unfit.
^ᵉnote:I.e., both are regarded. Therefore the Mishnah supra 61a states that if it is sacrificed for both, whatever the order, it is fit.
^ᶠnote:I.e., his words are invalid.
^ᵍnote:This is an anonymous Mishnah, and it is a general rule that such reflects R. Meir's view; Sanh. 86a.
^ʰnote:Hence it is fit.
^ⁱnote:I.e., the view of the Mishnah supra 61a.
^ʲnote:‘That which makes it permitted’ (the mattir) here is the slaughtering; half of that etc., is the cutting of one organ. R. Meir holds that the intention expressed at the cutting of the first organ determines the status of the sacrifice. Hence, if this intention was to eat it after time, it is piggul; while in the present case, since it was for the uncircumcised, it is disqualified. The Rabbis, however, hold that an illegitimate intention at the first organ cannot render it piggul, and in the same way an intention for uncircumcised at the first organ does not disqualify it.
^ᵏnote:I.e., before the leaven has been destroyed. The phraseology is Biblical: Thou shalt not slaughter (E.V. ‘offer’) the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread (Ex. XXXIV, 25).
^ˡnote:V. preceding note.
^ᵐnote:I.e., if he kills the evening tamid of the fourteenth before the leaven is destroyed, he violates a negative command.
^ⁿnote:In the former case the sacrifice is fit, hence the shechitah is duly regarded as shechitah. But in the latter the sacrifice is unfit; hence R. Simeon does not regard the shechitah as shechitah, and the verse quoted on p. 317, n. 6. does not apply to it.
^ᵒnote:Offered on Passover eve with leaven in his possession.
^ᵖnote:For a Passover offering killed at a time other than its own, viz., the fourteenth, is disqualified if sacrificed as a Passover offering, but fit if sacrificed as a peace-offering.
^ᵠnote:Because they are fit, v. Zeb. 2a.
^ʳnote:Because it is disqualified, ibid.

²or to one of the members of the company, and providing that it [the leaven] is with him in the Temple Court. R. Johanan said: Even if it is not with him in the Temple Court. Wherein do they differ? Shall we say that they differ in whether ‘with’ [‘al] means ‘near,’ R. Simeon b. Lakish holding, ‘with’ means near, while R. Johanan holds, We do not require ‘with’ [in the sense of] near,’ — but surely they have differed in this once [already]? For we learned: If a man slaughters the thanksoffering within [the Temple Court], while its bread is without the wall, the bread is not sanctified. What does ‘without the wall’ mean? R. Johanan said, Without the wall of Beth Pagi; but [if] without the wall of the Temple Court, it is sanctified, and we do not require ‘with’ [in the sense of] near. R. Simeon b. Lakish said: Even if without the wall of the Temple Court, it is not sanctified; which proves that we require ‘with’ [in the sense of] near! — Rather, they differ over a doubtful warning. But in this too they have already differed once? For it was stated: [If a man declares, ‘I take] an oath that I will eat this loaf to-day,’ and the day passed and he did not eat it, — R. Johanan and R. Simeon b. Lakish both maintain, He is not flagellated. R. Johanan said, He is not flagellated, because it is a negative injunction not involving an action, and every negative command not involving an action, we do not flagellate for it; but a doubtful warning counts as a warning. While R. Simeon b. Lakish said, He is not flagellated, because it is a doubtful warning, and a doubtful warning does not count as a warning; but as for a negative command not involving an action, we flagellate for it! I will tell you: After all they differ in whether ‘with’ implies near, yet it is necessary. For if they differed on the subject of leaven [alone], I would say: It is only there that R. Johanan maintains that we do not require ‘with’ [in the sense of] near, because it is a prohibited article, and wherever it is, it is;but in the matter of sanctifying the bread,it is not sanctified save within [the Temple Court], [hence] I would assume [that] he agrees with R. Simeon b. Lakish, that if it is inside it is sanctified, and if not, it is not sanctified, by analogy with service vessels. Thus this [latter case] is necessary. And if we were informed [of this] in the matter of sanctifying the bread, I would say: in this R. Simeon b. Lakish maintains that we require ‘with’ [in the sense of] near, so that if it is inside it is sanctified, [and] if not, It is not sanctified. But in the matter of leaven [I would say that] he agrees with R. Johanan that we do not require ‘with’ [in the sense of] near, because it is a prohibited article, and wherever it is, it is. Hence they are [both] necessary. R. Oshaia asked R. Ammi: What if he who slaughters has none, but one of the members of the company has [leaven]? — Said he to him, Is it then written, ‘Thou shalt not slaughter [the blood of My sacrifice] with thy leavened bread’? ‘Thou shalt not slaughter [the blood of My sacrifice] with leavened bread’ is written. If so, he countered, [he