Menachot

be baked leavened? Has it not already stated, It shall not be made leavened?1 From the verse, It shall not be made leavened, I might have said that one is liable only once for all [the works involved], Scripture therefore says, It shall not be baked leavened. Now baking was included in the general prohibition; why was it specifically mentioned? So that every other work shall be like it; thus as the work of baking is described as a specific work and one is liable solely on account of it, so I will include the work of kneading and of shaping and every other specific work, including also the work of smoothing2 which is also a specific work, that one is liable on account of each alone! — We derive our rule from the expression ‘their portion’.3 Perhaps then the whole verse refers to this only!4 — If so [the prohibition] should have been, ‘Their portion shall not be baked leavened’; why does Scripture say, It shall not be baked leavened: their portion? You can therefore infer both [prohibitions]. But perhaps the interpretation should be thus: for the baking which is expressly prohibited by the Divine Law one is liable once, but as for the other works one is only liable once for all of them! — This is a case of a subject which though included in a general proposition is specifically mentioned in order to teach us something concerning it, in which case what is specifically mentioned is not stated only for its own sake but to teach that the same affects the whole general proposition.5 But perhaps I should say that the verse ‘it shall not be made leavened’ is a general [prohibition] and the verse ‘It shall not be baked leavened’ is a particular [prohibition]; we thus have a general rule followed by a specific particular, in which case the general rule is limited to the particular specified, so that only the baking is prohibited but no other work! — R. Aptoriki explained, Here the general rule and the specific particular are far away from each other,6 and in every case where the general rule and the specific particular are far away from each other the principle relating to a general rule followed by a specific particular does not apply. 7 R. Adda b. Ahabah (some say, Kadi) objected, Do you say that where the general rule and the specific particular are far away from each other the principle relating to a general rule followed by a specific particular does not apply? Surely it has been taught: It is written, And he shall slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt-offering before the Lord; it is a sin-offering.8 Now where is the burnt-offering slaughtered? On the north side;9 this too is slaughtered on the north side. But do we derive it from here?10 Is it not written, In the place where the burnt-offering is slaughtered shall the sin-offering be slaughtered?11 Why then is the former verse8 necessary? It serves to make the rule absolute,12 namely, that if it was not slaughtered on the north side it is invalid. You say that it serves to make this rule absolute, but perhaps it is not so but teaches rather that this [sin-offering] must be [slaughtered] on the north side but no other13 requires the north side! The text therefore states, And he shall slaughter the sin-offering in the place of the burnt-offering;14 this establishes the rule that all sin-offerings must be slaughtered on the north side. Now this is the conclusion because the Divine Law has also written, And he shall slaughter the sin-offering, but without this verse I would have held that only this [sin-offering] requires the north side but no other requires the north side. And why? Is it not because this would be a case of a general rule followed by a specific particular, which would be governed by the principle relating to a general rule followed by a specific particular, notwithstanding that the two are far away from each other?15 Thereupon R. Ashi demurred, Is this an instance of a general rule followed by a specific particular? It is an instance of a specific particular followed by a general rule,16 in which case the general rule extends beyond the scope of the specific particular, and includes every [sin-offering]17 Rather the fact is that the Tanna's counter-argument was based upon the expression ‘it’;18 and he argued thus: ‘perhaps it is not so but teaches rather that this [sin-offering] must be [slaughtered] on the north side but no other requires the north side’, since the Divine Law stated ‘it’. Now that the general rule19 is derived from the verse, ‘And he shall slaughter the sin-offering’, what does the term ‘it’ exclude? — (Mnemonic: Nahshon, the slaughterer, a bird, the Passover-offering.) It teaches that it must be on the north side, but Nahshon's he-goat20 ‘was not [slaughtered] on the north side. For I might have thought that since the latter was included under the law of laying on of hands it was also included under the law requiring the north side; we are therefore taught [that it was not so]. And whence do we know that this was so concerning the laying on of hands?21 — For it was taught: The verse, And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the he-goat,22 includes also Nahshon's he-goat, for the requirement of the laying on of hands. So R. Judah. But R. Simeon says, (R. Gershom); or, shaping the loaf (Maim.). the remainder shall not be baked leavened. taking out of the handful, is subject to this prohibition? and certainly the baking, but the latter was specifically prohibited to teach that for the baking alone, as well as for any single work in connection with the meal-offering, one is liable. special case of a sin-offering of a ruler. generally so as to include all sin-offerings. princes of the other tribes, v. Num. VII, 12ff) at the dedication of the altar. This sin-offering was peculiar in that it was offered not in expiation of any sin committed. verse by reason of the fact that ‘he-goat’ is expressly mentioned here instead of the more usual expression ‘upon its head’.