מעילה 21 — Soncino English Talmud

¹You might have thought that the agent had thereby canceled his employer's order and that [the employer] should therefore be exempted from sacrilege. therefore [the Mishnah] lets us know [that this is not the case]. MISHNAH. IF A MAN SAID TO ANOTHER PERSON, ‘GET ME [SUCH A THING] FROM THE WIND OW OR FROM THE CHEST’, AND THE LATTER BROUGHT IT TO HIM [FROM ONE OF THESE PLACES]. EVEN THOUGH THE EMPLOYER SAYS, ‘I MEANT ONLY FROM THIS PLACE’. AND HE BROUGHT IT FROM ANOTHER PLACE, THE EMPLOYER IS GUILTY OF SACRILEGE. BUT IF HE SAID TO HIM, ‘GET IT FOR ME FROM THE WINDOW, AND HE BROUGHT IT FROM THE CHEST, OR ‘FROM THE CHEST AND HE BROUGHT IT TO HIM FROM THE WINDOW, THE AGENT IS GUILTY OF SACRILEGE. IF ONE HAS COMMISSIONED A DEAF-MUTE, AN IMBECILE OR A MINOR, AND THEY CARRIED OUT THEIR APPOINTED ERRAND THE EMPLOYER IS GUILTY, IF THEY DID NOT CARRY OUT THEIR APPOINTED ERRAND, THE SHOPKEEPER IS GUILTY. IF ONE HAS COMMISSIONED ONE OF SOUND SENSES AND REMEMBERS [THAT THE MONEY BELONGS TO TEMPLE PROPERTY] BEFORE IT HAS COME INTO THE POSSESSION OF THE SHOPKEEPER, THE SHOPKEEPER WILL BE GUILTY WHEN HE SPENDS IT. WHAT SHALL HE DO? HE SHALL TAKE A PERUTAH OF ANY OBJECT AND DECLARE THAT THE MONEY BELONGING TO TEMPLE PROPERTY, WHERESOEVER IT MAY BE AT THAT TIME, SHALL BE REDEEMED WITH THIS; FOR CONSECRATED THINGS CAN BE REDEEMED BOTH WITH MONEY AND WITH MONEY'S WORTH. GEMARA. What does he teach us thereby? — That unexpressed words are of no avail. IF ONE HAS COMMISSIONED A DEAF-MUTE, AN IMBECILE OR A MINOR, AND THEY HAVE CARRIED OUT etc. But surely these people are legally not fit to become agents! — Said R. Eleazar: They have the same status as the vat of olives of which we have learnt: From what tree do olives become susceptible to defilement? When they begin to exude, the moisture being one that comes out of them when they are in the vat and not moisture that comes out of them when they are still in the store basket. R. Johanan said: This is to be compared to that which we have learnt: If one placed it upon an ape or upon an elephant, which carried it to the right quarter (and another person was charged to receive it], the ‘erub is valid. Does this not prove that the fact of the execution of the appointed errand alone matters? So in our case: The appointed errand has at any rate been carried out. IF HE HAS COMMISSIONED A SANE PERSON etc. [Does this apply] even though the agent has not remembered? Against this the following contradiction is raised: If the employer remembered and not the agent, the agent is guilty of sacrilege, [but if both remembered the shopkeeper is guilty]. — Said R. Shesheth: Also our Mishnah has to be understood that both remembered. MISHNAH. IF HE GAVE HIM A PERUTAH AND SAID TO HIM: GET ME FOR HALF A PERUTAH LAMPS AND FOR THE OTHER HALF WICKS’, AND HE WENT AND BROUGHT FOR THE WHOLE WICKS OR FOR THE WHOLE LAMPS, OR IF HE SAID TO HIM, ‘GET ME FOR THE WHOLE LAMPS OR FOR THE WHOLE WICKS’, AND HE WENT AND BROUGHT FOR HALF [A PERUTAH] LAMPS AND FOR THE OTHER HALF WICKS. THEY ARE BOTH EXEMPTED FROM THE GUILT OF SACRILEGE. BUT IF HE SAID TO HIM, ‘GET FOR HALF A PERUTAH LAMPS FROM ONE PLACE AND FOR HALF A PERUTAH WICKS FROM ANOTHER’ AND HE WENT AND BROUGHT THE LAMPS FROM THE PLACE WHERE THE WICKS [WERE TO BE BROUGHT] AND THE WICKS FROM THE PLACE WHERE THE LAMPS [WERE TO BE BROUGHT]. THE AGENT IS GUILTY. IF HE GAVE HIM TWO PERUTAH'S AND SAID, ‘GET ME FOR THEM A CITRON’, AND HE BROUGHT FOR ONE PERUTAH A CITRON AND FOR THE OTHER A POMEGRANATE, BOTH HAVE TRANSGRESSED THE LAW OF SACRILEGE. R. JUDAH HOLDS THAT THE EMPLOYER IS NOT GUILTY, FOR HE CAN ARGUE, I WISHED FOR A LARGE CITRON AND YOU BROUGHT ME A SMALL AND UGLY ONE. IF HE GAVE HIM A GOLDEN DENAR AND SAID TO HIM, ‘GET ME A SHIRT^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ

^ᵃnote:Both containing the same kind of consecrated property.
