מנחות 13:2 — Soncino English Talmud

We are therefore taught [that there he agrees]. [IF HE INTENDED] TO BURN THE FRANKINCENSE THEREOF ON THE MORROW, R. JOSE SAYS, IT IS INVALID BUT THE PENALTY OF KARETH IS NOT INCURRED. Resh Lakish said, R. Jose laid down the principle that a ‘mattir cannot render piggul the other mattir. So, too, you may say of the two dishes of frankincense of the Shewbread, that one mattir cannot render piggul the other mattir. What is the point of ‘So, too, you may say’? — You might have supposed that R. Jose's reason in the case of the frankincense [in our Mishnah] was that it was not of the same substance as the meal-offering, but in the case of the two dishes of frankincense, since they each contain the same substance, you might have thought that one could render the other piggul; we are, therefore taught [that it is not so]. But how can you say that R. Jose's reason in the case of the frankincense is not ‘that it is not of the same substance as the meal-offering’? Surely it is expressly so stated in the last clause: THEY SAID TO HIM, HOW DOES THIS DIFFER FROM AN ANIMAL-OFFERING? HE SAID TO THEM, WITH THE ANIMAL-OFFERING THE BLOOD, THE FLESH AND THE SACRIFICIAL PORTIONS ARE ALL ONE; BUT THE FRANKINCENSE IS NOT OF THE MEAL-OFFERING! — The expression ‘IS NOT OF THE MEAL-OFFERING’ means, it is not dependent upon the [handful of the] meal-offering: for it is not right to say. as the handful is indispensable to the remainder-for so long as the handful has not been burnt the remainder may not be eaten-so it is indispensable to the frankincense; but in fact if he wishes he may burn this first and if he wishes he may burn that first. And what do the Rabbis [say to this]? — [They hold that] we apply the principle. ‘a mattir cannot render piggul another mattir’, only to such a case as where [the mattirs] are not ordained to be in one vessel, but where they are ordained to be in one vessel they are regarded as one [mattir]. R. Jannai said, If a non-priest gathered up the frankincense, it is invalid. Why? — R. Jeremiah said, This touches upon the law of ‘bringing nigh’. He is of the opinion that ‘bringing nigh’ without even moving the feet is quite a proper act, and [it is established that] if a non-priest brought it nigh, it is invalid. R. Mari said, We have also learnt the same: This is the general rule: If one took the handful or put it into the vessel or brought it nigh or burnt it [etc.]. Now it is clear that the taking of the handful corresponds to the slaughtering [of the animal-offering], the bringing nigh [of the handful] to the bringing nigh [of the blood], the burning [of the handful] to the sprinkling [of the blood], but as to the putting [of the handful] into a vessel what [service] is he performing! Should you say that it corresponds to the receiving [of the blood], but surely there is no comparison between them, for there [the blood] comes in of itself [into the vessel], whereas here [the handful] is taken and put into the vessel. We must therefore say that, since it can in no wise be omitted, it is an important service, and perforce is regarded as corresponding to the receiving [of the blood]; here, too, since it can in no wise be omitted, it is an important service, and perforce is regarded as the ‘bringing nigh’! — It is not so, for in fact it corresponds to the receiving of the blood; and as for your objection ‘There it comes in of itself, whereas here it is taken and put into the vessel’, I reply that, seeing that in both cases the subject is hallowed in a vessel, there can be no difference, surely, whether it comes into the vessel of itself or it is taken and put into the vessel! MISHNAH. IF HE SLAUGHTERED THE TWO LAMBS [INTENDING] TO EAT ONE OF THE [TWO] LOAVES ON THE MORROW, OR IF HE BURNT THE TWO DISHES [OF THE FRANKINCENSE INTENDING] TO EAT ONE OF THE [TWO] ROWS OF THE SHEWBREAD ON THE MORROW, R. JOSE SAYS, THAT LOAF OR THAT ROW ABOUT WHICH HE EXPRESSED THE INTENTION IS PIGGUL AND THE PENALTY OF KARETH IS INCURRED ON ACCOUNT OF THEM, WHILE THE OTHER IS INVALID BUT THE PENALTY OF KARETH IS NOT INCURRED. BUT THE SAGES SAY, BOTH ARE PIGGUL AND THE PENALTY OF KARETH IS INCURRED ON ACCOUNT OF THEM. GEMARA. R. Huna said, R. Jose maintains that if one expressed an intention which makes piggul in connection with the right thigh, the left thigh is not thereby rendered piggul. What is the reason? You may say it is based upon a logical argument, or you may say it is based upon a verse. ‘You may say it is based upon a logical argument’, for surely the wrongful intention is not stronger than actual uncleanness! And if one limb became unclean is the whole unclean? ‘Or you may say it is based upon a verse’, for it is written, And the soul that eateth of it shall bear his iniquity, that is, of it but not of any other part. R. Nahman raised an objection against R. Huna from the following: ‘There is never the penalty of kareth incurred unless he expressed an intention which makes piggul with regard to an olive's bulk from both’. Thus an olive's bulk from both, but not from one. Now who is the author of this Baraitha? Should you say it is the Rabbis — but according to them even though [the intention was] in respect of one loaf only [both are piggul]. Obviously then it is R. Jose. Now if you say that they are regarded as one body [there], then it is evident why they can be combined [here].28^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ

^ᵃnote:For R. Jose's reason is not as suggested above, but as given by Resh Lakish infra; v. next note.
