Meilah

And moreover it says in the concluding clause: ‘If the blood remained overnight, although it was still sprinkled, the Law of Sacrilege still applies [to the offering].1 This would be right if it related [for instance] to a sin-offering, but if it referred to a burnt-offering. need it at all be stated?2 — The concluding clause obviously supports [R. Giddal's view], but what about the opening clause? As the concluding clause offers a support so will also the opening one?3 But even the concluding clause need not necessarily support [R. Giddal's view].4 — And what would be the difference? — [The disqualification of] leaving the blood overnight is caused by action5 and [the transgressor is therefore penalized in that] the sprinkling has not the effect of exempting the offering from the Law of Sacrilege, but the thought [of piggul] is not an action and the sprinkling has the effect of exempting the offering from the Law of Sacrilege. But may we not say that the following supports [R. Giddal]? [It was taught]: ‘The Law of Sacrilege applies to Most Holy sacrifices that were rendered piggul’. Now, does this not imply even though the blood was sprinkled,6 and will then offer a support [of R. Giddal]? — No, [it speaks of a case] where the blood was not sprinkled. But what would be the case if [the blood was] sprinkled? Would the Law of Sacrilege indeed not apply to it? Why then state in the concluding clause: ‘The Law of Sacrilege does not apply to sacrifices of a minor degree of holiness [which were rendered piggul]’? Could the distinction not be made in the opening clause itself [in the following manner]: The Law of Sacrilege applies [to the offering] before the blood has been sprinkled. but is not applicable after it has been sprinkled? — [The concluding clause] undoubtedly supports [R. Giddal's view].7 Shall we say: Since the concluding clause supports [R. Giddal], so will also the opening one?8 — [No, the latter refers indeed to a case where the blood has not been sprinkled, and the reason why the distinction is not made within the opening clause itself is]: The statement [in the concluding clause] on sacrifices of a minor degree of holiness is absolute, the [distinction] in the opening clause would be, in form, conditional.9 R. JOSHUA LAID DOWN THE GENERAL RULE: WHATEVER HAS AT SOME TIME BEEN PERMITTED TO THE PRIESTS DOES NOT COME UNDER THE LAW OF SACRILEGE, AND WHATEVER HAS AT NO TIME BEEN PERMITTED TO THE PRIESTS DOES COME UNDER THE LAW OF SACRILEGE. WHICH IS THAT WHICH HAS AT SOME TIME BEEN PERMITTED TO THE PRIESTS? THAT WHICH REMAINED OVERNIGHT OR BECAME DEFILED OR WAS TAKEN OUT [OF THE TEMPLE COURT]. WHICH IS THAT WHICH HAS AT NO TIME BEEN PERMITTED TO THE PRIESTS? THAT WHICH WAS SLAUGHTERED [WHILE PURPOSING AN ACT] BEYOND ITS PROPER TIME OR OUTSIDE ITS PROPER PLACE, OR THE BLOOD OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY THE UNFIT AND THEY SPRINKLED IT. Said Bar Kappara to Bar Pada:10 O, thou son of my sister, keep in mind what to ask me to-morrow at the School House:11 Does PERMITTED TO THE PRIESTS mean ‘permitted through slaughtering’12 concluding clause indeed offer a support? — He said: What is the difference? — He replied: The disqualification of leaving the bread . . .’. offering can never assume a sacred character. It therefore supports directly the second part of R. Giddal's statement with reference to sacrifices of a minor degree of holiness. forward by Bar-Pada. of Sacrilege no longer applies to the flesh.