1 [This can be refuted]. As for ‘orlah, [that may be] because it had no period of fitness; will you say [the same of] meat and milk [seethed together], seeing that they had a period of fitness? Then let leaven during Passover prove it: though it had a period of fitness, it is forbidden for use. [This again can be refuted]. As for leaven during Passover, [that may be] because he [the offender] is punished with kareth, will you say [the same] of meat [seethed] in milk, where he is not punished with kareth? Then let kil'ayim of the vineyard prove it: though he [the offender] is not punished with kareth yet it is forbidden for use. Now if this is so, let us refute [it thus]: as for kil'ayim of the vineyard. [that may be] because we flagellate on its account even [when he does] not [use it] in the normal manner of its usage? And Abaye? — [He can answer] ‘will you say’ — with what? ‘Will you say [the same] of meat [seethed] in milk, for which we do not flagellate save [when it is eaten] in the normal manner of its use’ — is then ‘eating’ written in connection with meat [seethed] in milk? And the other who raises the objection holds: for that purpose it is deduced from nebelah: just as nebelah [must be enjoyed] in the normal manner of its usage, so [must] meat [seethed] in milk, in the normal manner of its usage. And Abaye? — [He argues]: for that reason ‘eating’ is not written in its own case, to teach that we flagellate on its account even [when one does] not [enjoy it] in the normal manner of its usage. But let us refute it [thus]: as for kil'ayim, [that may be] because it had no period of fitness? — Said R. Adda b. Ahabah: This proves that [in] kil'ayim of the vineyard, their very stock is forbidden, [and so we cannot refute it thus] since it had a time of fitness before taking root. ‘R. Shemaiah objected: If one sets a perforated pot in a vineyard, if one two-hundredth part is added, it is [all] forbidden: thus, only if there is added, but not if there is not added? — Said Raba, Two verses are written: ‘the fulness’ is written, and ‘the seed’ is written. How is this [to be reconciled]? That which is sown from the very outset [becomes forbidden] on taking root; that which was sown when [partly] grown, if it increased it is [forbidden]; if it did not increase, it is not [forbidden]! R. Jacob said in R. Johanan's name: We may cure ourselves with all things, save with the wood of the asherah. How is it meant? If we say that there is danger, even the wood of the asherah too [is permitted]; while if there is no danger, even all [other] forbidden things of the Torah too are not [permitted]? — After all [it means] that there is danger, yet even so the wood of the asherah [must] not be used. For it was taught, R. Eliezer said: If ‘with all thy soul’ is said, why is ‘with all thy might’ said? Or if ‘with all thy might’ is said, why is ‘with all thy soul’ said? But it is to teach you: if there is a man to whom his person is dearer than his wealth, therefore, ‘with all thy soul’ is stated; and if there is a man to whom his wealth is dearer than his person, therefore ‘with all thy might’ [i.e.. substance] is stated. When Rabin came, he said in R. Johanan's name: We may cure [i.e., save] ourselves with all [forbidden] things, except idolatry, incest, 29ᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷˣʸᶻᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜ
2 and murder. Idolatry, as we have stated. Incest and murder, as it was taught: Rabbi said: For as when a man riseth against his neighbour, and slayeth him, even so is this matter. Now, what connection has a murderer with a betrothed maiden? Thus this comes to throw light, and is itself illumined. The murderer is compared to a betrothed maiden: just as a betrothed maiden must be saved [from dishonour] at the cost of his [her ravisher's] life, so [in the case of] a murderer, he [the victim] must be saved at the cost of his [the attacker's] life. Conversely, a betrothed maiden [is learned] from a murderer: just as [in the case of] murder, one must be slain rather than transgress, so a betrothed maiden must be slain yet not transgress. And how do we know it of murder itself? It is common sense. Even as one who came before Raba and said to him: The governor of my town has ordered me, ‘Go and kill So-and-so, if not, I will kill you.’ He answered him: ‘Let him kill you rather than that you should commit murder; what [reason] do you see [for thinking] that your blood is redder? Perhaps his blood is redder.’ Mar son of R. Ashi found Rabina rubbing his daughter with undeveloped olives of ‘orlah. Said he to him: ‘Granted that the Rabbis ruled [thus] in time of danger; was it [likewise] ruled when there is no danger?’ ‘This inflammatory fever is also like a time of danger,’ he answered him. Others say, he answered him: ‘Am I then using it in the normal manner of its usage?’ It was stated: [As to forbidden] benefit that comes to a man against his will, — Abaye said: It is permitted; while Raba maintained: It is forbidden. Where it is possible [to avoid it], while he intends [to benefit], or if it is impossible [to avoid it], yet he intends [to benefit], none dispute that it is forbidden. If it is impossible [to avoid it], and he does not intend [to benefit], none dispute that it is permitted. They differ where it is possible [to avoid it] and he does not intend [to benefit]; now, on the view of R. Judah, who ruled, That which is unintended is forbidden, none dispute that it is forbidden. Where do they differ? On the view of R. Simeon, who maintained: That which is unintended is permitted. Abaye rules as R. Simeon. But Raba [argues]: R. Simeon rules thus only where it is impossible [to do otherwise], but not where it is possible. Others state: If it is possible [to avoid it], and he does not intend [to benefit], that is [the case of] the controversy between R. Judah and R. Simeon. If it is impossible [to avoid it], and he does not intend [to benefit], none dispute that it is permitted. When do they differ? Where it is impossible [to avoid it] and he intends [to benefit]. Now, on the view of R. Simeon, who regards the intention, none dispute that it is forbidden. Where do they differ? On the view of R. Judah, who maintained: It makes no difference whether he intends or does not intend, if it is possible [to avoid it] it is forbidden. Abaye rules as R. Judah.14ᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