Makkot

to the original statement [of R. Akiba], namely, ‘that if those [liable to kareth] should resort to repentance the Heavenly Tribunal would grant them remission.’ And in regard to the objection, ‘Now, after all, they have not yet done so [i.e. repented]?’1 [I retort.] The penalty of kareth is not [yet] decided2 [either]. R. Isaac says:3 Seeing that Holy Writ had [already] comprehensively declared all the offenders in unlawful relations to be liable to kareth, what object was there in reiterating that penalty in the instance of [the brother with] his sister? To show that kareth is their penalty, not a flogging. And the Rabbis,4 how do they explain [the reiteration of the penalty of] kareth in the case of [the brother with] his sister? — It is to indicate the principle of Distributive Incidence, as instanced in R. Johanan's statement; for R. Johanan said: The Mishnah5 means to teach us that should one happen to commit all these offences in one spell of unawareness he would [on discovering his error] become liable [to a sin-offering]6 on each act, separately. And R. Isaac, whence does he obtain that distributive principle? — He derives it from [the text]: And thou shalt not approach unto a woman7 [one being] in the separation of her uncleanness,8 [which he takes] to indicate liability for any and every woman approached [while being in that state]. And why do not the Rabbis derive the principle from this [text]? — They do, indeed so. But [if so], what would be the purpose of the reiteration of kareth in the instance of [the brother with] his sister? — To indicate separate liability for the several offences9 — with his sister,10 his father's sister11 and his mother's sister.12 [But] is not that obvious? Are they not diverse persons and of different denominations? — No; [I mean] a separate liability for [an unlawful association with] his sister, who is also his father's sister and his mother's sister.13 And [if you say], how is this possible? — It is possible in the case of a sinner the son of a sinner.14 And this last point, whence does R. Isaac derive it? — He obtains it by an [argument] a fortiori,15 as taught in the following: R. Akiba said: I [once] asked Rabban Gamaliel and R. Joshua at the fair held at Emmaus16 whither they had gone to buy an animal for the [forthcoming marriage] feast of Rabban Gamaliel's son: If one came [carnally] to his sister who is his father's sister and his mother's sister, what is the extent of his offence? Would he be liable once only for the several categories of the offence, or on each count severally? — Said they to me, This problem we have not heard, but we have heard the following: If one had come [carnally] to five [different] women during their term of niddah,17 in one spell of unawareness, [on discovering his error] he is liable [a sin-offering] for each one severally. And the point [you raise,] it seems, may be solved by an [argument] a fortiori [thus]: What say we in the problem of the niddah? That although each error is [a sin] of the same denomination, he is nevertheless liable [a sin-offering] on each act, severally; should he not all the more be held liable on each count where the sinful act falls under three different denominations? And the Rabbis [what say they]? — The [argument] a fortiori is not sound, for how can you argue from the niddah where several distinct persons are involved [to this where there is only one person]?18 And the other [R. Isaac] likewise accepts the refutation of that a fortiori; but he derives the principle of Distributive Incidence from the [redundant] expression of ‘his sister’ in the latter part of the same verse.19 And the other [Rabbis], what [say they] is the purport of repeating the expression — ‘his sister’ in the latter part of that verse? — They say, It lays down specifically the penalty of [a brother with any sister], his sister who is both his father's and mother's daughter, to indicate the [legal principle] that penalties inferred by argument are not sanctioned. 20 And the other [R. Isaac, whence does he derive this21 legal principle]? — If I may, I would say that he derives the penalty from the prohibition.22 Or, if I may, I should say that he derives it 23a); the flogging therefore is the sole penalty to be imposed by the human authority. ‘woman’ thus denotes every individual woman. son Rake II, and Rake II then came to B. B was thus to Rake II his own sister, his father's sister, and his mother's sister. VII, 6, 6). It is identified with Mozah, mentioned in Josh. XVIII, 26, and Suk. 45a; the Jewish colony Mozah (founded 1894) preserves the name anew, and the Arabic name of Kulonieh retains the old name. V. J. Klausner, ,hktrah vhruyxv IV, 236. The puzzling term zhkyht may be here the Greek word telos, ‘a military station’, or company. [For a full discussion of the term v. Cohn, J., Festschrift d. jud. theolog. Seminars, Breslau, 1929, II, pp. 11 ff.] designation. kareth-offences is kareth and not flogging, he cannot use the same again to teach that he is liable for his sister who is both his father's and mother's daughter. sister — i.e. be she half-sister or even sister-german. Just as in the verse laying down the prohibition all kinds of sisters are included, so likewise in regard to the penalty no distinction is made.