פסחים 60 — Soncino English Talmud

¹or perhaps we learned [it only] in respect to two services, and even according to R. Meir, who said, ‘Seize the first expression.’ that applies only in the case of one service, but in the case of two services he agrees that it is disqualified? — I will tell you: to which [case does this problem refer]? Shall we say, to [the case where it was] for another purpose [first] and [then] for its own purpose, then whether it was in connection with one service or in connection with two services, according to both R. Meir and R. Jose it was disqualified by the first [wrongful intention], for according to R. Jose too, he holds that a man is held responsible for his last words also? — Rather, [the problem refers] to [where it was done] for its own purpose [first] and then for another purpose: what then? — Come and hear: IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED THE PASSOVER SACRIFICE FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE AND CAUGHT [THE BLOOD]. AND WENT AND SPRINKLED IT FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE: how is it meant? Shall we say, [literally] as he teaches it, why must he intend all of them [for a wrong purpose]? From the first it is disqualified! Hence he must teach thus: IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED THE PASSOVER SACRIFICE FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE, or even if he slaughtered it for its own purpose, but HE CAUGHT [ITS BLOOD], AND WENT AND SPRINKLED IT FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE, or even if he slaughtered it, caught [its blood], and went [with it] for its own purpose. but SPRINKLED IT FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE, so that it is [a question of] two services. Then consider the second clause: FOR ITS OWN PURPOSE AND FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE: how is it meant? Shall we say. in respect of two services: then it is identical with the first clause! Hence it must surely be in respect of one service, and this agrees with R. Jose, who maintained: A man is held responsible for his last words too! — No. After all it refers to two services, but the first clause [discusses] where he is standing at [engaged in] the slaughtering and intends [with due purpose] in respect of the slaughtering, or again he is standing at the sprinkling and intends [for another purpose] in respect of sprinkling. While the second clause means when he is standing at the slaughtering and intends in respect of the sprinkling, when he [for instance] declares, ‘Behold, I slaughter the Passover sacrifice for its own purpose, [but] to sprinkle its blood for another purpose’; and he [the Tanna] informs us that you can intend at one service for another service, and that is R. Papa's question. Come and hear: OR FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE AND FOR ITS OWN PURPOSE, [IT] IS DISQUALIFIED. How is it meant? If we say, in the case of two services, [then] seeing that where [if the first is] for its own purpose and [the second is] for another purpose. you say that it is disqualified. is it necessary [to state it where it is first] for another purpose and [then] for its own purpose? Hence it must surely refer to one service, and since the second clause refers to one service, the first clause too refers [also] to one service! — No, after all it refers [only] to two services, and logically indeed it is not required, but because he speaks of ‘FOR ITS OWN PURPOSE AND FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE,’ he also mentions ‘FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE AND FOR ITS OWN PURPOSE. Come and hear: If he killed it [the Passover sacrifice] for those who cannot eat it or for those who were not registered for it, for uncircumcised or for unclean persons, it is disqualified. Now here it obviously refers to one service, and since the second clause refers to one service, the first clause too treats [also] of one service! — What argument is this? The one is according to its nature, while the other is according to its nature; the second clause [certainly] refers [only] to one service, while the first clause may refer either to one service or to two services. Come and hear: [If he killed it] for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is fit. How is it meant? Shall we say, at two services: and the reason [that it is fit] is because he intended it [for non-eaters] at the sprinkling, for there can be no [effective] intention of eaters at the sprinkling; hence [if it were] at one service, e.g.. at the slaughtering, where an intention with reference to eaters is effective, it would be disqualified, but we have an established law that if some are eaters it is not disqualified? 20^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ

^ᵃnote:On the first hypothesis the Mishnah refers even to one service, and will certainly also hold good in the case of two services; while on the second hypothesis the Mishnah refers to two services only, but will not hold good in the case of one service; Rashi infra 60b. s.v. ,jt vsucgc tphx and as is evident from the context.
^ᵇnote:I.e., they too must be taken into account, but his first words certainly cannot be ignored.
^ᶜnote:Viz., that all four services were performed for another purpose.
