and by the term ‘animal offerings’ he meant the majority of animal-offerings. Raba answered: It is no contradiction: here he took the handful out of a meal-offering and referred to it as [another] meal-offering, there he took the handful out of a meal-offering and referred to it as an animal-offering. Where one meal-offering was referred to as [another] meal-offering [it discharges the owner's obligation, for it is written,] And this is the law of the meal-offering: there is but one law for all meal-offerings; where a meal-offering was referred to as an animal-offering, [it does not discharge the owner's obligation, for it is written.] ‘And this is the law of the meal-offering’; but it is not written ‘of the animal-offering’. But did not the Tanna [R. Simeon] say, ‘For the preparation thereof clearly indicates [the true nature of the offering]’? — He meant thus: Although the expressed statement clearly does not [correspond with the actual offering] and consequently it should be invalid, [yet it is not so, for it is written,] ‘And this is the law of the meal-offering’: there is but one law for all meal-offerings. Then what is the meaning of the statement, ‘But with animal-offerings it is not so’? — It means, in spite of the fact that the same manner of slaughtering is for all offerings, it is written, ‘And this is the law of the meal-offering’, and not ‘of the animal-offering’. In that case, if one slaughtered a sin-offering brought on account of [eating] forbidden fat under the name of a sin-offering brought on account of [eating] blood, or under the name of a sin-offering brought on account of idolatry, or under the name of the sinoffering of the Nazirite or of the leper, it should be valid and also discharge [the owner], for the Divine Law says, This is the law of the sin-offering: there is but one law for all sin-offerings! According to R. Simeon it is indeed so; and as for the view of the Rabbis, Raba said, If one slaughtered a sin-offering brought on account of [eating] forbidden fat under the name of a sin-offering brought on account of [eating] blood, or under the name of a sin-offering brought on account of idolatry, it is valid; if [he slaughtered it] under the name of the sin-offering of the Nazirite or of the leper it is invalid, because with each of these there is a burnt-offering too. R. Aha the son of Raba reports that it is invalid in every case, for it is written, And he shall slaughter it for a sin-offering. that is, for that [particular] sin. R. Ashi answered, It is no contradiction: Here he took the handful out of that which was prepared on a griddle and referred to it as prepared in a pan, there he took the handful out of a meal-offering prepared on a griddle and referred to it as a meal-offering prepared in a pan. Where what is prepared on a griddle is referred to as prepared in a pan, [it discharges the owner's obligation, for] the wrongful intention is in respect of the vessel used, and a wrongful intention in respect of the vessel used does not invalidate the offering. Where a meal-offering prepared on a griddle is referred to as a meal-offering prepared in a pan, [it does not discharge the owner's obligation, for] the wrongful intention is in respect of a meal-offering, and it is thereby rendered invalid. But did not the Tanna [R. Simeon] say, ‘For the preparation thereof clearly indicates [the true nature of the offering]’? — He meant thus: Although the expressed statement clearly does not [correspond with the actual offering], and consequently it should be invalid, [yet it is not so, for] the intention is in respect of the vessel and any wrongful intention in respect of the vessel does not invalidate the offering. Then what is the meaning of the statement, ‘But with animal-offerings it is not so’? — It means, in spite of the fact that the same manner of slaughtering is for all offerings, and the same manner of receiving the blood and sprinkling it for all offerings, the wrongful intention is in respect of the slaughtering and it is thereby rendered invalid. R. Aha the son of Raba asked R. Ashi, Then why does R. Simeon say [that it discharges the owner's obligation] where a dry [meal-offering] was referred to as one mingled [with oil]? He replied, [The intention was] for anything that is mingled. If so, when referring [to a burnt-offering] as a peace-offering it might also be taken to mean anything that brings about peace! — There is no comparison at all! There the actual sacrifice is termed shelamim [peace-offering], as it is written, He that offereth the blood of the shelamim, which means, he that sprinkles the blood of the peace-offering; but here, is the meal-offering ever referred to simply as belulah [mingled]? It is written, And every meal-offering, mingled with oil [belulah ba-shemen] or dry; it is indeed referred to as ‘mingled with oil’, but never as ‘mingled’ by itself. Now they all do not adopt Rabbah's answer, for [they say], on the contrary, an intention which is manifestly [absurd] the Divine Law declares capable of rendering an offering invalid. They also do not adopt Raba's answer, for they do not accept his interpretation of the verse, ‘And this is the law of the meal-offering’. And they do not all adopt R. Ashi's answer because of the difficulty raised by R. Aha the son of Raba. That which is clear to Rabbah in one way and is clear to Raba in the opposite way, is a matter of doubt to R. Hoshaia. For R. Hoshaia put the question (others say, R. Hoshaia put the question to R. Assi): Where one referred to a meal-offering as an animal-offeringᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷˣʸᶻᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