Kiddushin

And whence do we know that [a woman may be acquired] by deed too? But may it not be inferred a minori: if money, which cannot free, effects betrothal;1 then deed, which frees,2 can surely tie? — [No.] As for money, that is because hekdesh and second tithe3 can be redeemed therewith;4 can you say likewise of a deed, by which hekdesh and second tithe cannot be redeemed, for it is written, [and if he that sanctified the field will in any wise redeem it,] then he shall add the fifth part of the money of thy estimation, and it shall be assured to him.5 Therefore Scripture saith, And when she is departed [out of his house, she may go] and be [another man's wife]:6 thus ‘be — coming’ [betrothed] is assimilated to ‘departure’ [divorce]; just as the ‘departure’ is by deed, so is ‘becoming’ too. Then let ‘departure be assimilated to ‘becoming’: just as the ‘becoming’ may be by money, so the ‘departure’ too may be effected by money? — Abaye replied: Then it will be said: Money unites and money sunders:7 shall the defender become the prosecutor!8 If so, of deed too it will be said: Deed sunders and deed unites: shall the prosecutor become the defender! — The contents9 of each deed are distinct.10 Then here too, [the purpose of] this money is distinct and that of the other is distinct? — Nevertheless, the impress [of the coin] is the same. Raba said: Scripture saith, then he shall write her [a writ of divorcement]:11 [hence], she can be divorced by writing, not by money. Say rather, she can be divorced by ‘writing’, but not betrothed by writing? — But it is written, and when she is departed, she may go and be, etc., assimilating etc.12 And why do you choose thus?13 — It is logical: when treating of divorce, one excludes [a particular method of] divorce; but when dealing with divorce, shall one exclude [a form of] marriage? [Surely not!] Now, according to R. Jose the Galilean, who utilises this verse [‘then he shall write, etc.’], for a different purpose,14 how do we know that she cannot be divorced by money? — The Writ saith, ‘a writ of divorcement’ — a deed can divorce her, but nothing else can divorce her. Now, how do the Rabbis employ this word ‘divorcement’?15 — They employ it [to shew] that it must be an instrument which [completely] sunders them from each other. Even as it was taught: [If the husband says,] ‘Behold, here is your divorce, on condition that you drink no wine or do not visit your father's house for ever,’ that is no ‘divorcement’:16 ‘for thirty days,’ that is a ‘divorcement’.17 And R. Jose the Galilean?18 — He deduces it from the use of kerithuth instead of koreth.19 And the Rabbis?20 — In their opinion, the use of kerithuth instead of koreth has no particular significance. Now, one could not be inferred from another; yet let one be inferred from two others?21 — Which could be inferred: should Scripture omit deed, that it might be inferred from the others? But as for the others, that is because their pleasure is great! 22 Should Scripture omit intercourse, that it might be inferred from the others? But as for the others, that is because their powers of acquisition are great!23 Should Scripture omit money, that it might be inferred from the others? But as for the others, that is because they have compulsory powers!24 And should you argue, money too has compulsory powers over a Hebrew maidservant25 — nevertheless, we do not find this in respect to conjugal relationship.26 R. Huna said: Huppah acquires [a woman], a minori. If money, which does not authorize one to eat terumah,27 effects possession;28 then huppah, which authorizes one to eat terumah, surely effects possession!29 Yet does not money authorize the eating [of terumah]? But ‘Ulla said: By Biblical law, an arusah30 may eat of terumah, for it is said: And if a priest acquire any soul, the purchase of his money, [he shall eat out],31 and this one [a betrothed woman] too is the purchase of his money. Why then did they [the Sages] say that she may not eat [thereof]? For fear lest a cup [of wine of terumah] be mixed for her32 in her father's house,33 and she give it to drink to her brothers and sisters. But argue thus: if money, which does not complete [marriage],34 acquires [in marriage],35 then huppah, which completes [marriage], surely acquires! As for money, [it may be asked,] that is because hekdeshoth36 and second tithe are redeemed therewith!37 Let then intercourse prove it.38 As for intercourse, that is because it acquires in the case of a yebamah! Then let money prove it.39 And thus the argument revolves: the distinguishing feature of one is not that of the other, nor is the distinguishing of this one that of the other; the feature common to both is that they acquire elsewhere, and acquire here [in marriage]; so do I adduce huppah, which acquires elsewhere40 and acquires here too.41 [No.] the redemption money is dedicated to the Temple. Similarly, if the second tithe cannot be carried to Jerusalem, it is redeemed, becomes secular, and the redemption money is consumed in Jerusalem. — Since then money is potent in respect of these, it may also effect marriage. v. Tosaf. Shab. 128a s.v. i,bu also p. 276, n. 4. Baraitha. necessary for each. Now the Talmud asks, Only two are required then the third follows by analogy: just as the two are methods of acquisition elsewhere, and also in marriage, so is the third. For each effects possession elsewhere, money and deed in ordinary purchases, and cohabitation in the case of a yebamah. desire. bought a Hebrew maidservant, her master can declare that the money paid was for betrothal, even against her will and that of her father. the outset, for in the first place the money is given for a maidservant, not a wife.