^ᵈnote:[The text seems to be in slight disorder, v. D.S. The general meaning is, however, clear.]
^ᵉnote:I.e., this clause states the case of a legal purpose at one service and an illegal purpose at another service.
^ᶠnote:And still the two clauses are not identical as it goes on explaining.
^ᵍnote:[MS.M. omits: ‘or again’.]
^ʰnote:[‘Slaughtering’ and ‘sprinkling’ are taken merely as examples, the same applying to the other services. Each was performed with the due or undue intention, as the case may be, in respect of itself.]
^ⁱnote:And that such intention is taken into account, so that if it is illegitimate the sacrifice is disqualified.
^ʲnote:Riba: that is why R. Papa asks his question, because the Mishnah affords no solution. Rashba: R. Papa's question as to whether the Mishnah may refer to two services is in such conditions, viz., where an illegitimate intention for one service is expressed in the course of another service.
^ᵏnote:For the very first intention is illegitimate and disqualifies it; how then is it to regain its validity? The same difficulty arises if the Mishnah refers to one and the same service, but then it can be answered that the Mishnah informs us in the first clause (‘FOR ITS OWN PURPOSE AND FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE’) that we do not determine the matter purely by his first words, and in the second clause (‘FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE AND FOR ITS OWN PURPOSE’) that the matter is not determined purely by his last words, but that due weight must be given to both.
^ˡnote:For the sake of parallelism.
^ᵐnote:Every Paschal lamb required its registered consumers before it was slaughtered, in accordance with Ex. XII, 4. In the present instance he enumerated those for whom he was slaughtering it, all of whom, however, were incapable of eating through old age or sickness (Rashi: none others had registered for it; Tosaf.: others who were capable had also registered for it, but he ignored them in his declaration), or had not registered for this particular animal.
^ⁿnote:‘Uncircumcised’ in this connection always means men whose brothers had died through circumcision, and they were afraid of a similar fate. These may not eat thereof, ibid. 48.
^ᵒnote:Who may likewise not eat it, being forbidden all sacred flesh. Lev. XXII, 4ff.
^ᵖnote:The Mishnahs printed on 59b and 61a are actually clauses of the same Mishnah.
^ᵠnote:I.e., either also to one service or exclusively to two services. And the question is, to which?
^ʳnote:Thus: at the slaughtering he declared that it was for those who can eat, and at the sprinkling he declared that it was for those who cannot eat (R. Han.).
^ˢnote:I.e., an intention with respect to the eaters expressed at the sprinkling is of no account.
^ᵗnote:Since even if only one desired to eat of it the whole animal must be killed, v. infra 61a.

²Hence it surely refers [also] to one service, and since the second clause refers [also] to one service, the first clause too refers [also] to one service! — What argument is this: the one is according to its nature, while the other is according to its nature: the second clause refers [also] to one service, while the first clause refers either to one service or to two services. The scholars asked: What is the law of a Passover sacrifice which he killed at any other time of the year for its own purpose and for another purpose? Does the other purpose come and nullify its own purpose, and [thus] make it fit, or not? — When R. Dimi came, he said, I stated this argument before R. Jeremiah: Since [slaughtering it] for its own purpose makes it fit at its own time, while [slaughtering it] for another purpose makes it fit at a different time, then just as [the slaughtering] for its own purpose, which makes it fit at its own time, does not save it from [the disqualifying effect of] another purpose, so also [the slaughtering] for another purpose, which makes it fit at a different time, does not save it [from the disqualifying effect] of its own purpose, and it is unfit. Whereupon he said to me, It is not so: If you say thus in respect to another purpose. that is because it operates in the case of all sacrifices; will you say [the same where it is slaughtered] for its own purpose, seeing that it does not operate [as a cause of disqualification] in the case of all [other] sacrifices but only in the case of the Passover sacrifice alone? What is [our decision] thereon? — Said Raba, A Passover sacrifice which he slaughtered at any other time of the