Menachot

that it makes no difference whether the wrongful intention for the altar was expressed by the use of the term ‘eating’1 or by use of the term ‘burning. Or [to teach you] that as for eating the quantity of an olive's bulk is essential,2 so for the burning the quantity of an olive's bulk is essential. The term ‘eating’, however, always means in the usual manner.3 And R. Eliezer? — If so, [he says], the Divine Law should have stated either he'akol he'akol4 or ye'akel ye'akel;5 why does it say he'akol ye'akel?6 That you may infer two things therefrom.7 R. Zera said to R. Assi, If this8 is the reason for R. Eliezer's view, then one should also incur the penalty of kareth? And should you say that this is indeed so, but you yourself have reported in the name of R. Johanan that R. Eliezer admits that one is not thereby liable to kareth! — He replied, Tannaim differ as to the real view of R. Eliezer; some say that it is invalid by Biblical law,9 others that it is invalid by Rabbinical law only. For it was taught: If one slaughtered an animal-offering intending to drink its blood10 on the morrow, or to burn its flesh11 on the morrow, or to eat of the sacrificial portions10 on the morrow, the offering is valid; but R. Eliezer declares it to be invalid. If he intended to leave some of its blood for the morrow, R. Judah declares it to be invalid. R. Eleazar said, Even in this case, R. Eliezer declares it to be invalid, and the Sages declare it to be valid. Now whose view does R. Judah adopt?12 Do you say that of the Rabbis? But surely if in the case where the intention expressed is included under the term ‘eating’13 the Rabbis declare the offering to be valid, how much more so in this case!14 It must therefore be that of R. Eliezer. And thereupon R. Eleazar had said, ‘Even in this case, R. Eliezer declares it to be invalid, and the Sages declare it to be valid’. Is not R. Eleazar identical with R. Judah? It must therefore be said that the difference between them is on the question of kareth. The first Tanna15 is of the opinion that in the case of ‘leaving’16 [R. Eliezer holds that] it is invalid only, but in the other cases17 [R. Eliezer holds that] he is even liable to kareth; whereas R. Eleazar comes to tell us that in both these cases [R. Eliezer holds that] it is invalid only but the penalty of kareth is not incurred! — No, all are of the opinion that there is no penalty of kareth involved; but in this dispute there are three different views. The first Tanna is of the opinion that only in the other cases do they18 differ,19 but in the case of ‘leaving’ all18 agree that it is valid. [ morrow, the offering is piggul consequence. the altar what is eaten by man, or an intention that what is usually burnt on the altar shall be eaten by man, is of consequence. etc? blood for the morrow. drinking the blood on the morrow or burning the flesh on the morrow. invalid by Rabbinical law, merely as a precautionary measure against an intention of burning on the morrow what is usually burnt, in which case the offering would be piggul by the law of the Torah.