^ᵇnote:According to the rule that the uttered word and not the unexpressed thought of a man are of avail.
^ᶜnote:To buy goods with money which belongs to the Temple.
^ᵈnote:As soon as he spends the money, for the shop keeper at this point transfers it from Temple property to private possession. As long as it is with the shopkeeper, the money is regarded as deposited with him.
^ᵉnote:So does the messenger, v. Gemara.
^ᶠnote:The employer and the messenger are exempted because the Law of Sacrilege applies only in the case of inadvertency.
^ᵍnote:Viz., the employer, according to Rashi and Tosaf., and according to Maim. the shopkeeper who has learned in the meantime that a coin of sacred property is among his money.
^ʰnote:So as to prevent the shopkeeper from committing sacrilege. according to Rashi; according to Maim. so as not to commit sacrilege himself.
^ⁱnote:Lit., ‘perutah’.
^ʲnote:Referring to the first clause of the Mishnah.
^ᵏnote:Toh. IX, 1.
^ˡnote:Food is susceptible to defilement only after it has been moistened with liquid. It is, however, essential that the circumstances are such as to enable one to assume that the owner regards the moistening as desirable.
^ᵐnote:To prepare the olives for the press they used to be packed in vessels until they formed a viscid mass. Previous to that they were kept in baskets. The exudation produced In the vat was preserved. It was advantageous for the owner that such exudation should take place. We, therefore, assume that the owner was satisfied with the dripping of the olives, which accordingly become fit for defilement. The juice produced in the basket, however, trickles down and its formation is against the owner's interest and wish. Thus Maim.
^ⁿnote:We learn from this that the vat may be considered an instrument for the realization of the owner's wish. In the same way are the deaf-mute, the imbecile and the minor to be considered a mere instrument by which the employer's wish is fulfilled. In other words: With sacrilege it is not the act of appropriation that is decisive, but the effect of possessing or deriving a benefit from consecrated things. It does not matter, therefore, whether it be achieved by legally qualified persons or not.
^ᵒnote:Viz., the ‘erub, v. Glos.
^ᵖnote:V. ‘Er. 31b.
^ᵠnote:Irrespective of the instrument by which it was achieved.
^ʳnote:Kid. 50a.
^ˢnote:And only the shopkeeper is subject to the Law of Sacrilege.
^ᵗnote:Belonging to the Temple.
^ᵘnote:The employer, because his order has not been carried out and the messenger. because he spent only half a perutah contrary to the commission he received.
^ᵛnote:Because he spent a whole perutah in contradiction to his commission.
^ʷnote:The employer by reason of that part of the order which was carried out according to his desire, and the messenger because of the other part.
^ˣnote:I.e., your purchase cannot be recognized as a part fulfillment of my order.
^ʸnote:Twenty-four silver denars, v. Keth. 99a, Tosaf. s.v. i,b .

²AND HE BROUGHT HIM FOR THREE [SILVER SELA'S] A SHIRT AND FOR THE OTHER THREE A CLOTH, BOTH HAVE TRANSGRESSED THE LAW OF SACRILEGE. R. JUDAH HOLDS THE EMPLOYER IS NOT GUILTY, FOR HE CAN ARGUE, I WISHED FOR A BIG SHIRT AND YOU BROUGHT ME A SMALL AND BAD ONE. GEMARA. May we infer from this that if a man said to his agent. Go, buy for me a kor of land and he bought only a lethek the acquisition on behalf of the buyer is valid? — I might retort: [Our Mishnah] refers to a case where [the messenger] bought something worth six [silver sela's] for three. But read then the concluding clause: R. JUDAH HOLDS THE EMPLOYER IS NOT GUILTY. FOR HE CAN ARGUE, I WISHED FOR A BIG SHIRT AND YOU BROUGHT A SMALL AND BAD ONE? — [This is to be understood in the following manner]: Because he can say to him, Had you spent the whole [golden] denar you could have bought something worth two [golden] denars. This interpretation stands to reason, for it says [in the concluding section]: R. Judah agrees with reference to pulse, for it makes no difference whether you buy pulse for a perutah or for a denar! But how is this? If it deals with a place where it is customary to sell cereals by estimate, Surely then also in the case of pulse when one buys for a whole sela’ he buys much cheaper? — Said R. Papa: It refers to a place where it is customary to sell it in kannas, each kanna for a perutah, in which case the price is absolutely fixed. MISHNAH. IF ONE DEPOSITED MONEY WITH A MONEYCHANGER, AND IT WAS TIED UP. HE MAY NOT