Kiddushin

[Again] ‘WHEREVER’ of the second clause includes a proselyte who marries a mamzereth. But if you say that it agrees with R. Jose: ‘WHEREVER’ of the first clause is [to be explained] as we have said: ‘THIS IS THE CASE’ [likewise] as we have said: but what is ‘WHEREVER of the second clause to include?1 — Now on your view, according to R. Judah, what is the purpose of the ‘THIS IS THE CASE’ of the second clause? Hence [you must say] because the first clause states ‘THIS IS THE CASE’, the second likewise states: THIS IS THE CASE. So here too, because the first clause states ‘WHEREVER,’ the second does likewise state WHEREVER. The [above] text [states]: ‘When Rabin came, he said in the name of R. Johanan: In the case of [other] nations, follow the male; if they become proselytes, follow the more inferior status of the two’. What is meant by ‘In the case of [other] nations, follow the male’? — As it was taught: How do we know that if a member of one of the nations2 has intercourse with a Canaanitish woman3 and begets a son, you may buy him as a slave?4 Because it is said: Moreover of the children of the residents that do sojourn among you, of them shall ye buy.5 I might think that even if a Canaanite has intercourse with a woman of other nations and begets a son, you may buy him for a slave; therefore it is said, which they have begotten in your land:6 only of those who are begotten in your land, but not of those who dwell in your land.7 ‘If they become proselytes, follow the more inferior status of the two.’ In which case? Shall we say, in the case of an Egyptian who marries an Ammonitess? What inferior status is there? [The Torah decreed,] An Ammonite [shall not enter unto the assembly of the Lord . . . even to the tenth generation],8 but not an Ammonitess!9 — But [it means] an Ammonite who marries an Egyptian woman: now, if [the issue] is male, he follows10 him [the father];11 and if [the issue] is female, she follows her [the mother].12 WHATEVER [WOMAN] WHO CANNOT CONTRACT KIDDUSHIN WITH THAT PARTICULAR PERSON. How do we know it? — For R. Hiyya b. Abin said in R. Johanan's name, the matter eventually being ascribed to the authority of R. Jannai, while R. Aha son of Raba said that it was eventually ascribed to the authority of R. Jose the Galilean: Scripture saith, And when she is departed out of his house, she may go and be married to a strange man:13 ‘to a stranger’, but not to relations.14 R. Abba demurred to this: Yet say: ‘a strange [man]’, but not [her husband's] son?15 — Of a son it is explicitly written: A man shall not take his father's wife;16 what then is the purpose of ‘a strange [man]’ This proves, [it is to teach], to strangers, but not to relations. Yet perhaps both refer to the [husband's] son, one [treating of it] at the outset, the other, if performed!17 — [That it is interdicted] at the outset is deduced from a wife's sister: if one may not betroth a wife's sister, who is [forbidden on pain of] kareth;18 how much the more so is this of those on account of whom death by Beth din is incurred!19 — Then perhaps both refer to a wife's sister, one [forbidding it] at the outset, the other, if performed!20 — That indeed is so. [Then] we have found [this] of a wife's sister; how we do know it of other consanguineous relations? — We learn then from a wife's sister: just as a wife's sister is distinguished in that she is a consanguineous relation with whom a deliberate offence21 involves kareth, and an unwitting offence involves a sin-offering, and kiddushin with her is invalid;22 so with every consanguineous relation, with whom a deliberate offence involves kareth and an unwitting offence a sin-offering, kiddushin is invalid. Now, as for all [others], it is well: they may be [so] derived; but as for a married woman and a brother's wife, it [the analogy] can be refuted [thus:] As for a wife's sister, that [the invalidity of kiddushin] is because she is not permitted [even] where there is a precept;23 will you say [the same] of a brother's wife, who is permitted where there is a precept? [The analogy with] a married woman too may be refuted: as for these, that [the invalidity of kiddushin] is because she cannot be permitted whilst they who cast the interdict upon her are alive;24 will you say [the same] of a married woman, who can be permitted during the lifetime of him who renders her forbidden?25 — But, said R. Jonah others state, R. Huna son of R. Joshua — Scripture saith, For whosoever shall do any of these abominations, even the souls that do them shall be cut off:26 thus all consanguineous relations are assimilated to a wife's sister: just as kiddushin with a wife's sister is invalid, so is kiddushin with all other consanguineous relations invalid. If so, is known, barring those enumerated in the Mishnah. them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids. Hence, ‘Moreover,’ etc., implies not only of them, but even of the residents etc. Since the members of the seven races are excluded (Deut. XX. 16f), it must mean, not only the pure members of the other nations, but even those borne by Canaanitish women. Ammonitess has no inferior status at all, for she may marry a Jew immediately after her conversion. Jew or a Jewess. But she does not take her father's status to count as an Ammonitess, in which case she herself could marry a Jew. valid. and necessitates a divorce for its dissolution; therefore the other shews that even if performed it is not recognised. strange man’ implying but not to relations, may intimate that such kiddushin is invalid if contracted. But with respect to other relations enumerated in Lev. XVIII, 7-17 in connection with which Scripture does not say: ‘thou shalt not take’ — a term implying ‘betrothal’ — kiddushin with them, though forbidden, may be valid. though if she were not his wife's sister it would be incumbent upon him (Deut. XXV, 5ff.). consanguineous relations?