Makkot

because this was [transgressing] a prohibition without [tangible] action [on his part],1 and a prohibition [contravened] without [tangible] action does not involve a flogging. Resh Lakish [on the other hand] says he is not flogged, because the warning in this case is dubious [in character]2 and a dubious warning is not [legally] regarded as a warning. And both base their views on statements of R. Judah's,3 as it is taught: And ye shall let nothing of it remain until the morning; but that which remaineth of it till the morning ye shall burn with fire.4 Scripture comes here providing a [positive] act to follow [in the wake of] a prohibition,5 thereby indicating that here no flogging is to be inflicted: these are the words of R. Judah; [etc.].6 Now R. Johanan argues thus: The reason [why no flogging is given here] is [only] because Scripture comes [with the direction of a positive act after the contravened prohibition]; but if Scripture had not come [and made here] this special provision, he [the offender] would have been given a flogging;7 this implies that a dubious warning is [legally] a warning.8 Resh Lakish [on the other hand] argues thus: The reason [that no flogging is given here] is because Scripture comes [with the direction of a positive act as following the contravened prohibition]; but if Scripture had not come [and made such provision here], he would receive a flogging; this implies that a prohibition [contravened] without [tangible] action entails a flogging.9 But according to R. Simeon b. Lakish, surely this too also is a [good] instance of dubious warning?10 — He bases his view [on this point] on another statement of R. Judah's, as it is taught: If one [maliciously] wounded first one husband [of his mother's] and then the other husband [of hers],11 or invoked a Divine imprecation,12 first on the one and then on the other, or wounded them both simultaneously, or cursed them both simultaneously, he is liable.13 R. Judah says, of [he did so] to both simultaneously,14 he is liable; if to one after the other, he is not liable. 15 And according to R. Johanan surely this too is a [good] instance of a prohibition [contravened] without [tangible] action?16 — On this [particular] point, his [R. Johanan's] view is in accordance with what R. Idi b. Abin stated, in the name of R. Amram who reported R. Isaac as reporting R. Johanan to have said that R. Judah, citing the name of R. Jose the Galilean, said: ‘In all prohibitions of the Torah, a prohibition involving [tangible] action entails a flogging; a prohibition not involving [tangible] action, does not entail a flogging, save in the case of one who takes an oath [and does not fulfil it];17 one who commutes [one gift promised to the Sanctuary with another]18 or invokes a Divine imprecation on his fellow.’19 Then, is not one statement of R. Judah contradicting another!20 — [The divergence in the statements] of R. Judah's according to R. Simeon b. Lakish [on the question of a dubious warning] may be taken as two [different] versions21 of R. Judah's [original] statement; again, [the divergence in R. Judah's statements] according to R. Johanan is not difficult to explain, as one may be taken as his own [R. Judah's] view and the other as that of his Master [R. Jose the Galilean]. We learnt elsewhere:22 ‘If one takes the dam with the young, R. Judah says he is flogged,23 and he does not send the dam free; but the Sages say that he lets the dam go,24 and receives no flogging. This is the general principle, Whenever a negative command involves the fulfilment of a positive action25 there is no flogging for contravention.’ R. Johanan observed: We have only this instance and one other.26 R. Eleazar asked him: Where? — When you find it [you will know], was the reply. He left him, made careful search and found [the following], as it is taught: A Ravisher who put away his wife [by divorce], if he be a [lay] Israelite, takes her back without receiving a flogging; if he be a priest, he receives flogging27 but does not take her back. Now this accords well on the view that teaches [the flogging depends on] whether the transgressor had carried out,28 or not carried out [the act of redress];29 but what about the view that teaches that [it depends on] whether he has nullified, or not nullified [his chance of making redress]?30 [True,] this [principle] applies well enough to the case of sending away the dam;31 but in the case of the Ravisher, how is the principle ‘whether he had nullified, or had not nullified [his chance of making redress]’ applicable? If [for instance], he killed his wife, he is liable to the severer penalty [of death]!32 — R. Shimi of Mahuza suggested that, for instance, he accepted on her behalf a betrothal token33 from another man. Said Rab: [Let us see:] If she had made him34 her attorney, it is the woman who nullified [the chance of] redress; and if she had not made him her attorney — can he do anything of the kind? It would be futile [on his part]! — But said R. Shimi of Nehardea: [Let us say,] for instance, that he took a solemn vow publicly [that he would never again live with her]. That [suggestion] is compatible with the opinion held that a vow made publicly is not subject to [formal] rescission; but, according to the opinion that a vow made publicly is subject to [formal] rescission,35 what can you then say? — That he made it dependent on the consensus of the public, as Amemar stated: The law is that a vow made in public is subject to [formal] rescission, but if made dependent on the consensus of the public, it is not subject to [formal] rescission.36 And are there not other instances? (Mnemonic: Larceny, Pledge, Corner.) There is the case of Larceny, where the All-Merciful ordained, Thou shalt not oppress [withhold from] thy neighbour nor rob him,37 and then [elsewhere] directs, That he shall restore that which he took by robbery!38 Then again, there is the case of the Pledge, where the All-Merciful ordained, Thou shalt not go into his house to fetch his pledge, and then [follows], Thou shalt stand without . . . thou shalt surely restore to him the pledge when the sun goeth down!39 And do not these instances fit equally well [if we say that the flogging depends on] whether the transgressor has carried out, or not carried out [the act of redress], or whether he had nullified or not nullified [his chance of making redress]?40 — [True,] but41 as [amends can be made] here by a monetary compensation [if he destroyed the pledge], he is not liable to both a flogging and compensation.42 To this R. Zera demurred: What if the pledge43 belonged to a proselyte,44 who has since died? inadvertently forgotten or been prevented till the time had gone by. notwithstanding the fact that from the nature of the case the warning must be dubious and indefinite as to the exact time of its application, it is yet sufficient (judicially) for a flogging. prematurely. It was doubtful whether this child was a premature child of the second husband, or a mature child of the first, either man thus being a possible father. The warning that wounding a parent was a capital offence (Lev. XXI, 15), was here a dubious warning, in regard to whom it actually applied, maybe this one or the other. and supra p. 52, n. 1. men simultaneously, one of them was certainly his father whom he injured. dubious warning is considered a warning, why does he not also deduce that a prohibition involving no tangible action entails a flogging seeing that nothar too involves no action?] the respective implications in the statements of R. Judah which R. Johanan and Resh Lakish interpret each in his own way. positive preceding a negative. viz., If you chance on a bird's nest, first, ‘send away the mother bird and take the young’ (positive); next, ‘Thou shalt not take the dam with the young’ (negative). offence, the matter is at an end. fulfilment of the positive command. renders her legally bound as his wife-designate: she can be released only by formal bill of divorce, but even then he could not remarry her (after having become the wife of another man). V. Deut. XXIV, 1-4. by declaring him absolved. Cf. Rashi on Num. XXX, 2 (end) and Ned. 77b. deposit was lost or destroyed intentionally by the thief or bailee so that he can no longer fulfil either the positive commands involved.] Why did R. Johanan say there were only two? everywhere in such cases the offender is flogged and does not pay, the money penalty being merged in the graver penalty; they accordingly omit ‘he is not . . . compensation.’] death the creditor is left without a claimant for damages, the offender should be flogged, as he cannot make amends by compensation. In that case, it would be a third instance.