^ᵇnote:R. Jose holds that in every offering in which there are two mattirs, a wrongful intention expressed during the service of one mattir with regard to the other mattir is of no consequence; thus an intention expressed during the burning of the handful (the first mattir) to burn the frankincense (the second mattir) on the morrow, would not render the offering piggul.
^ᶜnote:The two dishes of frankincense are the mattirs of the Shewbread, for only after the burning of both dishes are the twelve loaves of the Shewbread permitted to be eaten by the priests. Now if a wrongful Intention was expressed during the burning of the one dish in respect of the other dish (e.g., to burn the other dish on the morrow), it is of no consequence.
^ᵈnote:It is surely an obvious application of R. Jose's principle!
^ᵉnote:The mattirs of the meal-offering, the handful and the frankincense, are of different substances, and it might therefore be said that only in such a case does R. Jose hold that a mattir cannot render piggul the other mattir, but not where the mattirs are alike as in the case of the Shewbread.
^ᶠnote:And the meaning presumably is this: the blood and the sacrificial portions of an animal-offering all come from the one animal; the frankincense, on the other hand, is a different substance and does not come from the meal-offering.
^ᵍnote:This then is the position of R. Jose: a mattir does not render piggul another mattir; yet, says R. Jose, there is a distinction between an animal-offering and a meal-offering. In the case of an animal-offering the blood and the sacrificial portions are one, so that they are not regarded as separate mattirs; and therefore if a wrongful intention was expressed during the sprinkling of the blood with regard to the burning of the sacrificial portions, this would render the offering piggul. On the other hand, in the case of the meal-offering, the handful and the frankincense are two separate mattirs, for they ate of different substances, and are independent of each other, for either may be offered before the other; therefore the principle of a mattir not rendering piggul another mattir will apply.
^ʰnote:E.g.. the two lambs offered at the Feast of Weeks; cf. Lev. XXIII, 19. These lambs are also mattirs, for by their slaughtering the ‘two loaves’ (ibid. 17) are rendered permissible unto the priests. This example is inserted in the text in brackets, but is wanting in MS.M., and has been struck out by Sh. Mek.
^ⁱnote:The handful and the frankincense of a meal-offering were both originally in the same vessel.
^ʲnote:After the burning of the handful the frankincense was picked from the flour and then burnt upon the altar. V. Sotah 14b.
^ᵏnote:For when the non-priest hands over the frankincense to the officiating priest he has certainly reduced the distance of ‘bringing nigh’, which being an essential service must be performed by the priest only, whereas here it was partly performed by the non-priest.
^ˡnote:Lit., ‘its name is bringing nigh’. Therefore even if the non-priest did not move his feet at all, but merely handed over the frankincense which he had gathered up to the priest, this action is sufficient to fulfil the requirements of the ‘bringing nigh’; and therefore if performed by a non-priest it is invalid.
^ᵐnote:V. supra 12a. R. Mari desires to prove from this Mishnah that the gathering up of the frankincense is a vital service.
^ⁿnote:For as the slaughtering separates the blood (i.e. the altar's portion) from the flesh (i.e., the priests’ portion), so the taking of the handful separates the handful (i.e., the altar's portion) from the remainder (i.e., the priests’ portion).
^ᵒnote:Sc. the putting of the handful into the vessel.
^ᵖnote:I.e., the gathering up of the frankincense.
^ᵠnote:Thus between these two services there is at least a point in common, but the gathering up of the frankincense is in no wise comparable with either of these services, and therefore is not regarded as a vital service.
^ʳnote:Offered as peace-offerings on the Feast of Weeks, accompanied by two loaves as firstfruits; v. Lev. XXIII, 17,19. Throughout the whole of this chapter the expression ‘lamb’ refers to this special peace-offering.
^ˢnote:V. ibid. XXIV, 5ff.
^ᵗnote:I.e., if a person while slaughtering the sacrifice expressed the intention of eating the right thigh outside the time prescribed for it, that thigh only is piggul and whosoever eats of it incurs the penalty of kareth, but the rest of the flesh of the animal is not piggul. R. Huna arrived at this by taking R. Jose's view expressed in our Mishnah to an extreme length; viz., just as each loaf is a separate body or entity and the wrongful intention with regard to one loaf will not affect the other, so is each limb a separate body and the wrongful intention with regard to one limb will not affect the other.
^ᵘnote:Certainly not! Of course the limb spoken of here had been detached from the animal.
^ᵛnote:Lev. VII, 18.
^ʷnote:Which was the subject of a wrongful intention.
^ˣnote:I.e., if the wrongful intention was in respect of both loaves, even though only to the extent of a half-olive's bulk of each loaf, they are both piggul and the penalty of kareth is incurred by them that eat thereof.
^ʸnote:I.e., if the wrongful intention was in respect of an olive's bulk of one loaf only, the other loaf would not be piggul.
^ᶻnote:V. our Mishnah.
^ᵃᵃnote:I.e.,that two limbs (as the right and left thigh) are not regarded as separate entities but as one ‘body’ derived from the one animal; so that if a wrongful intention was expressed with regard to one limb both would be piggul, contra R. Huna.
^ᵃᵇnote:For the two loaves are, by reason of the form of the intention expressed (not ‘a half-olive's bulk from each loaf’, but ‘an olive's bulk from the two loaves’), also regarded as one entity. In our Mishnah, however, the two loaves are admittedly regarded as two separate entities, for they were in no wise combined in one, not even by the intention expressed.