Kiddushin

[If his oblation be a burnt-offering of the herd, he shall offer it with a tale without blemish:] he shall offer it [at the door etc.]:1 this teaches that he is compelled.2 I might think, against his will-hence it is taught: ‘with his free will’.3 How is this possible? He is compelled, until he declares, ‘I am willing’. Yet why, seeing that in his heart he is unwilling! Hence it must surely be because we rule; A mental affirmation is not recognised! — But perhaps it is different there, for we ourselves are witnesses that he is pleased to gain atonement. But [it follows] from the second clause: and you find it likewise in the case of women's divorce and slaves’ manumission: he [the husband or master] is compelled, until he declares,’I am willing.’4 Yet why: seeing that in his heart he is unwilling! Hence it must surely be because we say: A mental declaration is not recognised! — But perhaps it is different there, because it is a religious duty to obey the words of the Sages! — But, said R. Joseph, [it is deduced] from the following: If one betroths a woman and [then] declares, ‘I thought her to be a priest's daughter, whereas she is the daughter of a Levite,’ or ‘a Levite's daughter and she is the daughter of a priest’; ‘is poor, whereas she is wealthy’, or ‘is wealthy whereas she is poor’ ‘she is betrothed, because she has not deceived him. Yet why, seeing that he declares, ‘I thought [etc.]’? But it must be because we say: A mental stipulation! — Said Abaye to him: Perhaps it is different there, for it [the ruling] is in the direction of stringency!5 — But, said Abaye, [it is deduced] from this: IN ALL THESE CASES, EVEN IF SHE DECLARES, ‘IT WAS MY INTENTION TO BECOME BETROTHED TO HIM NOTWITHSTANDING’, SHE IS NOT BETROTHED. Yet why, seeing that she declares, ‘ IT WAS MY INTENTION’? — But perhaps it is different there, for since he stipulated, it does not rest with her to set aside his stipulation! — But, said R. Hiyya b. Abin, this occurred at R. Hisda's,6 and R. Hisda [went] to R. Huna's [academy, to discuss the matter], and it was solved from the following: If one says to his agent, ‘Bring me [money] from the window [sill] or the chest,’ and he brings it to him, even if the master says: ‘I was thinking only of this [purse],’7 yet since he brought him the money from this [place], the master is guilty of trespass.8 Yet why, seeing that he says: ‘I was thinking [etc.]ð? Hence it must surely be because we say that a mental declaration is null. Yet perhaps it is different there, because he comes to free himself from a sacrifice? — Then let him declare that he did it intentionally.9 But it is unusual for a person to declare himself wicked? — Then let him say: ‘I reminded myself.’10 For it was taught: If the principal recollects [that it is of hekdesh] but not his agent, the latter is guilty of trespass. 11 A certain man sold his property with the [express] intention of migrating to Palestine.12 He migrated, but could not settle down. Said Raba: When one goes there, it is with the intention of settling, and this man has not settled.13 Others state [that he ruled]: [He sold it] with the intention of migrating, and he has done so.14 A certain man sold his property with the [express] intention of migrating to Palestine. Eventually he did not go. Said R. Ashi: He could have gone had he desired.15 Others state [that R. Ashi declared]: Had he desired, could he have not gone?16 Wherein do they differ? — They differ where an impediment cropped up on the road.17 MISHNAH. IF HE SAYS TO HIS AGENT, ‘GO FORTH AND BETROTH TO ME SO-AND-SO IN SUCH AND SUCH A PLACE, AND HE GOES AND BETROTHS HER ELSEWHERE, SHE IS NOT BETROTHED. ‘SHE IS IN SUCH AND SUCH A PLACE, AND HE BETROTHS HER ELSEWHERE, SHE IS BETROTHED. GEMARA. Now, we learned the same of divorce: If he says: ‘Give my wife a divorce in such and such a place,’ and it is given to her elsewhere, it is invalid. ‘She is in such and such a place,’ and it is given to her elsewhere, it is valid. And both are necessary. For if we were informed this of kiddushin, where he comes to unite her to himself,18 [he may have thought:] ‘in this place I am popular and nothing will be said against me, but in that place I am hated and slander19 will be piled up against me.’20 But in respect to divorce, seeing that he comes to drive her away, I might argue that he does not care.21 And if we were informed this of divorce, [I might argue] in this place he is willing to be disgraced, but not in the other; [whereas] in respect to betrothal, I might argue that he does not care. Thus [both are] necessary. MISHNAH. IF HE BETROTHS A WOMAN ON CONDITION THAT SHE HAS NO VOWS UPON HER, AND IT IS FOUND THAT SHE HAS, SHE IS NOT BETROTHED, IF HE MARRIES HER22 UNCONDITIONALLY, AND IT WAS FOUND SHE HAD VOWS UPON HER, SHE IS DIVORCED23 WITHOUT HER KETHUBAH.24 [IF HE BETROTHS HER] ON CONDITION THAT SHE HAS NO BLEMISHES, AND BLEMISHES ARE FOUND IN HER, SHE IS NOT BETROTHED. IF HE MARRIES HER UNCONDITIONALLY AND BLEMISHES ARE FOUND IN HER, SHE IS DIVORCED WITHOUT HER KETHUBAH. ALL BLEMISHES WHICH INCAPACITATE PRIESTS [TO SERVE AT THE ALTAR] RENDER WOMEN UNFIT.25 GEMARA. And we learned this likewise [in the tractate] on Kethuboth.26 Here he [the Tanna] desires [to give the ruling on] betrothal, and settlements are taught incidentally to betrothal. There settlements are necessary [to be dealt with], and betrothal is taught incidentally to settlements. MISHNAH. IF HE BETROTHS TWO WOMEN WITH THE VALUE OF A PERUTAH, OR ONE WOMAN WITH LESS THAN A PERUTAH'S WORTH, EVEN IF HE SUBSEQUENTLY SENDS GIFTS,27 she is not free to remarry. Nevertheless, if she accepts kiddushin from another, she may be betrothed to the second, the betrothal of the first being null on account of the mental condition, and so she will require a divorce from both. trespass-offering. Now, if this is done through an agent: if the agent carries out instructions, the principal is liable; if he does not carry out instructions, he himself is liable. (The liability is incurred not for actual use, but for taking it to use it, whereby it is removed from the ownership of hekdesh.) effective, and so we believe him that he meant a different purse; and yet he, not his agent, is liable, which proves that a mental declaration is not valid. V, Joseph Karo on Tur. H.M. 206, and commentaries a.l.] could have gone, e.g., by joining a large company of travellers; hence the sale stands. But according to the second version, ‘could he have not gone,’ it is implied that there was nothing to prevent him. Here, however, there was, and so the sale is null.