USE IT; AND THEREFORE IF HE DID SPEND IT HE IS GUILTY OF SACRILEGE; IF IT WAS LOOSE HE MAY USE IT AND THEREFORE IF HE SPENT IT HE IS NOT GUILTY OF SACRILEGE. IF [THE MONEY WAS DEPOSITED] WITH A PRIVATE PERSON, HE MAY NOT USE IT IN NEITHER CASE, AND THEREFORE IF HE DID SPENT IT HE IS GUILTY OF SACRILEGE. A SHOPKEEPER HAS THE STATUS OF A PRIVATE PERSON. SAYS R. MEIR. R. JUDAH HOLDS, HE IS LIKE A MONEY-CHANGER. IF A PERUTAH BELONGING TO THE TEMPLE FELL INTO HIS BAG OR IF HE SAYS, ONE PERUTAH IN THIS BAG SHALL BE DEDICATED, HE IS GUILTY OF SACRILEGE AS SOON AS HE SPENDS THE FIRST PERUTAH. THUS THE VIEW OF R. AKIBA. WHILE THE SAGES HOLD: NOT BEFORE HE HAS SPENT ALL THE MONEY THAT WAS IN THE BAG. R. AKIBA AGREES, HOWEVER, WITH THE SAGES THAT IF HE SAID, A PERUTAH OUT OF THIS BAG SHALL BE DEDICATED, HE IS PERMITTED TO KEEP ON SPENDING [AND IS LIABLE ONLY] WHEN HE HAS SPENT ALL THAT WAS IN THE BAG. GEMARA. When R. Dimi arrived, he said, Resh Lakish had questioned R. Johanan: What is the difference between the first clause and the last? To this he [R. Johanan] replied: In the last clause the man's declaration was, This bag should not be spared from a donation to the Temple. When Rabin arrived he said: He raised before him a contradiction between the case of the pocket and that of the oxen. For we have learnt: If one said, I dedicate one of my oxen to the Temple, and he had two oxen, the larger one becomes sacred. To this the other re plied: In the last clause the man's declaration was, ‘this bag shall not be spared from a donation to the Temple’.^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ^ᵃʰ^ᵃⁱ^ᵃʲ^ᵃᵏ^ᵃˡ^ᵃᵐ^ᵃⁿ^ᵃᵒ^ᵃᵖ^ᵃᵠ^ᵃʳ^ᵃˢ^ᵃᵗ^ᵃᵘ^ᵃᵛ^ᵃʷ

^ᶻnote:Twelve silver denars.
^ᵃᵃnote:Viz., the last instance of the Mishnah where we read that according to the first Tanna the messenger is regarded as having acted on behalf of the employer with regard to a part of the commission.
^ᵃᵇnote:A piece of land which requires a kor (measure) of seed. It is usually valled Beth-Kor.
^ᵃᶜnote:I.e., half a kor.
^ᵃᵈnote:V. Keth. 98a.
^ᵃᵉnote:It is because the employer has obtained an article of the required quality that the commission is considered partly fulfilled.
^ᵃᶠnote:Thus cur. edd., a version which renders the discussion which follows incomprehensible. The Gemara in Keth reads ‘at least two denars’ and Tosaf. there understands this as follows: Had the messenger bought for the whole denar he would have got something worth more than two denars, because things are cheaper when bought in big quantities. The profit of the employer would then have been also relatively higher. This loss cannot be remedied, for even if the messenger bought now goods for another half denar at the same price, the extra profit over and above two denars would not materialize. Tosaf. quotes also a version which reads explicitly ‘more than two denars’.
^ᵃᵍnote:To be found in the Tosef. II. The bracketed words are rightly deleted by Sh. Mek.
^ᵃʰnote:There is no reduction when buying a large quantity. The employer had therefore no loss when the messenger spent only half a denar. The owner's order is therefore to be considered as partly fulfilled, and he is liable to the law of sacrilege.
^ᵃⁱnote:A certain measure.
^ᵃʲnote:With no reduction for larger quantities.
^ᵃᵏnote:Belonging to the Temple.
^ᵃˡnote:Or a banker, without telling him that the money was from sacred property.
^ᵃᵐnote:According to Rashi the depositor is guilty, while Maim. holds that both are exempted.
^ᵃⁿnote:Lit. , ‘householder’.
^ᵃᵒnote:V. Gemara infra as to the difference between this form of promise and the previous.
^ᵃᵖnote:From Palestine.
^ᵃᵠnote:Viz., that which forms the subject of the dispute between R. Akiba and the Sages.
^ᵃʳnote:Why does R. Akiba differ from the Sages in the first clause and agree with them in the last?
^ᵃˢnote:It is assumed that the last perutah was meant.
^ᵃᵗnote:Resh Lakish's.
^ᵃᵘnote:R. Johanan.
^ᵃᵛnote:Men. 108b; from which it is inferred that if, however, both oxen were equal the one that is met first is considered sacred, while in the last clause of the Mishnah we learn that one can fulfil such a promise with the last perutah. Thus Rashi. Tosaf. explains the contradiction as follows: Why not say also in the last instance of our Mishnah that the biggest coin in the pocket should become sacred. Apparently Tosaf. read ‘coin’ instead of PERUTAH’ in the last clause of the Mishnah, or PERUTAH should be understood in its general significance as money.
^ᵃʷnote:Viz., R. Johanan.