is culpable] even if a person at the end of the world [possesses leaven]! — Said he to him, Scripture saith, Thou shalt not slaughter [the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread]; neither shall [the sacrifice of the feast of the Passover] be left overnight unto the morning: [thus,] ‘Thou shalt not slaughter . . . with leavened bread’ [applies to] those who are subject to ‘it shall not be left overnight’ on its account. R. Papa said: As a corollary, the priest who burns the fat [on the altar] violates a negative command, since he is subject to the general [interdict of] leaving the emurim overnight. It was taught in accordance with R. Papa. He who slaughters the Passover sacrifice with leaven violates a negative command — When is that? When it belongs to him who slaughters or to him who sprinkles [the blood] or to one of the members of the company. If it belonged to someone at the end of the world, he is not tied to him. And whether he slaughters or sprinkles or burns [the fat], he is liable. But he who wrings a bird's neck on the fourteenth does not violate anything. But the following contradicts it: He who slaughters the Passover offering with leaven violates a negative command. R. Judah said: The tamid too. Said they to him, They [the Sages] said [thus] of nought except the Passover-offering alone. When is that? When either he who slaughters or he who sprinkles or one of the members of the company possesses [the leaven]. If a person at the end of the world possesses it, he is not tied to him. And whether he slaughters or he sprinkles or he wrings [a bird's neck] or he sprinkles [the blood of the bird], he is liable. But he who takes the handful of the meal-offering does not violate a negative command. He who burns the emurim does not violate a negative command.^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ^ᵃʰ^ᵃⁱ^ᵃʲ^ᵃᵏ^ᵃˡ^ᵃᵐ^ᵃⁿ

^ˢnote:Registered for this sacrifice.
^ᵗnote:In Ex. XXXIV, 25, quoted on p. 317, n. 6.
^ᵘnote:Why then repeat the controversy here?
^ᵛnote:The thanksoffering was accompanied by forty loaves. These were verbally sanctified before the sacrifice was actually slaughtered, whereupon they acquired a monetary consecration, which means that they might not henceforth be eaten or put to use until the offering is sacrificed; while if they became defiled, they were redeemed and reverted to hullin. The slaughtering of the sacrifice conferred intrinsic (‘bodily’) sanctity upon them; they were more readily disqualified then, and if defiled they had to be burnt. In this connection too ‘with’ (kg) is written: then he shall offer with the sacrifice of the thanksoffering unleavened cakes . . . with (kg) cakes of leavened bread he shall present his offering (Lev. VII, 12f). — ‘Not sanctified’ means not intrinsically sanctified.
^ʷnote:A fortified suburb of Jerusalem (Jast.), which is the uttermost boundary of the town (Rashi). Its exact spot has not been identified, v. Neubauer, Geographie, pp. 247ff.
^ˣnote:‘Flagellation, the punishment for violating a negative command, is imposed only if the offender has been duly warned before he sinned. Now, if the leaven is in the Temple Court, he can be warned with the certainty that his proposed action is forbidden. But if it is not in the Temple Court, we are doubtful, as we do not know whether he has leaven at home, and thus it is a doubtful warning. R. Simeon b. Lakish holds that such is not a valid warning, and flagellation is not thereby incurred; while R. Johanan holds that it is a warning, and when we subsequently learn that he had leaven at home, he is flagellated.
^ʸnote:I.e., he violates the injunction, ‘Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain (Ex. XX, 7) by remaining passive, not by a positive act, v. Shebu. 20b.
^ᶻnote:Lit., ‘its name is’.
^ᵃᵃnote:For naturally until the last moment of the day only a doubtful warning can be given, as we do not know that he will permit the day to pass without eating it.
^ᵃᵇnote:For them to differ in both cases.
^ᵃᶜnote:These sanctify whatever is put into them, but only when they are in the Temple Court (Tosaf.).
^ᵃᵈnote:Resh Lakish states it (supra) as an obvious thing, but R. Oshaia was in doubt.
^ᵃᵉnote:Ex. XXXIV, 25. Hence he is culpable.
^ᵃᶠnote:And that obviously applies to its owners only.
^ᵃᵍnote:I.e., if he still has leaven when he burns the fat, even if none of the company has any.
^ᵃʰnote:He has no connection with him, — or, he is not bound to take him into account, — is unaffected thereby.
^ᵃⁱnote:This supports R. Papa.
^ᵃʲnote:While he still possesses leaven. The reference is to a bird offered as a sacrifice for a man lacking atonement; as stated supra 59a, it could be brought on the fourteenth after the afternoon tamid, i.e., when it is time for the Passover sacrifice to be slaughtered.
^ᵃᵏnote:This is explained anon.
^ᵃˡnote:V. note on Mishnah.
^ᵃᵐnote:vzn, term used in connection with bird sacrifices, as distinct from ezr, which refers to animal sacrifices.
^ᵃⁿnote:V. Lev. II, 2.