year for its own purpose and for another purpose is fit. For it tacitly stands [to be killed] for its own purpose, yet even so, when he kills it for another purpose it is fit, which proves that the other purpose comes and nullifies its own purpose. Hence, when he slaughters it for its own purpose and for another purpose too, the other purpose comes and nullifies its own purpose. Said R. Adda b. Ahabah to Raba: Perhaps where he states it, it is different from where he does not state it? For [if he kills it] for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is fit, yet when he kills it for those who cannot eat it alone, it is disqualified. Yet why so? Surely it tacitly stands for those who can eat it? Hence [you must admit that] where he states it, it is different from where he does not state it; so here too, where he states it, it is different from where he does not state it. Is this all argument? he rejoined. As for there, it is well: there, as long as he does not [expressly] overthrow it at the slaughtering, its tacit [destiny] is certainly to be killed for its own purpose. But here, does it tacitly stand for those who are [registered] to eat it? Perhaps these will withdraw and others will come and register for it, for we learned: They may register and withdraw their hands from it [the Paschal lamb] until he kills it. The scholars asked: What is the law of a Paschal lamb which was slaughtered during the rest of the year with a change of its offering, which may then not be eaten, or in part, in the sense that they may be eaten, but their owners have not discharged their obligations and must bring another. Therefore it is logical that its disqualifying power should be so strong as to render of no avail the fact that it was slaughtered for its purpose too. owners? Is a change of owner like a change of sanctity, and it validates it; or not? — Said R. Papa. I stated this argument before Raba: Since a change of sanctity disqualifies it at its own time, and a change of owner disqualifies it at its own time: then just as a change of sanctity, which disqualifies it at its own time, validates it at a different time, so a change of owner, which disqualifies it at its own time, validates it at a different time. But he said to me, It is not so: If you say thus in the case of a change of sanctity, [that is] because its disqualification is intrinsic, and it is [operative] in respect of the four services,^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ^ᵃʰ^ᵃⁱ^ᵃʲ^ᵃᵏ^ᵃˡ^ᵃᵐ

^ᵘnote:I.e., also to one service.
^ᵛnote:This will not have quite the same meaning as the same phrase used before. There it obviously meant that it treats of one service only. Here however the meaning is this: even in the case of one service the sacrifice is fit, this law holding good in the case of both one service or two services. Thus, if this intention, viz., that he was killing it for eaters and non-eaters, was expressed at the slaughtering, the sacrifice is fit, because eaters were included. While it may also refer to two services, as explained on p. 301, n. 7.
^ʷnote:V. p. 301. n. 6.
^ˣnote:E.g., if a man dedicated a lamb for the Passover sacrifice a considerable time beforehand. Now it is stated infra 70b that if he kills it as a peace-offering at any time other than the eve of Passover it is fit; if as a Passover offering, it is unfit.
^ʸnote:Lit., ‘exclude from’.
^ᶻnote:From Palestine to Babylon
^ᵃᵃnote:Lit., ‘not in its own time’.
^ᵃᵇnote:Lit., ‘draw out’.
^ᵃᶜnote:So that if it is killed both for its purpose and for another purpose, it is unfit.
^ᵃᵈnote:That it disqualifies the Passover sacrifice even if it is also killed for its own purposes.
^ᵃᵉnote:All sacrifices, if slaughtered for a purpose other than their own, are disqualified, either wholly, viz., in the case of a sin-offering and the Passover
^ᵃᶠnote:Before the eve of passover.
^ᵃᵍnote:The other purpose can nullify the tacit assumption that it stands for its own purpose, but it may be unable to nullify the explicit declaration that it is slaughtered for its own purpose too.
^ᵃʰnote:So that according to your argument it is the same as though he explicitly killed it for both.
^ᵃⁱnote:The animal was set aside for a certain person and then slaughtered for a different person, but for its own purpose (Rashi).
^ᵃʲnote:I.e., like slaughtering it as a different sacrifice.
^ᵃᵏnote:The text must be emended thus.
^ᵃˡnote:I.e., an illegitimate intention is expressed in respect to the sacrifice itself.
^ᵃᵐnote:V. Mishnah supra 59b and note a.l.