Menachot

and by the term ‘animal offerings’1 he meant the majority of animal-offerings. Raba answered:2 It is no contradiction: here he took the handful out of a meal-offering and referred to it as [another] meal-offering, there he took the handful out of a meal-offering and referred to it as an animal-offering. Where one meal-offering was referred to as [another] meal-offering [it discharges the owner's obligation, for it is written,] And this is the law of the meal-offering:3 there is but one law for all meal-offerings;4 where a meal-offering was referred to as an animal-offering, [it does not discharge the owner's obligation, for it is written.] ‘And this is the law of the meal-offering’; but it is not written ‘of the animal-offering’. But did not the Tanna [R. Simeon] say, ‘For the preparation thereof clearly indicates [the true nature of the offering]’?5 — He meant thus: Although the expressed statement6 clearly does not [correspond with the actual offering] and consequently it should be invalid,7 [yet it is not so, for it is written,] ‘And this is the law of the meal-offering’: there is but one law for all meal-offerings.4 Then what is the meaning of the statement, ‘But with animal-offerings it is not so’?8 — It means, in spite of the fact that the same manner of slaughtering is for all offerings, it is written, ‘And this is the law of the meal-offering’, and not ‘of the animal-offering’. In that case, if one slaughtered a sin-offering brought on account of [eating] forbidden fat under the name of a sin-offering brought on account of [eating] blood, or under the name of a sin-offering brought on account of idolatry, or under the name of the sinoffering of the Nazirite or of the leper, it should be valid and also discharge [the owner], for the Divine Law says, This is the law of the sin-offering:9 there is but one law for all sin-offerings!10 According to R. Simeon it is indeed so; and11 as for the view of the Rabbis,12 Raba said, If one slaughtered a sin-offering brought on account of [eating] forbidden fat under the name of a sin-offering brought on account of [eating] blood, or under the name of a sin-offering brought on account of idolatry, it is valid;13 if [he slaughtered it] under the name of the sin-offering of the Nazirite or of the leper it is invalid, because with each of these there is a burnt-offering too.14 R. Aha the son of Raba reports that it is invalid in every case, for it is written, And he shall slaughter it for a sin-offering. 15 that is, for that [particular] sin.16 R. Ashi answered, It is no contradiction: Here he took the handful out of that which was prepared on a griddle and referred to it as prepared in a pan, there he took the handful out of a meal-offering prepared on a griddle and referred to it as a meal-offering prepared in a pan.17 Where what is prepared on a griddle is referred to as prepared in a pan, [it discharges the owner's obligation, for] the wrongful intention is in respect of the vessel used, and a wrongful intention in respect of the vessel used does not invalidate the offering. Where a meal-offering prepared on a griddle is referred to as a meal-offering prepared in a pan, [it does not discharge the owner's obligation, for] the wrongful intention is in respect of a meal-offering, and it is thereby rendered invalid. But did not the Tanna [R. Simeon] say, ‘For the preparation thereof clearly indicates [the true nature of the offering]’?18 — He meant thus: Although the expressed statement clearly does not [correspond with the actual offering], and consequently it should be invalid,19 [yet it is not so, for] the intention is in respect of the vessel and any wrongful intention in respect of the vessel does not invalidate the offering.20 Then what is the meaning of the statement, ‘But with animal-offerings it is not so’?21 — It means, in spite of the fact that the same manner of slaughtering is for all offerings, and the same manner of receiving the blood and sprinkling it for all offerings, the wrongful intention is in respect of the slaughtering and it is thereby rendered invalid. R. Aha the son of Raba asked R. Ashi, Then why does R. Simeon say [that it discharges the owner's obligation] where a dry [meal-offering] was referred to as one mingled [with oil]?22 He replied, [The intention was] for anything that is mingled.23 If so, when referring [to a burnt-offering] as a peace-offering it might also be taken to mean anything that brings about peace!24 — There is no comparison at all! There the actual sacrifice is termed shelamim [peace-offering],25 as it is written, He that offereth the blood of the shelamim,26 which means, he that sprinkles the blood of the peace-offering;27 but here, is the meal-offering ever referred to simply as belulah [mingled]?28 It is written, And every meal-offering, mingled with oil [belulah ba-shemen] or dry;29 it is indeed referred to as ‘mingled with oil’, but never as ‘mingled’ by itself. 30 Now they all31 do not adopt Rabbah's answer, for [they say], on the contrary, an intention which is manifestly [absurd] the Divine Law declares capable of rendering an offering invalid.32 They also do not adopt Raba's answer, for they do not accept his interpretation of the verse, ‘And this is the law of the meal-offering’.33 And they do not all adopt R. Ashi's answer because of the difficulty raised by R. Aha the son of Raba.34 That which is clear to Rabbah in one way35 and is clear to Raba in the opposite way,36 is a matter of doubt to R. Hoshaia. For R. Hoshaia put the question (others say, R. Hoshaia put the question to R. Assi): Where one referred to a meal-offering as an animal-offering the express variation of the sacrifice is so absurd as to be absolutely ignored; and therefore the sacrifice serves to discharge the obligation of the owner. meal-offering to refer to it as another is of no consequence. absurd. offering invalid, for otherwise it may be said that it is permitted to vary offerings. obligation is not discharged. Now, however, according to the interpretation suggested, the contrast with meal-offerings must give the result that any variation in animal-offerings discharges the owner's obligation since, after all, there is but one manner of slaughtering and one manner of sprinkling for all offerings. learnt that the sin-offering is thereby rendered invalid (Zeb. opening Mishnah)? translation follows the text as suggested by Sh. Mek. in the margin, which is supported by MS.M. V. also commentaries of Birkath Hazebah (B.H.) and Z. Kodoshim (Z.K.) offering mentioned bears the name and true characteristic of the sin-offering. not the law. According to another reading, the word uvhhsvc is omitted, and the translation would be: ‘these are (sc. have the characteristics of) burnt-offerings’; i.e., the sin-offering of the Nazirite and of the leper do not, like all other sin-offerings, bring about atonement, but only serve to render the person fit to partake of that which he was forbidden heretofore, namely, to permit the Nazirite to drink wine, and the leper to enter the Temple and to partake of sacred food. slaughter the offering for that particular sin. be valid since the expressed intention is apparently absurd. meal-offering itself, and therefore the wrongful intention should invalidate the offering. is admitted by R. Simeon that with regard to animal offerings a wrongful intention does invalidate the sacrifice. mingled with oil, for this would have been expressly stated; it is regarded as empty words and the offering is not affected thereby. conflicting views of R. Simeon, now proceeds to explain why these three Rabbis cannot agree upon one answer. verse in connection with the sin-offering, and there is no evidence to show that R. Simeon ever held such a view with regard to the sin-offering, namely, that if one slaughtered a sin-offering brought on account of eating forbidden fat under the name of the sin-offering of the Nazarite, it discharges the owner's obligation. mingled with oil. belie his expressed intention, does not render the offering invalid; v. supra p. 5.