Pesachim

or perhaps we learned [it only] in respect to two services, and even according to R. Meir, who said, ‘Seize the first expression.’ that applies only in the case of one service, but in the case of two services he agrees that it is disqualified?1 — I will tell you: to which [case does this problem refer]? Shall we say, to [the case where it was] for another purpose [first] and [then] for its own purpose, then whether it was in connection with one service or in connection with two services, according to both R. Meir and R. Jose it was disqualified by the first [wrongful intention], for according to R. Jose too, he holds that a man is held responsible for his last words also?2 — Rather, [the problem refers] to [where it was done] for its own purpose [first] and then for another purpose: what then? — Come and hear: IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED THE PASSOVER SACRIFICE FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE AND CAUGHT [THE BLOOD]. AND WENT AND SPRINKLED IT FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE: how is it meant? Shall we say, [literally] as he teaches it,3 why must he intend all of them [for a wrong purpose]? From the first it is disqualified! Hence he must teach thus: IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED THE PASSOVER SACRIFICE FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE, or even if he slaughtered it for its own purpose, but HE CAUGHT [ITS BLOOD], AND WENT AND SPRINKLED IT FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE,4 or even if he slaughtered it, caught [its blood], and went [with it] for its own purpose. but SPRINKLED IT FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE, so that it is [a question of] two services.5 Then consider the second clause: FOR ITS OWN PURPOSE AND FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE: how is it meant? Shall we say. in respect of two services: then it is identical with the first clause! Hence it must surely be in respect of one service, and this agrees with R. Jose, who maintained: A man is held responsible for his last words too! — No. After all it refers to two services,6 but the first clause [discusses] where he is standing at [engaged in] the slaughtering and intends [with due purpose] in respect of the slaughtering, or again7 he is standing at the sprinkling and intends [for another purpose] in respect of sprinkling.8 While the second clause means when he is standing at the slaughtering and intends in respect of the sprinkling, when he [for instance] declares, ‘Behold, I slaughter the Passover sacrifice for its own purpose, [but] to sprinkle its blood for another purpose’; and he [the Tanna] informs us that you can intend at one service for another service,9 and that is R. Papa's question.10 Come and hear: OR FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE AND FOR ITS OWN PURPOSE, [IT] IS DISQUALIFIED. How is it meant? If we say, in the case of two services, [then] seeing that where [if the first is] for its own purpose and [the second is] for another purpose. you say that it is disqualified. is it necessary [to state it where it is first] for another purpose and [then] for its own purpose?11 Hence it must surely refer to one service, and since the second clause refers to one service, the first clause too refers [also] to one service! — No, after all it refers [only] to two services, and logically indeed it is not required, but because he speaks of ‘FOR ITS OWN PURPOSE AND FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE,’ he also mentions ‘FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE AND FOR ITS OWN PURPOSE.12 Come and hear: If he killed it [the Passover sacrifice] for those who cannot eat it or for those who were not registered for it,13 for uncircumcised14 or for unclean persons,15 it is disqualified. Now here it obviously refers to one service, and since the second clause refers to one service, the first clause too treats [also] of one service!16 — What argument is this? The one is according to its nature, while the other is according to its nature; the second clause [certainly] refers [only] to one service, while the first clause may refer either to one service or to two services. 17 Come and hear: [If he killed it] for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is fit. How is it meant? Shall we say, at two services:18 and the reason [that it is fit] is because he intended it [for non-eaters] at the sprinkling, for there can be no [effective] intention of eaters at the sprinkling;19 hence [if it were] at one service, e.g.. at the slaughtering, where an intention with reference to eaters is effective, it would be disqualified, but we have an established law that if some are eaters it is not disqualified? 20 services; while on the second hypothesis the Mishnah refers to two services only, but will not hold good in the case of one service; Rashi infra 60b. s.v. ,jt vsucgc tphx and as is evident from the context. performed with the due or undue intention, as the case may be, in respect of itself.] to whether the Mishnah may refer to two services is in such conditions, viz., where an illegitimate intention for one service is expressed in the course of another service. arises if the Mishnah refers to one and the same service, but then it can be answered that the Mishnah informs us in the first clause (‘FOR ITS OWN PURPOSE AND FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE’) that we do not determine the matter purely by his first words, and in the second clause (‘FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE AND FOR ITS OWN PURPOSE’) that the matter is not determined purely by his last words, but that due weight must be given to both. the present instance he enumerated those for whom he was slaughtering it, all of whom, however, were incapable of eating through old age or sickness (Rashi: none others had registered for it; Tosaf.: others who were capable had also registered for it, but he ignored them in his declaration), or had not registered for this particular animal. were afraid of a similar fate. These may not eat thereof, ibid. 48. for those who cannot eat (R. Han.).