Kiddushin

to one who is presumed to have brothers but not sons. So we argue. Why should he lie? Why does he say it?1 to free her from the yabam! Then he could Say, ‘I will free her by a divorce [just before my death].’ Now, Rabbi holds that [the argument,] ‘why should I lie’ is as [strong as] witnesses, so that the witnesses come and cancel2 the presumption. But R. Nathan holds, [The argument,] ‘why should I lie’ is [only] as [strong as] a presumption, and one presumption cannot come and completely cancel another.3 MISHNAH. IF ONE GIVES HIS DAUGHTER IN BETROTHAL WITH OUT SPECIFYING WHICH, THE BOGEROTH4 ARE NOT INCLUDED. IF ONE HAS TWO GROUPS OF DAUGHTERS BY TWO WIVES, AND HE DECLARES, I HAVE GIVEN IN BETROTHAL MY ELDEST DAUGHTER, BUT DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE ELDEST OF THE SENIORS OR THE ELDEST OF THE JUNIORS, OR THE YOUNGEST OF THE SENIORS WHO IS OLDER THAN THE SENIOR OF THE JUNIORS, ALL ARE FORBIDDEN, EXCEPT THE YOUNGEST OF THE JUNIORS: THIS IS R. MEIR'S OPINION. R. JOSE SAID: THEY ARE ALL PERMITTED, EXCEPT THE ELDEST OF THE SENIORS. I HAVE BETROTHED MY YOUNGEST DAUGHTER, BUT DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE YOUNGEST OF THE JUNIORS OR THE YOUNGEST OF THE SENIORS, OR THE ELDEST OF THE JUNIORS WHO IS YOUNGER THAN THE YOUNGEST OF THE SENIORS,’ THEY ARE ALL FORBIDDEN, EXCEPT THE ELDEST OF THE SENIORS; THIS IS R. MEIR'S VIEW. R. JOSE SAID: THEY ARE ALL PERMITTED, EXCEPT THE YOUNGEST OF THE JUNIORS. GEMARA. But minors are [apparently] included; this proves that kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse is kiddushin?5 — The circumstances are that there is only a bogereth and a minor. But ‘BOGEROTH’ is taught! — By ‘bogeroth’, bogeroth in general are meant. Then it is obvious: what business have bogeroth [here]?6 — We refer here to where she [the bogereth] appointed him [her father] an agent. I might have thought that when he accepted kiddushin he did so on her behalf; hence we are informed that a man does not put aside something by which he benefits to do something by which he does not benefit. But do we not refer [even] to where she said to him, ‘Let my kiddushin be yours!’ — Even so, a man does not put aside a good deed which [primarily] rests on him and perform one which is not incumbent upon him.7 IF ONE HAS TWO GROUPS OF DAUGHTERS. Now, it is necessary.8 For if we were told the first one, [I would say only] here does R. Meir rule [so], for since there is yet a younger one than this, he calls this one ‘elder’, but in the latter [clause], I might say that he agrees with R. Jose that only the youngest of all he calls ‘young’. Again, if the latter [clause only] were stated: I would say that only there does R. Jose rule thus, but in the former he agrees with R. Judah.9 Thus both are necessary. Shall we say that R. Meir holds that a man places himself in a position of doubt, while R. Jose maintains that he does not?10 But we know them [to hold] the reverse. For we learnt: If one vows, ‘[This be forbidden me] until Passover,’ it is forbidden until it arrives; ‘until Passover shall be’, it is forbidden until it is gone.11 ‘Until pene [before]12 Passover’: R. Meir ruled: It is forbidden until it comes; R. Jose said: Until it is gone!13 — Said R. Hanina b. Abdimi in Rab's name: The passage [on vows] must be reversed. And it was taught even so: This is a general principle: That which has a fixed time. and one vows, until’ — R. Meir said: It means, Until it goes; R. Jose said: Until it comes. Abaye said: The controversy refers [only] to two groups of daughters; but in the case of one group, all agree that ‘elder’ and ‘younger’ are literal,14 [for] the middle one is called by name. R. Adda b. Mattena said to Abaye: If so, when he declared at betrothal that it was the reverse, we believe him; because he had no need to lie, since he could always free his wife from the yabam by a divorce. But the controversy arises where he retracts his words at death. Rabbi holds that the argument whereby we believed him at betrothal is as strong as witnesses, and completely eradicates the general pre-marriage presumption and establishes her as a woman not bound to a yabam. Hence it does not rest with him at death to interdict her. But R. Nathan holds that this argument does not completely eradicate the former presumption. Nevertheless, if he persists in his former statement we believe him; since, however, he reverses it at death, the original presumption holds good, and she is forbidden. is necessary for its corollary that minors are included, thus shewing that kiddushin that cannot be followed etc. But if there is only one, neither the teaching itself nor its corollary is necessary. scope, holds that he intends his words to bear a meaning which can be attributed to them only with doubt; whereas R. Jose maintains that he intends them to bear only that meaning which they certainly possess. interpretations. v. Ned. (Sonc. ed.) p. 191. n. 3,]